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The companion paper to this (Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality) 
argues that a moderate flat-rate (proportional) income tax on capital imposed and 
collected annually has attractive theoretical and political economy properties that 
can be harnessed in actual tax instrument design. This paper continues the 
analysis by specifying in detail how such a tax might be designed.  
The idea of the Dual Business Enterprise Income Tax, or Dual BEIT, is to 
offer business enterprises a neutral profits tax environment in which to operate, in 
which normal returns to capital are exempt from tax by means of an annual capital 
allowance termed the Cost of Capital Allowance (COCA). In turn, investors in 
firms include in income each year the same COCA rate, applied to their tax basis 
in their investments. The result is a single tax on capital income (rents plus 
normal returns), where the tax on normal returns is imposed directly on the least 
mobile class of taxpayers. Labor income continues to be taxed at progressive tax 
rates.  
The paper considers in detail three particular design issues. First, because 
labor is taxed at progressive rates whose top rate exceeds the capital income rate, 
the Dual BEIT must specify a labor-capital income tax centrifuge, to tease apart 
labor from capital income when the two are intertwined in the case of the owner-
entrepreneur of a closely-held firm.  Second, the paper considers the theory and 
practice behind the choice of the COCA rate. Third, the paper specifies an 
international tax regime that should be attractive to firm managers yet robust to 
stateless income gaming. 
Throughout, the emphasis is on developing pragmatic technical solutions 
that are implementable without profound transition issues, that are administrable, 
and that fairly balance theoretical desiderata against political economy realities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
A. From Theory to Practice. 
A companion paper (Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality) argues that a relatively 
low flat rate tax on business capital income, measured and collected annually, is a desirable 
instrument for U.S. federal fiscal policy, and in practical application dominates progressive 
consumption tax proposals. Economic theory does not proscribe taxing capital income, once real 
world considerations like the importance of gratuitous transfers of capital are considered. 
Further, political economy considerations strongly support using a capital income tax, measured 
and collected annually, as an important constituent fiscal policy instrument, both to raise 
substantial revenues and as a targeted inequality remediation device. 
As a proportional tax, a flat-rate capital income tax applies at the same marginal and 
effective rates to both income and losses, thereby preserving the symmetry on which rests the 
theoretical analysis of returns to risk. And as a political economy matter, a flat-rate capital 
income tax measured and collected annually operates as a progressive tax in application: because 
only high-ability taxpayers or those who are the beneficiaries of gratuitous transfers can afford 
indefinite deferral of consumption, the increasing “tax wedge” on savings over time introduces a 
measure of top-bracket progressivity along the margin of time. In other words, what many 
economists view as the fatal flaw of capital income taxation (the increasing tax wedge over time) 
in fact is a feature, not a bug. A low flat capital income rate actually imposed annually may thus 
offer some efficiency gains when compared with an “ideal” progressive consumption tax straw 
man, while still being progressive in fact.  
An annual capital income tax fits with American constitutional constraints that would 
bedevil an annual wealth tax. Further, it is more robust to legislative panic (or pandering) in the 
face of recessions or other developments than is any system (including the estate tax) that relies 
on collecting tax decades in arrears. The 2004 tax holiday for “repatriating” offshore low-taxed 
earnings held by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms demonstrates the fragility of 
any taxing scheme that allows inchoate tax liabilities to accrue over long time periods;1 like a 
reservoir behind a dam, all those contingent tax revenues can be flooded away in a single breach 
of the system. 
Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality explains the desirability of imposing a flat rate 
tax on all instances of business capital income, measured and collected annually, notwithstanding 
                                                 
1 Section 965 (2004). 
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the obvious point that economic rents in theory can bear much higher tax rates without inducing 
deadweight loss.  
A flat rate structure has the great advantage of symmetry in the rate imposed on losses 
and gains of differing magnitudes, measured ex post: this is an essential feature if the resulting 
tax is not to distort ex ante investment decisions. As described in Part IV and in the companion 
article, the entire theory of why a cash flow tax operates to exempt normal returns from tax is 
that the expensing of investment makes the government an undivided proportional co-investor in 
that investment: a progressive tax structure destroys that neutral co-investment ex post, and 
therefore burdens investment decisions, ex ante. 
 And while the case for a higher tax rate on rents is easy to make in theory, it is difficult 
to implement in practice, particularly when one remembers that firms and investors in those 
firms make investment decisions at different points in time. A firm might capture economic rents 
through the extension of its market-dominant core intangibles, but to a late-arriving investor in 
the firm’s stock, those firm-level rents would be priced as normal returns.2 
A flat rate tax on business capital income is an incremental extension of current tax 
policies, and thus minimizes transition issues and dislocations to asset prices. By taxing all 
business capital income in whatever form derived (that is, regardless of entity type, form of 
financing or nature of industry) in a consistent manner, such a tax also minimizes allocative 
distortions resulting from current law’s uneven application of capital taxation.  
Finally, there is no reason, beyond pure coincidence, why an ideal income tax should 
burden labor income and capital income under the identical rate schedule. The elasticities of 
labor and capital taxable income, and the elasticities of real labor and capital supply in the face 
of taxation, are not identical to one other, and the role played by each in the economy and in 
social structures also differ. As suggested above, a flat (proportional) tax on capital income will 
operate as progressive along the relevant margin of time, but that reasoning does not extend to 
labor income. From the other direction, and particularly in light of the relatively inelastic real 
labor responses to tax rates in the range with which we have recent experience, an explicit 
progressive tax rate structure on labor income both raises substantial revenues and can do so in a 
way that satisfies political economy redistribution concerns.  
This Article takes both the reasoning and the conclusions of Capital Taxation in an Age 
of Inequality as prologue, and extends that paper by specifying in reasonable detail the design of 
the flat rate, uniformly-applied capital income tax that I have in mind. The proposed tax – called 
the Dual Business Enterprise Income Tax, or Dual BEIT (where “BEIT” is pronounced “bite,” as 
in a tax bite) – builds on earlier work of mine, but is substantially amended and restated from its 
earliest iterations.  
                                                 
2 Capital Taxation in an Age of Uncertainty, Section ___. 
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The BEIT half of the Dual BEIT is a robust technology for measuring explicit returns to 
capital, but is agnostic about tax rates, and does not by itself address the issue of labor income 
masquerading as capital income. Dual income tax learning adds a conscious commitment to 
different tax rates on capital and labor income – for example, 25 percent on the former and 40 
percent on the latter (ignoring lower tax rate brackets on lower incomes) Marrying the two 
themes yields the Dual BEIT. 
U.S. academic and policy circles are awash in proposals that generally might fall under 
the rubric of business tax reform. The Dual BEIT differs from some competing ideas in its 
breadth, as it covers all forms of business organization and all forms of financing a business, in 
its depth, in that it encompasses and coordinates firm and investor taxation, and in its 
practicality, as it requires very little by way of new information exchange or collection.  
More generally, it is incumbent on proponents of new tax structures intended for actual 
implementation to specify their proposals in sufficient detail that their operation and 
administrability can be assessed. This is surprisingly difficult work, and while that work might 
be described by some as tax engineering rather than physics (or mere lawyers’ work, to put 
things more directly), it is what separates tax policy chatter from feasible legislation. Some 
proposals currently in the marketplace of tax policy ideas do not satisfy this standard, and remain 
largely abstractions.  
This Article therefore describes the Dual BEIT sufficiently that its operation and practical 
implications are laid bare; I think of the Article as a preliminary term sheet from which a first 
draft of legislation could be produced. In doing so, there is a risk that readers will confuse some 
of the inevitable design details with conceptual complexity, or a detail as to which they might 
come to a different conclusion as evidence that the entire structure is faulty. I ask such readers 
for forbearance, and urge that this effort to think through important design details not be held 
against the Dual BEIT when compared to other ideas whose detailed implementations remain 
unexplored.  
 
B. Capital Income is the Issue. 
1. Capital Income Taxation Today. In policy circles today, “corporate” or alternatively 
“business” income tax reform is a hot topic. But “business income” is an underspecified tax 
concept, and reform proposals often are framed so narrowly as to vitiate their own objectives. 
The challenge in designing a “business income” tax is to measure comprehensively and tax 
consistently taxpayers’ returns on the capital they invest in businesses of all shapes and sizes, 
regardless of legal labels or traditional accounting norms.  
When policymakers speak of business income, therefore, what they should mean is 
capital income from business investment. Only a holistic focus on capital income can lead to 
consistent tax burdens on that income, regardless of the formal labels attached to its different 
practical iterations (the entity vs. its stakeholders, debt vs. equity, and so on).  
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As in Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality, I use the term “capital income” here to 
comprise all returns to capital, in the narrow, traditional sense of that term.3 Capital income 
includes, by way of example, interest and dividend income, property rental income, royalties, 
capital gains and the imputed rental income of owner-occupied housing. Capital income also 
includes most net business income. Firms bring both labor and capital to bear in generating net 
income; at least in the case of publicly held corporations, however, the labor component is fully 
compensated and deducted from the business tax base. As a result, the remaining business tax 
base contains only capital income. (The problem of the closely held business, whose  owner-
entrepreneur puts both her own capital and her labor to work, and where the net income of the 
firm cannot through simple inspection be divided into labor and capital income components, is 
addressed through the new “labor-capital income centrifuge” discussed later in this Article.)  
The standard presentation in the legal tax literature basically divides the returns to capital 
into three categories.4 First are “normal” returns, usually (incompletely) explained as the pure 
return to waiting, or time-value-of-money returns. These are usually presented as the core risk-
free return from postponing consumption of one’s wealth. that one might expect to earn, for 
example, by investing in a Treasury bond. As discussed in Part IV, however, this is an 
incomplete formulation: normal returns also include ex-ante returns to risk, where those risk 
opportunities are replicable – that is, where an investment can be described as a marginal 
investment. To an economist, all business capital earns at least a normal return. 
The standard presentation next describes risky returns, the higher returns that one expects 
to obtain as compensation for accepting the risk of uncertain rewards. From an ex ante 
perspective, risky returns are measured by the risk premium associated with an investment, as 
reflected in its expected return less the risk-free normal return. Actual ex post risky returns, of 
course, will vary considerably from this expected return, and often will be negative. Part IV 
argues that ex ante returns to risk – that is, a firm’s set of marginal investment opportunities – in 
fact constitute (risk adjusted) normal returns. The concept of “risky” returns might better be 
limited either to returns to true uncertainty,5 or to ex post returns to risk, because tax systems 
generally operate ex post. One of the great difficulties in designing an income tax on capital is 
                                                 
3 Thus, as used in both Articles the term “capital” does not include human capital. 
4 John R. Brooks II, Taxation, Risk and Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns to Risk Under a Normative 
Income Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 255, 261 n. 25 (2013); David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. 
REV. 1 (2004); Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 
91 (2004); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal 
Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-
Bearing Under Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879 (2006); Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of 
Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAX. L. REV. 17 (1996); Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. 
Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993); Edward D. Kleinbard, Designing an 
Income Tax on Capital, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle 
eds., 2007). 
5 See Capital Taxation in an Age of Uncertainty, Section __. 
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ensuring that the taxation of ex post returns to risk does not distort ex ante marginal investment 
decisions.  
Finally, taxpayers also can earn “economic rents” or “inframarginal returns” – the 
supersized returns that come from a unique and exclusive market position or asset, such as a 
valuable patent or trade name.6 Rental income from renting an undeveloped lot for use as a 
parking lot typically would represent a normal return on one’s capital; economic rents, by 
contrast, are jumbo returns that are not attributable simply to taking on large quanta of risk.  
As in the companion Article, the phrase “capital income” here includes all returns to 
capital. Net business income after accounting for labor inputs is simply one important instance of 
capital income, not a separate type, and typically would comprise all of normal returns, ex-post 
returns to risk, and rents. I follow economists in using the word “profits” to mean returns over 
and above risk-adjusted ex ante normal returns.7 This means that in ideal implementations the 
term encompasses only economic rents (again, when measured from an ex ante perspective). 
Economists often equate capital (and therefore the measurement of returns to capital) 
with “real” assets employed in a business, by which they mean investments in tangible, greasy 
machinery, or buildings, or land, or even intangible assets like patents, trademarks, or goodwill, 
but not financial assets such as stocks and bonds. But at a more practical level, any income tax 
must address the fact that capital income is earned in respect of investments in both real assets 
and financial assets that, in the broadest sense, are indirect claims on those real assets.  
Coordinating the taxation of returns to real and financial assets is one of the great 
challenges in designing an income tax on capital. For example, a corporate income tax reform 
proposal that does not consider the impact of the taxation of dividends and interest paid by the 
corporation to ultimate individual stakeholders, or the impact of capital gains realized on a sale 
or other disposition of an interest in a firm, fails ab initio in constructing a coherent business 
capital income tax. Therefore, throughout this paper, “capital” comprises both real and financial 
assets. 
As briefly summarized in Part IV, and as is well known, the standard presentation in the 
literature is that the difference between a capital income tax and a profits tax (including a cash 
flow tax or a consumption tax) is that only the former burdens normal returns. The standard 
presentation concludes that both burden economic rents, and that neither burdens pure returns to 
risk. Because the Dual BEIT is intended to operate as a capital income tax, its success will be 
measured as a function of its ability to measure and tax normal returns accurately. As the next 
subsection suggests, in practice this is a low bar to clear.  
                                                 
6 Robert H. Wessel, A Note on Economic Rent, 57 American Economic Review 1221, 1223 (1967) (“The traditional 
rent concept also allows to divide, conceptually at least, factor compensation into two parts, payments which induce 
factors to work and surplus which only confers a greater reward for work which would have been done anyway.”). 
 
7 E.g., Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence with Excess Profits (unpublished manuscript). 
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2. Capital and Labor Income Taxation in Practice. There are only two important kinds of 
income: returns from labor and returns from capital. When tax law professors in the United 
States teach Tax 1, we like to discuss cases involving cash stuffed into a piano bought at a 
second-hand shop, or treasure trove, but these are not important contributors to economic output.  
I submit that we know a good deal about how to tax labor income, and in general do a 
pretty good job of it. If we fail, we do so largely by choice. (The mischaracterization under U.S. 
law of “carried interest” as capital income is an obvious example.) But when it comes to taxing 
capital income, we perform very poorly. We are inconsistent in how we measure capital income, 
depending on the formal labels that different investments take, and we likewise are inconsistent 
in the tax rates we apply to that capital income that does come to our attention.  
In brief, capital income taxation in the United States today is incoherent in both theory 
and application.8  The United States taxes returns to capital at wildly varying rates, depending 
on such factors as accidents of history (the form in which a business might originally have been 
organized or capitalized), purely formal distinctions (the labeling of an investment as debt 
or equity), divergences between tax and economic depreciation, accidents in the timing of sales 
of financial or real assets, and the efficiency of the capital markets in matching tax-sensitive 
issuers with tax-indifferent investors, or vice versa.  The U.S. system for taxing capital income 
is thus fundamentally rotten at its core: it can neither measure nor tax consistently the most 
straightforward returns to real or financial capital.9 
Both the Congressional Budget Office10 (CBO) and the U.S. Treasury Department11 have 
closely studied how the United States taxes capital income in practice. For example, CBO (2005) 
found that the effective marginal total tax rate on corporate income — that is, the ‘‘all in’’ tax 
rate on a prospective marginal investment, including the aggregate tax burdens imposed on the 
interest, dividend income and capital gains of investors, taking into account their tax posture and 
                                                 
8 Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, (The Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution, 2007); 
Kleinbard, “Designing an Income Tax on Capital,” chap. 4 in Taxing Capital Income (Washington, D.C.: Urban 
Institute Press, 2007). 
 
9 Interest income earned by a taxpaying investor is the great exception; those rules are largely rational in their 
measurement of this form of capital income – if inflation is set to one side. 
 
10 Congressional Budget Office, Taxing Capital Income: Effective Rates and Approaches to Reform (October 2005);   
Congressional Budget Office, Computing Effective Tax Rates on Capital Income (Dec. 2006); CBO, Taxing Capital 
Income: Effective Marginal Tax Rates Under 2014 Law and Selected Policy Options (Dec. 2014).  
 
11 U.S. Treasury, Treasury Conference On Business Taxation and Global Competitiveness: Background Paper (Jul. 
2007), reprinted as “Business Taxation and Competitiveness,” 116 Tax Notes 399 (Jul. 30, 2007). The Treasury 
Department has repeated its analysis with more recent data, in The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform: 
An Update, Joint Report by the White House and the Department of the Treasury (Apr. 2016), updating The 
President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform, Joint Report by the White House and the Department of the 
Treasury (Feb. 2012). 
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relative size — was around 26.3 percent, compared with a statutory marginal rate on corporate 
income alone of 35 percent. The effective marginal total tax rate on capital invested in 
noncorporate businesses was much lower — 20.6 percent. That difference alone points to a 
fundamental weakness of the current system, which is the differing tax burden the Code imposes 
on capital invested in different legal forms of business.12  In 2014, another study by CBO came 
to broadly similar results, except that 2014 tax rates were somewhat higher across the board, so 
that the all-in corporate effective marginal tax rate for a firm with a typical capital structure was 
31 percent, and that for unincorporated businesses 27 percent.13  
Second, the CBO and Treasury analyses demonstrates that our current business tax 
system imposes wildly divergent burden on marginal investments depending on funding source 
(debt vs. equity) and asset class. Using just CBO (2005)’s figures, equity-funded corporate 
capital investments were taxed at a marginal effective total tax rate of 36.1 percent (higher than 
the statutory rate of 35 percent because of investor-level taxes), while debt financed investments 
faced a negative 6.4 percent rate — a 42.5 percentage point swing. (A negative marginal tax rate 
implies that the tax system actually subsidizes the cost of the investment.14) And there was a 12.3 
percentage point difference between the effective total tax rate imposed on a marginal 
investment in the 25th percentile of asset classes (ranked in order of tax burden) and that 
imposed on the 75th percentile—that is, between the top and the bottom of the middle half of all 
assets. Again, CBO (2014)’s conclusions are broadly similar, as are those of the U.S. Treasury. 
                                                 
 
12 One can argue that many small businesses are unincorporated and that the rate difference noted in the text in turn 
reflects a congressional decision to tax small businesses more lightly. If that is the justification, it is a poorly 
directed incentive, as the tax benefits from adopting a noncorporate business structure are freely available to very 
large enterprises as well as small ones. 
 
13 Congressional Budget Office, Taxing Capital Income: Effective Marginal Tax Rates Under 2014 and Selected 
Policy Options (Dec. 2014). 
 
14 The 26.3 percent effective marginal total tax rate on corporate investments is the weighted average of those two 
rates, weighted by the CBO to reflect the relative amount of debt financing by American corporations (roughly 41.3 
percent of the total capital invested in corporations). (CBO 2006 at 47.) 
 
The President’s 2016 Framework Update concluded that debt financed investment in equipment faced an effective 
marginal tax rate in 2011 of -60 percent. Presumably this extraordinary figure reflects the availability of 100 percent 
expensing (“bonus depreciation”) in that year. For comparison, the The President’s 2016 Framework Update found 
that the effective marginal corporate tax rate on such an investment was -38.9 percent in 2015. 
 
A negative effective marginal tax rate means that the after-tax rate of return exceeds the pretax rate. The driver of 
this outcome is that the marginal investment in question (typically, debt-financed property eligible for accelerated 
depreciation) generates a loss for tax purposes, which loss is presumed to be used to offset tax on a different equity-
funded marginal investment by the taxpayer. Although the Treasury does not literally write out a check to a taxpayer 
in respect of an isolated marginal investment with a negative effective marginal tax rate, the result is the same, once 
a taxpayer is presumed to act rationally and to pair such an investment with an equity-funded one. CBO (2014), n. 
30, p. 18. 
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And both studies concluded that returns to owner-occupied housing (the largest physical asset 
class) enjoy a negative tax rate environment.  
The usual response is to suggest that the U.S. tax system today is a combination of 
comprehensive income and consumption tax themes, but this simply reduces to an observation 
that sometimes the United States taxes capital income (or some components thereof), and 
sometimes it does not. Moreover, the observation fails to capture the extraordinary variations in 
the burdens that the U.S. tax system imposes today on capital income, depending either on the 
nature of the real asset deployed in a business, or the other, more formal, characteristics 
mentioned above. Most fundamentally, the formulation says nothing useful about when capital 
income taxation should be turned off, and when turned on—and if turned on, at what effective 
marginal tax rate.  
 
C. Practical Obstacles to a Functioning Capital Income Tax. 
Simply measuring capital income is famously difficult in theory, and nearly impossible in 
contemporary practice. To do so requires uprooting at least six deeply engrained practical 
hurdles in our tax system.  
First, we must confront the realization doctrine. The realization doctrine in practice 
means that the taxation of capital gain is essentially optional on the part of the taxpayer. More 
generally, “deferral” (the consequence of reliance on the realization doctrine) directly undercuts 
the entire objective of capital income taxation: it effectively exempts from tax the compounding 
of simple interest returns on an investment held for a period of time.15 
Second, we must deal with the debt-equity distinction, under which completely different 
income measurement tools apply to financial instruments that might be economically similar, but 
that give rise to different formal legal rights and obligations. The tax model treats stockholders as 
the indirect owners of all of a business enterprise, and creditors as simply temporary lessors of 
money. This simplistic model collapses under the weight of overwhelming contrary factors in the 
modern world. Today, it often is not possible to label one financial capital instrument as 
evidencing ownership of the underlying real assets of a business enterprise, and all other 
instruments as evidencing the temporary rental of money. 
The International Monetary Fund, among others, has done important recent work 
demonstrating the systematic “debt bias” introduced by income tax systems that allow 
deductions for interest on debt obligations.16 In light of the large amount of tax-exempt 
                                                 
15 Edward D. Kleinbard,  “Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate Environment,” 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239360. 
 
 
16 IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy, June 12, 
2009; IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (Ruud A. de Mooij, author), Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the 
Problem, Finding Solutions, May 3, 2011. 
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institutional investment, and the ease with which financial engineers can package equity-type 
returns within an instrument treated as indebtedness for tax purposes, tax revenue collections 
suffer, normal returns escape taxation, and firms’ capital structures become more fragile, as a 
result of their appetite for increased leverage. 
Third, we must address the (non)coordination of firm and investor-level measures of the 
same real incomes. One very difficult challenge in designing an income tax system that properly 
measures capital income is to coordinate and allocate tax liabilities at these two different levels – 
the financial investor holding financial capital instruments, and the business enterprise investing 
in real assets and earning net business income – to advance the fundamental objective of 
imposing a single comprehensive and constant tax burden on returns to capital generally, and 
normal returns in particular. The current tax system fails utterly in this critical exercise.  
Fourth, we must address our arbitrary tax depreciation and expense capitalization rules. 
This sounds excessively tedious, but depreciation and capitalization go to the heart of whether 
capital income, in the form of net business profits on firm income tax returns, is accurately 
measured. Systematically measuring and taxing these time-value returns is much more difficult 
than it appears. Much of the complexity of any business income tax stems from this fact; 
proposals that essentially assume away the issue (e.g. the U.S. Treasury’s 1992 CBIT proposal17) 
thus evade the heart of the problem.  
An income tax will properly measure and tax time-value-of-money (normal) returns on 
real assets only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the tax system must develop 
comprehensive rules to capitalize, rather than deduct, expenditures that create or enhance the 
value of a real asset (for example, expenditures to build a factory or to establish a brand name). 
This problem is pervasive in the current tax system, where, for example, all advertising expenses 
are currently deductible, even if they are incurred to develop a valuable brand name.  
Fifth, accepting the conclusions of the companion article that capital and labor incomes 
should be taxed under the Dual BEIT at different rates, we face a new and important question: 
how do we distinguish the two? For example, an entrepreneurial chef decides to open a new 
restaurant. She invests her life’s savings of $500,000, and works there 16 hours a day, six days a 
week, taking out no salary. Five years later, the restaurant is a great success, due in part to her 
culinary skill. What fraction of the current annual profits is attributable to her labor 
contributions, and what to the capital she has invested? When a few years later she sells the 
restaurant, including its name and associated goodwill, how much of the gain attributable to 
those intangible assets is a return to capital, and how much to labor? The latter question is 
particularly fraught, because we know the answer under current law: the entirety of the chef’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
17 Report of The Department of the Treasury on Integration of The Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing 
Business Income Once (Jan. 1992), Ch. 4. CBIT is discussed in Section II.D. 
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gain attributable to those self-created intangible assets constitutes long-term capital gain.18 In 
this way, labor income of an owner-entrepreneur is systematically converted to capital income. 
These points were particularly underappreciated, until the controversy surrounding the 
taxation of “carried interest” received by investment fund managers focused policy makers on 
the issue.19 If capital and labor incomes are taxed on different schedules (which in fact we do 
today, sometimes), we need an administratively reliable means to distinguish labor from capital 
income in cases where the two are hopelessly intermingled.  
The problem is pervasive in small businesses, where an owner-manager earns net 
business income attributable to the combination of her personal effort and the capital she puts at 
risk. So long as different tax rules are applied to labor income and capital income, this 
indissolubly intermingled income is likely to be characterized by taxpayers in whichever way 
minimizes their tax liabilities (currently, as capital income). 
Finally, reimagining capital income taxation requires rejecting many deeply engrained 
modes of thought relating to the institutional foundations of our income tax.  Even without 
regard to the five sets of problems already described, the tax burden imposed on different legal 
forms of conducting a business (for example, corporation versus partnership) is not constant, and 
there is no satisfactory economic explanation for the difference. This failing—the differing tax 
burdens imposed on different legal forms of doing business— is a paradigmatic example of a 
crucial bad habit of thought that is the source of much of what ails the U.S. business tax system.  
Fundamentally, the tax code has always attempted to categorize all business activity into 
a few discrete cubbyholes, each with its own operative rules. These cubbyholes in turn are 
defined by recourse to intuitive understandings of the ideal types of each form of organization or 
each method of raising capital, based largely on nineteenth-century legal, accounting and social 
norms, not economic considerations. For example, the tax code observes that Entrepreneur A has 
organized her business as a partnership, whereas Entrepreneur B has formed a corporation. The 
tax code responds, “The tax model must respect each choice. Rules must be developed for taxing 
partnerships that reflect the nature of partnerships, and different rules must be developed for 
taxing corporations that reflect the different nature of corporations—after all, there must be a 
reason why each entrepreneur chose the form he or she did.” The end result is separate tax 
cubbyholes for “partnership” and “corporation.” 
                                                 
18 The former collapsible corporation rules (former section 341, repealed by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003, repeal made permanent in 2013) stand as a lone counterexample, but probably would 
not apply to the mature business described in the text, and in any event the statute was repealed. It had a loose 
analogy in the partnership tax arena, in section 751’s rules relating to unrealized receivables, but again those rules 
would not reach the intangible assets described in the text. 
 
19 Victor Fleischer, “Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds,” 83 NYU L. Rev. 1 
(2008). The term “carried interest” refers to the shares of an investment partnership’s capital gains that are awarded 
to fund managers in return for their agreement to run the investment partnership; that is, carried interest represents a 
profits interest in the partnership disproportionate to capital interests.  
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The tax code then relies on outmoded norms, not economic insight, to develop the 
substantive tax rules applicable to each conceptual cubbyhole. The resulting rules reflect these 
antique viewpoints by assuming, for example, that partners are closely tied to one another 
through personal bonds, while their arrangements with each other lack institutional continuity. 
As a result, a partnership is not itself subject to tax, but instead is viewed as a simple pass-
through vehicle. 
Over the decades the tax code has extended this mode of thought without any 
reexamination of its premises. As a consequence, today the pass-through model applies even to 
well-capitalized limited liability companies, which, in their protection of investors from entity-
level liabilities and in their governance structures, are indistinguishable from corporations. The 
net result is that a limited liability company with dozens or even hundreds of members (or for 
that matter a handful of corporate owners only) and a billion dollars of annual revenue is taxed 
under the same rules as are two partners operating the local dry cleaning establishment—and the 
local dry cleaning establishment, if it happened to organize itself as a corporation, is taxed as if it 
were Apple Inc. 
The differing taxation of different forms of business enterprises is just one example. The 
same point can be made about most financial instruments, or the poor targeting of preferential 
capital gains tax rates, which turn out to have nothing to do with “double taxation” or the like. As 
one simple example of the latter, when interest rates decrease, the value of an outstanding bond 
increases, because the present value of the future interest receipts now exceeds the rate that 
borrowers need to pay. But when a taxpayer sells a U.S. Treasury bond held for more than one 
year at a profit attributable to just such a decline in rates, the gain is treated as long-term capital 
gain, notwithstanding that the gain reflects payments received today in lieu of future interest 
income. 
This bad intellectual habit of building the tax system on the shoulders of outdated social 
and legal norms explains why the tax code is riddled with so many seemingly inconsistent rules 
for economically similar investments or transactions, and why Congress and tax administrators 
continue to compound these inconsistencies. This mode of thought alternatively bewilders and 
infuriates economists, because it has almost nothing to do with economic logic. Notwithstanding 
this frustration, the phenomenon is real and pervasive.  
 
D. Criteria for Measuring the Success of a Capital Income Tax. 
 
1. An Annual Flat-Rate Tax. Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality recommends a 
capital income tax imposed at a flat rate disconnected from the rate structure for labor income, 
measured and collected annually. Section I.A. has quickly summarized some of the reasoning 
behind this recommendation, and as noted there, this Article begins by embracing this goal.  
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It is worthwhile to emphasize why political economy considerations counsel in favor of 
the annual taxation of capital income, rather than retrospective tax structures that can be 
designed to have the same present value, through the imposition of deemed interest charges in 
the calculation of tax due.20 There are two reasons: one relates to the trustworthiness of 
individual taxpayers to recollect correctly how long they have owned securities (which in the 
case of public companies, but arguably not private ones, is susceptible to third party reporting), 
the other, which to me is the more fundamental, is simply that Congress has shown itself to be an 
untrustworthy guardian of deferred tax revenues. The 2004 repatriation tax holiday is the most 
obvious and egregious example; through that holiday, U.S. multinational firms had the 
opportunity to repatriate to the United States offshore low-taxed earnings at a nominal rate of 
5.25 percent, and an effective rate near 3.5 percent – precisely one-tenth the tax rate that was the 
condition imposed for the deferral of tax in the first place.21  The 2001-3 tax cuts on accrued but 
unrealized capital gains can be adduced as another, as can the one-year repeal of the estate tax, or 
the [one-year] suspension of any limitations on rolling tax-deferred retirement accounts into tax-
paid Roth IRAs.  
A retrospective tax whose measure includes an embedded interest charge compounds not 
only the putative tax bill, but also the likelihood of an escape hatch suddenly opening. Many 
members of Congress are unlikely to understand why a nominal tax rate of, say, 60 or 70 percent 
(or higher) is appropriate for gain derived from an asset held for many decades; indeed, many 
will argue for the opposite result, that the social payoffs to patient investing are sufficiently large 
as to justify lower rates than those imposed on assets held for just a year or two. In turn, the risk 
of a holiday from retrospective tax rates becomes even more acute when one imagines the 
question arising in a year like 2010, when the economy was in the depths of the Great Recession, 
and a one-time tax holiday could be spun as just the sort of economic stimulus that the country 
required. 
 
2. Applied Consistently and Comprehensively. A business capital income tax should look 
past formalisms and apply consistent tax rates to all capital income, however earned. Normal 
returns, for example, should be taxed as such, regardless of whether labeled marginal returns to 
investment in a business asset, or interest income; capital income of unincorporated and 
corporate firms should bear the same tax burdens, and so on. This ambitious goal means that a 
successful business capital income tax system should make no distinctions based on the legal 
type of entity engaged in business, or in the different legal modes of expressing the rights and 
obligations of stakeholders and firms – that is, since debt and equity can often substitute for one 
                                                 
20 Alan J. Auerbach, “Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation,” 81 American Economics Review 167 (1991). Cf. 
James Kwack, “Reducing Inequality With a Retrospective Tax on Capital,” 25 Cornell J. of Law and Policy 191 
(2015). 
 
21 Edward D. Kleinbard and Patrick Driessen, “A Revenue Estimate Case Study: The Repatriation Holiday 
Revisited,” 120 Tax Notes 1191 (Sep. 22, 1998). 
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another in a firm’s capital structure, the tax system should not yield different burdens depending 
on which is chosen, and instead capital structures should reflect non-tax market considerations. 
Because firms and investors are separate juridical persons, all this requires some sort of 
effective business-investor tax integration strategy, so that normal returns, returns to risk and 
rents are each taxed consistently when looking holistically at aggregate outcomes, regardless 
again of the legal form of the relationships or the juridical person (firm or investor) recognizing 
the income. This does not, however, require a formal corporate dividend imputation or similar 
scheme; indeed, many such structures either are insufficiently ambitious, and leave in situ a debt 
bias, or distinctions between corporate and noncorporate forms of business organization, or reach 
too far, and claw back business tax incentives in one context that might be available in the 
other.22 
 
3. A Feasible Labor-Capital Income Centrifuge. Like any dual income tax,23 in which 
capital income is taxed under a different schedule from labor income, the Dual BEIT depends 
entirely on what I term a labor-capital income tax centrifuge – a mechanism to tease apart net 
business income, particularly in the context of an owner-manager of a closely-held business, into 
its constituent labor and capital income components. Part III of this Article proposes such a 
mechanism. To the extent it is adjudged a hopeless failure, so too does the Dual BEIT as 
currently conceived fail. 
A dual income tax accentuates the difficulties in distinguishing capital from labor income 
in appropriate cases, but the issue of course is present in current law, chiefly by virtue of the 
preferential tax rates afforded capital gains. The issue has largely been ignored, as the earlier 
example of the chef who sells her restaurant for a price that reflects self-developed goodwill and 
tradename value was intended to illustrate. The Dual BEIT at least attempts to address the issue 
head-on.   
 
 4. A Featureless Tax Topography.24 Every peak or canyon in the topography of tax 
institution design is problematic: it either invites gaming up to the border between one set of 
rules and another, or it leads to substantially different results for economically similar situations. 
Congress often seeks to grasp perfection, by refining rules for smaller and smaller subsets of 
affected taxpayers, and in doing so is the enemy of the good, because the end result is excessive 
complexity, unintended consequences from the intersection of those complex rules, and 
                                                 
22 Edward D. Kleinbard, “The Trojan Horse of Corporate Integration,” 152 Tax Notes 957 (Aug. 15, 2016). 
 
23 Edward D. Kleinbard, “An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents,” 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 41 (2010). 
 
24 I proposed this terminology in Kleinbard, “Designing an Income Tax on Capital,” chap. 4 in TAXING CAPITAL 
INCOME (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2007). 
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excessively enthusiastic tax gaming. The issue is not simply one of tax preferences: fundamental 
conceptual cubbyholes of current law, like the distinction between debt and equity, are the source 
of endless gaming, revenue loss, and economic distortions. 
The proposals made here, by contrast, draw sharp distinctions in outcomes as sparingly as 
possible. The author is confident that Congress can and will respond to the resulting rough 
justice with ever more reified rules, but there is no tax system that is immune to this institutional 
instinct. The best that can be done is to start with a tax design that relies on as few major 
distinctions as possible, to deny the legislature footholds from which to erect ever more complex 
superstructures. 
Examples of the sort of sharp dividing lines that would prove troublesome in practice 
include proposals that apply different tax systems to public and private firms.25 Section I.E., 
below, considers briefly reform proposals to tax investors in public firms on a mark-to-market 
basis. These proposals of necessity adopt a completely different scheme for non-public firms, 
and in doing so create the potential for distortions at least as great as those attributable today to 
the debt-equity distinction. The growth in private equity firms and similar alternative funding 
sources means that it is not inevitable that a private firm become publicly-listed as the business 
grows; rounds of private investor funding can replace the public capital markets, thereby offering 
successful new firms low cost options to choose whichever tax regime is to their advantage. 
 
5. Resistant to Base Meddling. A capital income tax system should be as resistant as 
possible to Congressional interventions and accretions. No tax legislation can be wholly immune 
to Congressional enthusiasms for tweaks, refinements and exceptions, but experience argues for 
a simple system, even at the expense of perfection. It further argues in particular for a system 
that obviates the importance of depreciation and capitalization, either through expensing or (as in 
the Dual BEIT) an expensing-equivalent deduction. Proposals like the Comprehensive Business 
Income Tax (CBIT), as suggested by the U.S. Treasury many years ago,26 discussed in Section 
I.E., below, rely entirely on a firm’s business income tax base being correctly specified to 
accomplish their economic objectives of imposing a uniform tax on capital income. But this 
requires not only the adoption of economic depreciation models, but also comprehensive expense 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, “How to Tax Capital,” (Feb. 2016) (unpublished manuscript, forthcoming, Tax L. 
Rev.); Eric Toder and Alan D. Viard, “Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues With A Mark To Market Tax On 
Shareholder Income,” 69 Nat’l Tax J. 701 (2016). Gergen’s thoughtful article reviews much of the recent tax law 
and policy literature. Gergen recommends a periodic wealth tax on ownership interests in public firms; Toder and 
Viard are closer to the many proposals that have been made over the years for mark-to-market income taxation on 
the values of interests in public firms. Each in turn of necessity proposes a complementary tax regime for privately-
held firms. In Gergen’s case, for example, that complementary scheme is expressly modeled on the BEIT. 
 
26 Report of The Department of the Treasury on Integration of The Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing 
Business Income Once (Jan. 1992), Ch. 4. 
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capitalization rules. Even the best intentioned of Congresses over the years has found it 
impossible to resist the call of accelerated depreciation, and no Congress has been fully 
committed to comprehensive expense capitalization, as the kerfluffle surrounding Chairman 
Dave Camp’s proposal to capitalize some advertising expenses demonstrates. 
 
6. Extensible to All Financial Instruments. A successful capital income tax regime must 
incorporate rules that achieve the regime’s overall objectives, taking into account the great 
variety of instruments representing claims against firms that are available in the capital markets, 
the ingenuity of those markets in tailoring new instruments to arbitrage tax rules, and the 
presence of exchange traded and private financial derivative contracts that can replicate virtually 
any conceivable capital markets instrument cash flow. 
 
7. Minimal Recordkeeping and Coordination Requirements. A practical capital income 
tax system must be administrable when deployed to millions of taxpayers. This argues that the 
system should keep to a minimum investor-level recordkeeping requirements – particularly 
requirements that might stretch over many years. Current law suffers from this in respect of tax 
basis in an investment, which is essentially irrelevant to most investors unless and until the time 
comes to sell that investment. Relatively recent basis reporting requirements for some publicly-
traded securities – fiercely resisted by the securities industries, and implemented only over a 
painfully slow transition period – point to how information technology can help here, but the 
smaller the requirements to retain information of no immediate application, the better. Further, a 
tax regime should require minimal direct coordination between firms and investors: readers are 
familiar with the nuisance and the anxiety that comes from trying to retain all the IRS Form 
1099s that arrive in one’s mailbox at different times. Again technology could help – that is the 
intuition behind the Ready Return initiative, which would send taxpayers prepopulated draft tax 
returns containing information currently provided to the Internal Revenue Service by third 
parties – but third party information, however communicated, sometimes is wrong or must be 
amended, to the great confusion and consternation of investors.  
For example, pass-through models of business capital income taxation suffer acutely 
from information coordination problems, because it is impossible to allocate the income of firms 
to their investors in real time, yet stocks can be bought and resold in milliseconds. Similarly, 
dividend imputation corporate integration schemes must have in place rules to address 
subsequent adjustments in corporate tax liability after imputation credits have been awarded, to 
handle investors who receive dividends and sell their stock before year end, and so on.  And 
retrospective taxation puts a premium on the verification of the term of an investor’s ownership, 
not just her gross sales proceeds. 
To be clear, none of these issues is insurmountable, particularly in light of the power of 
information technology. But proponents of arrangements that pose these sorts of issues must 
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specify their resolution at a level of detail that permits the evaluation of what these information 
collection or coordination requirements actually would entail in practice, and what tax avoidance 
or arbitrage opportunities they might present. 
 
8. Clear Constitutional and Treaty Compliance. Fundamental capital income tax reform 
is a heavy lift, to borrow an inside the Beltway phrase. Despite bipartisan interest in corporate 
tax reform in particular, neither house of Congress has passed legislation that might fit this 
description in recent memory. Given the political reality that capital income tax reform is likely 
to remain a once a generation effort, it is important that any proposal rest on firm Constitutional 
footings. This calls into question in particular annual wealth taxes and the like, because they 
probably run afoul of Constitutional characterization as “direct” taxes that require apportionment 
among the states, thereby rendering them impossible to implement.27 At a minimum, it is 
incumbent on proponents of plans that raise a Constitutional issue to offer a cogent defense, so 
that policymakers can judge whether the political costs of voting for major legislation with losers 
as well as winners is worthwhile. 
Further, although more controversially, it is highly desirable that any major capital 
income tax reform effort be compliant with the many multilateral trade treaties to which the 
United States is a party, under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. Bilateral tax 
treaties are amended all the time, but the WTO’s networks of trade treaties are revised at a pace 
that makes the Congress of the United States look nimble by comparison. The WTO treaties are 
the foundation of the global economy’s open markets, from which the United States has gained 
much, and contain enforcement mechanisms that have been applied in the past. The United 
States found to its chagrin in the Domestic International Sales Corporation and Foreign Sales 
Corporation cases that the WTO can interpret its treaties in ways that directly reject U.S. 
domestic tax legislation, and in doing so impose fines on the United States, in the form of 
authorizing the imposition of compensatory tariffs by other countries – in the FSC case, $4 
billion of such penalties.28 Again, proponents willing to run this risk have an obligation to lay out 
a legal defense of their proposals, and a workable scenario for what should happen should the 
United States lose the case. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 See Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality, Section __. 
 
28 The history is briefly summarized in David L. Brumbaugh, “Export Tax Benefits and the WTO: Foreign Sales 
Corporations and the Extraterritorial Replacement Provisions,” Cong. Res. Serv. Report RS20746 (Apr. 2007). 
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II. DUAL BEIT MECHANICS – KEY FEATURES. 
  
 A. High Level Overview. 
Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality develops the case for why a flat-rate tax on 
capital income is an attractive policy instrument. The Dual BEIT is the proposed mechanism for 
implementing such a tax.29  The analysis begins with the fundamental observation that the 
difference between a capital income tax and a profits-only tax is that the former burdens normal 
returns, while the latter by design exempts them. How can we systematically tax ex ante risk-
adjusted normal returns, while preserving neutrality in the taxation of profits, in a world of small 
firms and big ones, private and public, partnerships and corporations, debt financing and equity 
funding?   
The Dual BEIT answers this challenge by imposing a profits-only tax on firms, and a 
corresponding tax on the normal returns of investors. The two together sum up to a single tax on 
capital income, because from an ex ante perspective, capital income comprises only risk-adjusted 
normal returns and rents.  
As explained below, the Dual BEIT employs a capital account allowance to create a 
profits tax base for a firm’s business income.30 I use the term “Cost of Capital Allowance” 
(COCA) to describe the Dual BEIT’s firm-level capital account allowance.31  
                                                 
29 I first presented the “Business Enterprise Income Tax” and “Cost of Capital Allowance” ideas in 2007; their 
embryonic form dates back to 1989. Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating The Business Income Tax  (The Hamilton 
Project, The Brookings Institution, Discussion Paper 2007-09, 2007); Edward D. Kleinbard, “Designing an Income 
Tax on Capital,” in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 165, 179 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene 
Steuerle eds., 2007); Edward Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (And Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital 
Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943 (1989).  The details of the Dual BEIT as summarized in this paper supersede those 
presented in these earlier contributions. 
 
For readers familiar with the earlier papers, the major developments include: 
 
• The adoption of the dual income tax structure, in which capital income and labor income are taxed under 
two different rate schedules. As suggested above, this has important theoretical and practical implications. 
• To implement the dual income tax structure, the development of a novel “labor-capital income centrifuge” 
to tease apart the two kinds of income when they are intermingled, as in the case of the owner-entrepreneur 
of a closely held firm. 
• The explicit adoption of a consistent flat rate capital income tax rate on all forms of business capital 
income. This is consistent in practice with distributional concerns and preserve neutrality in the taxation of 
risky investments. 
• A more complete articulation of a theory for taxing the international income of multinational enterprises, 
and its instantiation in the Dual BEIT. 
• The abandonment of a second-level tax on extraordinary capital gains (itself the product of a misguided 
intuition as to the political climate at the time it was suggested).   
 
 
30 “Capital Account Allowance” is the terminology used, for example, in ROBIN BOADWAY & JEAN-FRANCOIS 
TREMBLAY, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR CANADA (Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, 
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 Unlike a standalone profits tax, however, the Dual BEIT is designed as a true income 
tax. The missing piece that must be added to economic profits (rents) to turn a profits-only tax 
into an income tax – basically, normal returns – is accomplished by requiring investors in 
business enterprises to include the same COCA rate, applied this time to their unrecovered 
investments in business firms, in income every year. This is the unique feature of the Dual BEIT: 
a profits-only tax at the firm level combined with a correlative tax only on normal returns at the 
investor level equals an income tax on capital income.  
The “dual” part of the Dual BEIT name reflects the proposal’s debt to Nordic dual 
income taxes.32 Their fundamental insight was that there is no economic or policy reason to 
assume that an ideal income tax would burden labor income and capital income under the 
identical rate schedule; in turn the Nordics developed administratively plausible mechanisms for 
separating capital from labor income in difficult cases. The “Business Enterprise Income Tax,” 
or BEIT part, is the mechanism I developed to introduce a feasible system for taxing capital 
income in a comprehensive and consistent manner. The “dual” component relates to rates, and to 
identifying capital income when it is intermingled with labor income; the “BEIT” component is 
the mechanism for defining and measuring the annual capital income base. 
Dual income tax systems are income taxes that explicitly reject the ideal of a single rate 
of tax on all income from whatever source derived, and instead adopt a two-pronged schedular 
design that imposes different rates on capital income, on the one hand, and all other income 
(principally, labor income), on the other.33 In its simplest form, a dual income tax adopts a 
relatively low flat rate of tax on capital income, and progressive rates on labor income, where the 
highest labor income rate is materially greater than the flat capital income rate, but other rate 
structures are possible. 
Norway has been the leader in designing dual income taxes; over the years, it has 
implemented different systems that alternatively have taxed all capital income at one flat rate, or 
                                                                                                                                                             
School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, Mowat Research No. 88, 2012). Other authors use 
synonymous terms, like “allowance for corporate capital.” For reasons of consistency with my prior work, I use 
“Cost of Capital Allowance” (COCA).  
 
31 Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (And Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance System, 67 
TAXES 943 (1989).  As summarized in note 31 and more generally in the text of this Article, the actual proposal 
made there has been superseded by subsequent work. 
 
32 For  the different iterations of Nordic dual income taxes, see Edward D. Kleinbard, “An American Dual Income 
Tax: Nordic Precedents,” 5 Northwestern J. of Law and Social Policy 41 (2010). Part III briefly summarizes some of 
that paper’s findings. 
 
33 Wolfgang Eggert and Bernd Genser, Dual Income Taxation in EU Member Countries (CESifo DICE, January 
2005), 43 (“The [dual income tax] is a schedular tax regime which divides total income into capital and labour 
income and regards them as different tax bases.”). In practice, a dual income tax can be implemented in such a 
manner that there is no risk of some unspecified type of income failing to be taxed under either schedule. 
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that more recently have taxed normal returns at a low rate while endeavoring to tax economic 
rents at basically the top rate on labor income.34 
A dual income tax, in which capital income is taxed on a different and lower rate 
schedule from the top rate on labor income, brings squarely to the front the necessity of 
developing a new tax tool, a “labor-capital income centrifuge,” to tease apart labor and capital 
income when they are commingled in the hands of the small business owner-entrepreneur (or 
other cases). The Nordic countries experimented with different designs to accomplish this. Part 
III explores this important issue in more detail. 
Dual income tax systems by themselves do not assure that capital income is measured 
accurately. That is, other than in the one area of segregating capital from labor income, dual 
income tax systems by themselves do not define the capital income base. That is the purpose of 
the BEIT part of things.  
The BEIT mechanism is designed to tax at the firm level the economic profits (rents) and 
net ex-post returns to pure risk taking earned by business enterprises, and normal returns to 
capital at the investor level.35 This means that all the components of capital income are taxed 
once, and only once. It is this allocation of returns (normal returns only to investors; profits to 
firms) and the consistent use of the same capital account allowance type mechanism to 
accomplish both these results that are the novel contributions of the BEIT mechanism. 
The BEIT part of the Dual BEIT has only a handful of new components, built on top of 
existing income tax concepts. This should mitigate transition issues, reduce price dislocations for 
existing real and financial capital assets, and make the proposal tractable for policymakers.  
The BEIT mechanism has two irreducible parts. First, it adopts a firm-level profits-only 
tax through a capital account allowance mechanism, and applies that mechanism to all business 
enterprises (other than micro-firms).  
A “cash-flow tax” is one instance of a profits tax, because a well-designed one does not 
burden normal returns. An ideal firm-level cash-flow tax looks very much like an income tax, 
except that firms are permitted an immediate deduction for any business investments that they 
make, and must include in income all returns in respect of that investment, including the return 
of the original amount invested.36  
A cash-flow tax is, however, only one available mechanism to implement a profits tax 
while still preserving income tax-like optics (in particular, annual tax returns that look to receipts 
and expenses to determine a tax base). Another approach to designing a profits tax base for firms 
                                                 
34 Edward D. Kleinbard, “An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents,” 5 Northwestern J. of Law and Social 
Policy 41 (2010). 
 
35 This can also be phrased as taxing ex ante risk-adjusted normal returns to investors, and profits to firms. 
 
36 See Part IV. 
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is to introduce a new tax deduction that is designed explicitly to exempt a normal return from 
tax.37 Under the standard interpretation of the components of capital income, a deduction that 
offsets a firm’s normal returns from invested capital leaves only profits (rents) in the tax base, 
because under the standard interpretation, pure returns to risk, in the form of capital-free bets, are 
taxed neither by an income nor a profits tax. 
These cash-flow equivalent forms of profits taxes rely on a “capital account allowance,” 
“allowance for corporate equity” (“ACE”), or the like, to exempt a firm’s ex ante risk adjusted 
normal returns from tax.38 An allowance for corporate equity, for example, does so by 
combining a firm’s deduction of its actual interest expense, plus a notional deduction for a 
deemed normal return on the firm’s equity capital.  
The ACE in particular is not simply an academic daydream. Several countries have 
adopted ACE regimes as their corporate tax regimes.39 And in October 2016, the European 
                                                 
37 David F. Bradford, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: GOING GLOBAL WITH A SIMPLE, PROGRESSIVE TAX 
(2004), 26-30 
 
38 The term “Allowance for Corporate Equity” (ACE) was proposed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in 1991, and 
Michael Devereux and Harold Freeman. Institute for Fiscal Studies, Equity for Companies: A Corporation Tax for 
the 1990s (1991); Michael P. Devereux and Harold Freeman, “A General Neutral Profits Tax,” Fiscal Studies 12, 
no. 3 (1991): 1–15.  
 
For more recent general overviews of ACE regimes, see Geerten M.M. Michielse, Ruud de Mooij & Charlotte Van 
Peteghem, “Allowances for Corporate Equity,” TAX DESIGN ISSUES WORLDWIDE (2015) ch. 4; Alexander Klemm, 
Allowances for Corporate Equity in Practice (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/06/259, November 
2006);  
 
The BEIT and ACE (or comparable) systems have different agendas. ACE was conceived as an alternative 
mechanism for implementing a profits-only tax: corporations would receive a tax deduction equal to a notional cost 
of equity, calculated in a manner similar to the COCA deduction (applied, however, to “shareholders’ funds,” not all 
assets), and continue to deduct actual interest expense. Distributions to shareholders would in some fashion be 
exempt from tax; like the Treasury Department’s CBIT proposal (discussed in Section II.D.)  the proponents of ACE 
became a bit vague when discussing how preference items would be handled, and capital gains taxed. ACE 
proposals were not intended to advance the taxation of financial derivatives at all. Like COCA, however, ACE 
deductions for notional capital charges corrected for errors in company-level depreciation practices. Devereux and 
Freeman, “A General Neutral Profits Tax,” 5. 
 
Unlike both CBIT and COCA, ACE applied only to corporations and retained a distinction between debt and equity: 
actual interest expense on the former would be deductible, while notional capital charges could be deducted in 
respect of the latter. The limitation of ACE to one class of business entities and the preservation of the debt-equity 
distinction seem to be fundamental weaknesses of the proposal. 
 
39 Croatia was the first to implement a full ACE regime from 1994 to 2000 with a notional deduction for a deemed 
normal return on the firm’s equity capital. Austria had a partial ACE regime from 2000 to 2004, taxing at a reduced 
rate notional return on new equity capital. Italy also implemented a regime similar to Austria’s, in which notional 
return on new equity capital was taxed at a lower rate whereas profits were taxed at a higher rate. Since 2006, 
Belgium has used a full ACE regime with a deductible notional rate of return applied to a firm’s equity, where the 
notional return is set at a 10-year government bond rate, measured as of two years previous to the year in question. 
The history and impact of the Belgian ACE system is reviewed in Jozef Konings, Cathy Lecocq, Bruno Merlevede, 
and Robrecht Vandendriessche, The Role of an Allowance for Corporate Equity for the Capital Structure and 
Employment in Multinational Enterprises: An evaluation of the Notional Interest Deduction in Belgium, KU Leuven 
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Commission announced that it would re-launch its “Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base” 
(CCTB) initiative, this time incorporating an ACE.40 The CCTB initiative is designed to create a 
uniform tax base for all large European companies: each Member State will then set its own tax 
rates to be applied to corporate income attributable to such country under the principles of the 
CCTB. The draft CCTB statute introduces a new “Allowance for Growth and Investment,” 
which appears to operate as an ACE applicable to net new equity (that is, increases in a firm’s 
equity after the effective date of the CCTB regime). The ACE rate will be the European Central 
Bank’s benchmark 10-year bond, plus 2 percent (or 2 percent, if the benchmark bond’s yield is 
negative).41 
The capital account allowance implemented in the Dual BEIT dispenses with a deduction 
for interest, rent or royalty expenses, and instead provides a single tax deduction for all of a 
firm’s invested capital, whether financed through debt or equity. I use the term “Cost of Capital 
Allowance” (COCA) to describe the Dual BEIT’s firm-level capital account allowance. The Cost 
of Capital Allowance is a deduction equal to a statutorily-set rate (as an arbitrary example, 1-year 
Treasury Bills plus 300 basis points42) applied to all of a firm’s business capital, whether actually 
financed by debt or equity. 43  
Allowance for corporate equity (ACE) regimes afford a firm a notional deduction in 
respect of their equity financing, while continuing to permit a deduction for actual interest 
expense. Unlike ACE systems, the BEIT offers the same deduction (the COCA) regardless of 
whether real assets are financed with debt or equity, or for that matter whether assets are leased. 
licensed or owned.44 The BEIT thus removes the temptation to issue equity-flavored debt 
                                                                                                                                                             
VIVES Center (Jul. 2016).   Since 1996, Brazil has used a partial ACE regime where notional interest is deductible 
when paid out to shareholders.  
 
40 The press release  and associated texts may be accessed at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/common-consolidated-corporate-tax-base-ccctb_en. 
 
41 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016) 685, 
(Oct. 25, 2016), Article 11, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_685_en.pdf. 
 
 
42 The reasons why the COCA rate should be a risk-adjusted normal return, rather than a risk-free normal return, are 
discussed in Part IV. It is worth noting here, however, that this is consistent with the European Commission’s 
proposal just described in the text. 
 
43 EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, REHABILITATING THE BUSINESS INCOME TAX 11-14 (The Hamilton Project, The 
Brookings Institution, Discussion Paper 2007-09, 2007); Edward D. Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on 
Capital, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 165, 180-89 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 
2007). See n. 34, supra, as to the continuing relevance of these. 
 
44 Michael P. Devereux, “Issues in the Design of Taxes on Corporate Profit,”65 National Tax J. 709 (2012, and 
Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating The Business Income Tax (The Hamilton Project, The Brookings Institution, 
Discussion Paper 2007-09, 2007) specify some of the difficulties inherent in constructing an ACE to replicate the 
economics of a cash flow tax. 
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instruments, which still remains in ACE systems where the “interest” rate on the hybrid 
instrument exceeds the ACE allowance. It also prevents domestic base erosion through 
intercompany royalty streams within a foreign-domiciled multinational group. 
A capital account allowance implementation of a profits tax further has the advantage 
over cash flow taxes of easier transitions from current law (because existing investment in assets 
– i.e., tax basis – at the time of transition does not become useless in the new regime), and 
because they are less susceptible to windfall gains and losses through the timing of investments 
as tax rates change.45 
At the firm level, then, the Dual BEIT looks superficially much like the current income 
tax. The Dual BEIT taxes all business operations identically, by taxing all enterprises, regardless 
of legal form, as taxpaying entities, and subject to the same rules. The COCA deduction replaces 
a deduction for interest, rent or royalty expenses, and, because it applies to the entirety of a 
firm’s business capital, renders moot for tax purposes the firm’s capital structure or mode of 
obtaining control over real assets. 46 A business enterprise continues to claim depreciation 
deductions, but because those deductions reduce the firm’s capital, the Dual BEIT also renders 
moot the depreciation schedule chosen: at any moment in time, the present value of future 
depreciation deductions in respect of an asset and future COCA deductions in respect of that 
asset sum to the same figure. 
Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality and this paper assume that current law will 
continue to measure the amount of an investor’s non-business interest income, which in turn will 
be taxed at the same flat capital income tax rate as is applied to investor-level business capital 
income. Thus, interest income from Treasury securities would be measured under current law. 
The Internal Revenue Code in fact does a very credible job of applying original issue discount 
principles consistently to such securities. All other instances of capital income (rents or royalties, 
for example) would be deemed to arise in the conduct of a business. 
The Dual BEIT would apply to all business enterprises, without regard to their legal 
form. In the United States in particular, with its profusion of unincorporated businesses, taxing 
all firms as entities is necessary to define the tax base consistently across different forms of 
business organization that compete directly with one another. 47  As described in Section II.C., 
                                                 
45 David Bradford, Christian Keuschnigg & Martin D. Dietz, A Growth Oriented Dual Income Tax, 14 Int’l Tax & 
Pub. Fin. 191, 197 (2007); David F. Bradford, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: GOING GLOBAL WITH A 
SIMPLE, PROGRESSIVE TAX, American Enterprise Inst. (2004) at 28-30; David Bradford, Transition to and Tax-Rate 
Flexibility in a Cash-Flow-Type Tax, in Tax Policy and the Economy (1998); David F. Bradford, FUNDAMENTAL 
ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION, American Enterprise Inst. (1996) at 36. 
 
46 EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, REHABILITATING THE BUSINESS INCOME TAX 17 (The Hamilton Project, The Brookings 
Institution, Discussion Paper 2007-09, 2007); Edward D. Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on Capital, in 
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 165, 180 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007). See n. 
34, supra, as to the continuing relevance of these. 
 
47 The importance of this foundation is described in Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating The Business Income Tax 
(The Hamilton Project, The Brookings Institution, Discussion Paper 2007-09, 2007); Edward D. Kleinbard, 
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below, it also is extremely attractive as a matter of political economy, because firm managers 
will operate under a profits-only (i.e., consumption) tax regime, thereby responding to their 
perennial pleas for a more “competitive” business tax system. Moreover, a profits tax 
environment permits radical simplification of otherwise esoteric corners of the law, like tax-free 
business combinations. 
The second irreducible feature of the Dual BEIT is its taxation of the normal returns to 
business capital investment at the investor level. Unlike a pure profits tax whose base carries 
through to investors (so that their normal returns also are exempt from tax), the BEIT imposes at 
an investor level a tax on normal returns (and no other returns), measured only by the investor’s 
tax basis (cost) in her financial assets multiplied by the same COCA rate used by firms to 
exclude normal returns from tax at their level. The investor tax on normal returns restores the 
combination of the two levels of income tax (firm and investor) to a single income tax on capital 
(which by definition burdens normal returns as well as profits). The investor side of the BEIT 
accomplishes de facto integration and a single level of tax on normal returns, imposed on the 
least mobile class of capital owners. 
More specifically, investors include in income annually an amount equal to the same 
COCA rate multiplied by their adjusted tax basis in their investments (the “Includible Amount”). 
(The recent Dutch “box tax” on financial assets is comparable.)  Includible Amounts function 
much like original issue discount under current U.S. tax law: the investor’s tax basis goes up by 
the amount of her Includible Amount, and down in respect of cash received on her investment 
(e.g., dividends or interest). Cash returns thus are relevant only insofar as they affect an 
investor’s remaining tax basis in her investment. Sales or any other disposition of investments 
(including by gift or bequest) have no immediate tax consequence, but the new owner of the 
investment (whether by purchase, gift or bequest) would take a purchase price/fair market value 
basis in the investment, from which the new owner’s Includible Amounts would be calculated in 
future periods.  
Ideally, tax-exempt institutions would fall under the Includible Amounts investor tax 
regime just described. I recognize, however, that this is not a probable practical outcome. To the 
extent such institutions remain tax exempt, one can nonetheless take comfort in the fact that the 
effective tax rate on firms’ leveraged investments in equipment, where the leverage is provided 
by tax exempts, will have been brought up from negative tax rates (i.e., circumstances where 
after tax returns exceed pretax returns) to zero, and and debt-financed assets yielding economic 
rents will face a positive tax liability, rather than zero. 
Under the BEIT, an investor’s deemed normal return is includible in taxable income 
regardless of whether it is received in cash; more generally, the BEIT ignores actual cash flows 
on financial investments, except to use them as adjustments to basis (cost). Obviously an income 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Designing an Income Tax on Capital,” in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 165, 179 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. 
Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007). Exceptions would be made for genuinely micro-scale businesses. 
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inclusion equal to a specified interest rate applied to a financial asset, which in turn is taxed at a 
specified tax rate, could be reduced to a simple annual wealth tax on that asset, but to deal with 
U.S. constitutional constraints on direct wealth taxation, the BEIT rejects that framing and 
further permits a loss deduction on sale equal to any prior income inclusions not ultimately 
received in cash. This last feature is required to address U.S. constitutional concerns, as 
explained in the companion article. Beyond that, however, the concept of capital gains or losses 
disappears. 
The firm-level profits tax rate and the investor tax rate on deemed normal returns in 
general would be the same annual flat rate (e.g., 25 percent). Labor income would be taxed on a 
progressive schedule whose top rate was substantially higher (e.g. 40 or 45 percent). This 
decision introduces the need for the labor-capital income centrifuge described in Part III. 
Allowances would be made for small businesses (through graduated tax rates and higher 
capital account allowances), and investor retirement plans (subject to a lifetime cap of, for 
example, $1 million). If desired, genuinely micro-scaled businesses with a handful of investors 
could be taxed in the same manner as S corporations are today. 
The BEIT mechanism measures returns to capital consistently, no matter the form of the 
business organization through which they are earned, or the label of the financial instrument 
through which an investor holds her claim. It also automatically coordinates investor and firm 
income, in a manner that is parsimonious with regard to the information that the two must share. 
And the BEIT does not rely on administratively unreasonable mechanisms, like aligning tax 
depreciation with economic depreciation, taxing investors in some firms but not others on a 
“pass-through” basis, or relying on mark-to-market taxation of investors in public but not 
privately-held firms. The BEIT thus contemplates a relatively featureless tax topography, rather 
than one pockmarked by distinctive peaks and rifts, in the form of bright line distinctions 
between different modes of calculating the tax base (e.g., public vs. privately-held firms). 
At the same time, the BEIT mechanism by itself is largely agnostic about tax rates. The 
concept originally was conceived primarily as a vehicle for the accurate measurement of capital 
income, and it can be adjusted to tax normal returns, on the one hand, and rents and risky returns, 
on the other, at the same or different rates, which rates in turn can be the same as or different 
from those applied to labor income. Dual income tax principles and the BEIT thus are 
complementary. The Dual income tax offers a device for accurately teasing apart labor and 
capital income in those cases where they otherwise form an indissoluble matrix, and a theoretical 
hook from which to hang a reasoned view of the appropriate tax burden on all capital income. 
The BEIT picks up from there, and ensures that all capital income is taxed once, and only once, 
through its consistent and comprehensive design of the tax base. 
As just outlined, the Dual BEIT’s basic operation is quite straightforward, although its 
implementation in specific settings (such as cross-border investment) necessarily requires 
additional explication. To make the presentation tractable, Sections II.B. and C. assume away 
some of these incremental issues, in order to present in a bit more detail the application of the 
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Dual BEIT to a publicly-held industrial firm with entirely domestic operations and investors. By 
ignoring the problem of the mixed income of an owner-entrepreneur in a privately-held firm, I 
can defer until Part III a discussion of the Dual BEIT’s mechanism for teasing apart labor and 
capital income in such circumstances. Part IV then considers in detail the specification of the 
Dual BEIT’s Cost of Capital Allowance. Getting the COCA rate a bit wrong is not fatal to the 
tax system as a whole, in the sense that it would still function to a first approximation as a capital 
income tax, but the efficiency of the system does require that the Cost of Capital Allowance be 
reasonably accurate. Parts V and VI extend the analysis to cross-border income and to special 
industries and circumstances.  
 
B. Firm-Level Computations. 
 
1. In General. Under the Dual BEIT, a “business enterprise” (which term encompasses 
both corporations and unincorporated businesses) deducts each year its Cost of Capital 
Allowance – an annual allowance for the financial capital invested in it, measured at a specified 
rate multiplied by the issuer’s total capital. The COCA allowance replaces current law’s 
deductions for interest, rent and royalty expenses, and is available regardless of whether any 
amount is distributed to investors. No further deductions are available to the issuer even if 
payments to investors exceed the annual COCA rate. As a result, any extraordinary returns 
(returns above the COCA rate) are taxed at the business enterprise level.  
Because the COCA deduction is not tied to actual payments to investors, or to any 
particular mode of financing a business, issuers no longer will face a tax imperative to employ as 
much debt financing as possible or to issue complex financial instruments designed to give 
issuers tax-deductible interest expense in respect of contingent returns. Instead, issuers will 
minimize the economic cost of their financial capital, secure in the knowledge that there is no tax 
component to that calculation. 
The annual COCA rate is set by statute at a formula rate that varies with 1-year 
government debt rates, plus a spread, designed to approximate a typical firm’s overall cost of 
capital.48 For the reasons developed in Part IV of this Article, the COCA rate should not be a 
riskless rate of return, but rather one that reflects an average risk-adjusted return. Special 
concessionary rates would apply to the smallest firms, which accords with the fact that their cost 
of capital is higher than that of more established ones. 
                                                 
48 Part IV explains why I believe that a risk-free government bond rate without a spread is not the right rate to use. 
For the moment, however, consider that the ACE, a widely studied form of profits-only tax, and one that actually 
has been implemented by several countries, essentially reaches the same result I do, as an ACE provides an 
allowance for capital comprising the sum of a firm’s actual interest expense plus an additional allowance in respect 
of equity capital. 
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Since balance sheets in fact balance, the total tax-cognizable investment in a business 
enterprise (the right-hand side of a tax balance sheet) must equal the total tax basis of the issuer’s 
assets (the left-hand side). As a result, the annual COCA deduction is calculated in practice as 
the statutory COCA rate multiplied by the issuer’s total adjusted tax basis in its assets.  
Real assets that today are depreciable (or amortizable) would remain so under the COCA 
system. Since the effect of depreciation is to reduce asset basis, a business enterprise’s COCA 
deductions would decrease as it depreciates its nonfinancial assets. Thus, the COCA deduction is 
in addition to, not in place of, asset depreciation. 49  
 
2. Coordination between COCA and Asset Depreciation Rules. The COCA system 
operates alongside, not in place of, standard asset depreciation rules. An issuer’s COCA 
deductions interact in interesting ways with the issuer’s deductions for asset depreciation.  
Because a business enterprise’s aggregate asset basis is used to calculate the COCA 
deduction, the COCA system effectively mitigates distortions attributable to too fast or too slow 
depreciation, to yield a neutral tax base. This is a well-known result in public finance literature,50 
but worth explaining in a little more detail for a wider audience. 
Consider two extremes. In the first, an issuer that deducts rather than capitalizes an 
expenditure forfeits any COCA deduction with respect to the capital invested. In the second, an 
issuer that treats that same cost as a nondepreciable capital expenditure receives a COCA 
deduction in perpetuity. The net result of this self-correcting mechanism is that the present value 
of the sum of a business enterprise’s COCA and depreciation deductions will remain a constant 
percentage of the enterprise’s capital (measured as historic cost), regardless of the depreciation 
and capitalization rules the business employs.51 This is precisely the result desired: exemption of 
a normal rate of return from tax at the business enterprise level, and inclusion of a normal return 
on investment at the investor level. 
                                                 
49 A holder of a financial capital instrument that itself is a business enterprise (other than financial institutions, 
which are subject to special rules summarized below) would be treated like any other investor in respect of that 
asset, and therefore would be required to follow the income inclusion rules described below, including recognizing 
in income each year the Includible Amount on that financial capital instrument (that is, the business enterprise’s tax 
basis in that instrument multiplied by the COCA rate). At the same time, financial capital instruments owned by a 
business enterprise constitute part of that enterprise’s asset base and therefore would also enter into a business 
enterprise’s COCA expense calculations. A business enterprise would obtain a COCA deduction for its tax basis in a 
portfolio investment and would include in income from that investment its Includible Amount equal to the same 
amount. The net result is that there would be no tax at the business enterprise level on interfirm investments. 
 
50 David F. Bradford, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: GOING GLOBAL WITH A SIMPLE, PROGRESSIVE TAX, 
American Enterprise Inst. (2004), at 28-30; Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce, “A General Proposition on the Design 
of a Neutral Business Tax,” 24 J. of Pub. Econ. 231 (1984).  
 
51 Bradford, supra n. 50, argues that economic theory requires that basis for this purpose be measured by the current 
market value of an asset; that might be right, but is more than can be expected from a practical tax system, 
particularly one so deeply imbued with century-old accounting norms as its perspective on income definition and 
measurement. 
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This observation in turn leads to a question: why not retain the COCA concept to 
measure normal returns to investors but dispense with it at the business enterprise level? If the 
result is equivalent, why not disallow all deductions on financial capital instruments and permit 
issuers to expense all investments as they are made? 
There are several good reasons not to do so. First, as the late David Bradford pointed out, 
a COCA/depreciation system has the advantage over a simple asset expensing rule of mitigating 
the effects of changes in tax rates, because unlike expensing, the value to an issuer of the “tax 
receivable” it holds (the stream of future COCA deductions) depends on future tax rates. 
Second, the Dual BEIT’s combination of deductions for depreciation and financial capital 
can roughly be analogized to the current law’s deductions for depreciation and interest expense. I 
believe that presenting the BEIT as building on well understood tax concepts is helpful as a 
political economy matter.52 Finally, if the COCA rate diverges from the normal rate of return, the 
COCA/depreciation system resembles more closely the status quo of relative tax burdens across 
different industries than does an expensing solution.  
 
3. The Dual BEIT’s Asset Sales Rules; Superconsolidation; Business Losses. Because the 
COCA system operates to make the business enterprise tax base a neutral profits tax, sales of 
assets by one firm to another have the same consequences on a present value basis as if every 
sale were a tax-free carryover basis event. This means that the tax system no longer operates as 
an impediment to efficient firm dispositions of assets. 
For this reason, the BEIT mechanism repeals all “tax-free reorganization” (merger) rules 
and the like. As a result, corporate mergers, as well as acquisitions of control of the stock of one 
firm by another, are treated as a sale of all of the target firm’s assets, and a realization event to 
investors.  Because the deemed asset sales have no present value tax cost to firms, and because 
investors have no tax liability beyond their Includible Amounts, the only net economic effect of 
these rules is to “reset the clock” on investors’ tax bases in their financial interests.53 
For example, imagine a business enterprise that holds a depreciable asset with a tax basis 
of zero and a value of $100, which firm sells that asset to Buyer for $100, incurring $25 of tax on 
the sale. Seller’s $25 tax liability represents the present value of Buyer’s future tax savings from 
depreciating its $100 tax basis for the asset. As a result, Seller and Buyer will be in the same 
aggregate after-tax position as if the asset were transferred tax-free (in this case with a zero 
basis) to Buyer. Unlike tax-free incorporations and reorganizations under current law, however, 
the BEIT system does not duplicate gain (or loss). Buyer has invested $100 for an asset with a 
                                                 
52 Conversely, there might be merit in exploring a simple expensing rule within BEIT/COCA for small businesses 
because administrative and systems considerations are more important for small companies than for large firms. 
 
53 See in Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating The Business Income Tax, The Hamilton Project, The Brookings 
Institution, Discussion Paper 2007-09 (2007). 
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tax basis of $100 (as would be true of any other investment), and Seller does not take a carryover 
basis in any asset or security Buyer issues. 
After its $25 tax charge, Seller now holds $75 in cash, where before it held an asset with 
a value of $100 and a tax basis of zero. If one imagines Seller now borrowing $25 and buying a 
new $100 asset, the present value of its future COCA deductions will equal $25, effectively 
reimbursing Seller for the cash tax it laid out at the time of sale. As this example implies, 
however, the COCA rate must be commensurate with firms' borrowing rates rather than risk free 
rates for the system to be neutral in application. 
Because the Dual BEIT is a neutral profits tax at the enterprise level, the Dual BEIT not 
only can dispense with tax-free reorganization rules, but also with consolidated tax return 
intercompany transaction and similar rules, because there no longer is any meaning to the 
concept of tracking different tax attributes of different corporations within the umbrella of a 
common parent. Instead, every group of enterprises with a common parent can be viewed as a 
single agglomeration of assets, just as is done in financial accounting today. I refer to this as 
“superconsolidation,” to contrast it to the impenetrable hodgepodge of rules governing 
consolidated tax returns today. Nonpractitioners will find it difficult to grasp just how much 
complexity is swept away in the immediately preceding sentences.  
The Dual BEIT also contemplates that a business enterprise’s net operating losses would 
compound each year at the COCA rate. This rule preserves economic neutrality in the timing of 
income and loss recognition where a loss produces only a nonrefundable net operating loss 
carryover.  If a firm were to liquidate (for example, through bankruptcy) with an unused balance 
of net operating losses, theory would dictate that those losses be refunded, but practical 
experience suggests that this is a highly improbable outcome for a legislature to endorse. It 
appears to subsidize foolish investments as opposed to sensible risky ones, and it would 
incentivize firms at the cusp of bankruptcy to throw in the towel to claim their refund. These are 
the sorts of imperfections that one must accept as the price of descending from the Olympian 
heights of academia to actual policy recommendations. 
 
C. Investor Taxation of Normal Returns.  
 
1. Income Inclusions. The Dual BEIT requires all investors in business enterprises – 
including (in an ideal world, at least) tax-exempt institutions – to include each year in ordinary 
income an “Includible Amount,” which equals each investor’s tax basis in its investments in 
business enterprises multiplied by the COCA rate for that year. This is designed of course to 
represent a deemed normal return on investments in business enterprises.  
Under the Dual BEIT, Includible Amounts generally are taxed currently at flat capital 
income rates (in the running example in this paper, 25 percent), regardless of the amount 
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received in cash. If those Includible Amounts are not received, the accrued but unpaid amount is 
added to a taxpayer’s basis in its investment and compounded at the COCA/Includible Amount 
rate each year. This is essentially identical to how original issue discount operates today.  
An investor’s starting tax basis in an investment is her purchase price, or, in the case of a 
transfer by gift or bequest, the instrument’s fair market value. Cash distributions are treated 
simply as reductions in an investor’s tax basis in her investments. Cash distributions in excess of 
basis are not themselves taxed, but if those cash distributions are invested in new investments, 
the new investments will attract Includible Amounts. The result is similar to existing U.S. tax 
rules for original issue discount debt instruments: the investor includes in income Yield x 
Investment (where yield here is the COCA rate), and treats cash flows as returns of previously 
taxed yield or principal. 
The concept of capital gains no longer would be relevant, as the capital income tax rate 
applied to the Investor’s Includible Amount constitutes the full extent of the investor’s tax 
liability. The Dual BEIT of course can accommodate exceptions for retirement savings (up to a 
lifetime cap of, say, $1 million), and graduated tax rates for those taxpayers whose labor income 
is taxed below the capital income flat rate. 
The Dual BEIT places the taxation of normal returns on investors for three reasons. First, 
an important intuition undergirding the proposal is that financial capital instruments turn over 
more rapidly than do noninventory real assets. As a result, investors’ tax bases in their financial 
capital instruments should reflect more closely economic measures of income than do business 
enterprises’ bases in their real assets. Second, investors do not have tax preferences, like 
accelerated depreciation, that are reflected in investors’ bases in their investment assets. Third, as 
discussed in Part V, moving the taxation of normal returns to the investor level has helpful 
political economy knock-on effects in an international context. 
Holders of financial capital instruments calculate their Includible Amounts by reference 
to the tax basis in the instruments they own. As a result, the aggregate of investors’ Includible 
Amounts will not equal the sum of issuers’ COCA deductions, and generally will exceed those 
deductions, for two reasons. First, the intuition here is that market trading in securities is likely to 
lead to more realization events at the investor level than will corresponding sales by business 
enterprises of noninventory real assets. (Remember here as well that under the Dual BEIT all 
realization events are recognition events, so that an investor’s basis is reset to market value, 
while firms have zero present value tax consequences.) Second, current law effectively permits 
business enterprises to deduct the cost of developing many intangibles; these immediate 
deductions reduce an enterprise’s aggregate tax basis in its assets but not the actual economic 
capital invested in the enterprise (which presumptively would be reflected in market prices for 
the enterprise’s securities).  
The COCA system applicable to holders requires no special recordkeeping by the issuer 
or information from prior holders. In particular, calculations are personal to each investor; 
Includible Amount accounts do not carry over from a prior third-party investor from which the 
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current investor purchased that security, or alternatively received the security as a gift or bequest. 
In the first case, the new owner begins with her purchase price as her basis for measuring her 
Includible Amounts; in the second, the donee or recipient of a bequest takes a fair market value 
starting basis. In practice there should be little difference, particularly in the case of public 
companies. 
 The COCA system applicable to holders admittedly requires some modest recordkeeping 
by each holder, but that recordkeeping would be mathematically straightforward and, because it 
would be reflected on each year’s tax return, can be kept up to date by an individual investor 
simply referring to her prior year’s return. Modern tax preparation software will make this even 
easier, again because all the requisite information is personal to the taxpayer. As a result, 
investors would not find themselves in the common predicament today of trying to reconstruct 
the basis of stock received as a Christmas present forty years earlier. 
A simple example is desirable here. Imagine that Investor pays $1,000 on January 1 to 
acquire an Issuer security (which might be denominated as debt, or stock, or an exotic hybrid – it 
does not matter which). Assume for simplicity that the COCA rate is six percent in every year. 
Issuer immediately purchases an asset that is depreciated on a five-year straight-line basis. 
Issuer’s COCA deductions each year will equal the sum of the tax bases of all its assets. 
Assuming for this example a simple rule that looks only to asset basis at the start of the year, 
Issuer’s COCA deduction for this asset will equal $60 in year one, $48 in year two,54 and so on. 
(Issuer also will obtain a COCA deduction for any asset basis attributable to any net cash the 
asset generates and Issuer retains.) At the end of five years, Issuer’s tax basis in the asset will be 
zero, and Issuer will no longer obtain any COCA deductions.  
Investor, meanwhile, continues to own his Issuer security. Each year, Investor takes into 
ordinary income a six percent yield on his tax basis in his financial capital instrument. If Issuer 
happens to distribute exactly $60 a year to Investor in respect of that security, Investor will 
include that $60 a year in income – not because $60 represents the cash received, but because 
Investor’s tax basis in the asset remains constant (it goes up by $60 in Includible Amounts, and 
down by $60 in respect of cash distributions). If Issuer distributes nothing, Investor will include 
$60 in year 1, $64 in year two (six percent of $1,060 tax basis), and so on. If Issuer makes no 
current cash distribution and Investor sells the security at the end of year one for $1,200, Investor 
pockets the cash without further tax. New Investor will now recognize $72 of minimum 
inclusion income in her first year of ownership ($1,200 x 6%). Issuer’s COCA deductions 
continue unaffected.  
One important source of inefficiency in current capital income tax design is the “lock-in” 
problem experienced by investors, in which an investor with substantial unrealized appreciation 
in respect of an investment continues to hold that investment to avoid triggering capital gains tax 
liability, when she would prefer to sell it. (The problem of course is compounded in the United 
                                                 
54 Six percent multiplied by the asset’s opening of the year tax basis of $800. In practice, the Dual BEIT would 
employ conventions to average tax basis over the course of a year. 
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States by the fact that capital gains tax is forgiven in respect of the unrealized appreciation on 
assets held at death.)  
In one sense, the Dual BEIT eliminates the lock-in phenomenon, because the Dual BEIT 
simply does not impose any investor tax beyond that on Includible Amounts. As a result, the 
decision whether to hold an investment or to sell it and finance consumption with the proceeds is 
unaffected by tax considerations. In another sense, however, the Dual BEIT retains an unwanted 
lock-in incentive problem. Here, it is not the capital gains as such, but rather the fact that if one 
investment is sold at a gain to purchase another investment, the new investment will have a 
higher tax basis than will the old one, and therefore will attract greater Includible Amounts.  
 The Dual BEIT thus does not wholly eliminate the lock-in problem, but it does 
ameliorate it in several respects. First, the fact that Includible Amounts are added to basis and 
compound means that the gap between the market value and tax basis of an investment security 
will tend to converge over time (albeit very slowly in some cases). Second, the Dual BEIT is 
designed to trigger investor-level realization events as often as possible (as when one business 
enterprise merges with another). The hope is that in this way the incentive problem will not be 
hugely problematic. 
 The Dual BEIT serves as a comprehensive income tax on capital invested in business 
enterprises, whether domestic or foreign. As such, its intended scope does not reach interest 
income earned from non-business borrowers – in particular, the U.S. Treasury. Part VI returns to 
this, but the expectation is that current law would continue to apply to such debt instruments, but 
income therefrom would be taxed at the same flat capital income rate applicable to the BEIT (in 
the running example in this Article, 25 percent). 
 
2. The Special Problem of Investor Losses. As developed in Capital Taxation in an Age 
of Inequality, the U.S. Constitution presents a special issue for investor-level taxation. It is likely 
that even today an annual wealth tax, even if limited to a taxpayer’s business investments, would 
be viewed as a “direct” tax (in the constitutional sense) requiring apportionment among the 
states, which is impossible (because it would impose different tax rates on residents of different 
states, depending on their relative wealth).  And in turn, an annual “income” tax that takes the 
form of a simple deemed return on investment  is at risk of being characterized as an 
impermissible stealth form of direct tax on property.55 
The only response is to permit an investor who sells an investment at a loss, relative to 
the investor’s adjusted tax basis, to claim a loss deduction (at the capital income tax rate), up to 
the amount of prior Includible Amounts. Losses beyond this amount (losses of principal) would 
                                                 
55 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), vacating 157 U.S. 429 (1895). For all the criticism 
leveled at the case, it has never been overruled, and the facts here, where the income in question is completely 
notional in its measurement, surely would be at risk. 
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be ignored, just as capital gains are ignored. Current law’s wash sale rules would be retained, but 
beyond this restraint, the loss deduction (adjusted to reflect the allowable tax rate) effectively 
could offset current year labor income. Administratively, the loss allowance could be 
implemented as a 25 percent tax credit, and made refundable or eligible for carryback/carryover. 
This loss allowance rule should be sufficient to distinguish the Dual BEIT from a wealth 
tax, where diminutions in value never trigger rebates of prior taxes on the property’s former 
higher value. It also can be justified as a normative matter, because the imputed return 
mechanism of Includible Amounts is meant to serve as an administrable approximation of the 
normal returns that an investor expects to earn; where the expectation is definitively unmet, then 
reversing the prior inclusions can be argued to be  appropriate.56  
The extent of any economic distortions attendant on this rule would depend to a 
significant extent on the tax treatment of a firm’s bankruptcy. If for example on the bankruptcy 
of a firm its net operating loss carryovers were to disappear, then the investor loss allowance rule 
would be easier to justify.  
 
D. Competing Solutions. 
Because capital income taxation long ago fell out of academic favor, at least in U.S. law 
schools, relatively little work was done for several decades in rethinking how we might better 
define the capital income tax base.57 In recent years, however, several broad capital income tax 
reform proposals have been offered, and corporate income tax reform ideas (particularly in 
respect of the taxation of the returns to U.S. corporations’ foreign direct investment) are a hardy 
perennial. Those ideas that are focused on flows rather than stocks (that is, income rather than 
wealth taxes) typically run into one of three impediments: they rely on measuring accurately 
normal returns to real capital, they rely on devices (such as “mark-to-market” taxation of 
publicly-traded financial assets) where information is imperfect, and where the resulting system 
introduces sharp divisions between different modes of taxation applicable to different taxpayers 
that compete directly in the marketplace, or they are so incompletely specified that their 
administrability is untestable. This section I.E. briefly signals why I believe the Dual BEIT to be 
a more attractive policy instrument; the companion article also touches on these issues.   
 
1. Wealth and Bequest Taxes. An ideal capital income tax can be viewed as 
approximating an indirect form of annual wealth tax. The intuition is simply that wealth when 
                                                 
56 If the reason for the investor-level loss is that the business enterprise has incurred losses, then it is true that the 
firm will have a net operating loss at the same time that the investor has a loss on sale of her interest in the firm, but 
that is not a doubling of the loss: the latter reduces the sum of firm and investor income back to zero, and the former 
records losses from the starting point of original capital invested in the enterprise. 
 
57 Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the Corporate Income Tax, is a principal exception. 
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invested ordinarily should yield normal returns (again, which means risk-adjusted normal 
returns), and a tax on normal returns therefore can, through appropriate rate-setting, approximate 
a tax on the wealth itself.  
There does not appear to be any practical advantage, however, to implementing a wealth 
tax over an income tax on normal returns, given government’s great difficulty in directly 
observing or valuing wealth (stock) rather than income (flows) in the hands of savers. As a 
political economy matter, taxing flows always has the advantage of resolving taxpayers’ cash 
flow difficulties (although admittedly the Dual BEIT runs afoul of this observation). And in the 
United States, a national direct wealth tax probably would violate the U.S. Constitution: indeed, 
the Supreme Court case that struck down the late 19th Century federal income tax did so 
precisely on the basis that a capital income tax was an indirect means of taxing capital, which 
Congress could not do directly.58 (The companion paper discusses this in more detail.) For all 
these reasons, there appears to be little reason to pursue annual taxes framed as wealth taxes in 
preference to annual capital income taxes.59 
 In theory, one fairly could compare potential economic efficiency gains from taxing 
bequests rather than lifetime capital income, but in practice, in the United States at least, “death 
taxes” are even more politically fraught than are lifetime capital income taxes. What is more, 
bequest taxation is susceptible both to outright evasion (the Van Gogh that mysteriously 
disappears while the owner is on his deathbed) and to complex avoidance strategies that are at 
least as difficult to address as is capital income taxation. Moreover, in the United States broad-
based bequest taxation essentially would function as a brand new tax, in that only about 5,000 
federal estate tax returns are filed annually.60 This raises difficult economic efficiency transition 
issues (because long-term assets held at the time of introduction ultimately will be subject to 
both income and broad-based bequest taxation), beyond the politically charged question of 
broad-based “death taxes.”  
Finally, an estate tax operates as an ex post excise tax, and therefore the tax rate that must 
be imposed will always be substantially higher than that necessary to raise equivalent revenues 
through a periodic income tax. And as with any tax that allows the deferral of an individual’s 
                                                 
58 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), vacating 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The decision has been 
vigorously criticized from the day it was handed down; the best response to the Supreme Court would have been that 
framing matters, particularly when dealing with terms that have no real substantive meaning in economics. The 
particular issue was resolved through a constitutional amendment authorizing a federal income tax. 
 
59  Mark P. Gergen, “How to Tax Capital,” (Feb. 2016) (unpublished manuscript, forthcoming, Tax L. Rev.) argues 
for a periodic wealth tax measured as a fraction of the mark-to-market value of investments in publicly traded firms. 
Gergen, however, does not expressly engage with the constitutional issue. Gergen also must then propose a 
complementary tax for privately held firms. He does so by adopting the BEIT for these cases, a move with which 
this author surely cannot disagree, given the circumstances Gergen has placed himself in by accepting a radical 
difference in tax regimes between public and private firms. 
 
60 I acknowledge of course that this number is kept artificially low by aggressive tax planning, which in turn incurs 
real deadweight loss. 
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contingent tax liability for many decades, a bequest tax is susceptible to swings in political 
perspectives, putting at risk accruals of wealth under prior law. As more fully developed in 
Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality, bequest taxation thus serves as a useful adjunct to 
annual income taxation, but the income tax is better equipped to handle the bulk of the load. 
 
2. Pass-Through Models.  One cluster of capital income tax proposals argues that directly 
taxing financial capital instruments is a waste of time: why not instead simply apportion business 
income in some fashion to all stakeholders, in accordance with their relative claims? This is a 
“pass-through” approach to taxing business capital income. 
A pass-through model of taxing business income retains all the problems of current law’s 
income mismeasurement attributable to the realization principle at the entity level. The pass-
through model simply distributes that mismeasured income to investors. In this model, 
enterprise-level real asset depreciation reasserts itself as the means by which time-value returns 
are taxed, because it determines in part the aggregate taxable income to be divided. As a result, 
the pass-through model will tax normal returns accurately only if that model adopts 
economically perfect capitalization and depreciation rules for purchased and self-created tangible 
and intangible assets. Decades of experience with the political and administrative process have 
demonstrated the fragility of that assumption, as well as the administrative difficulties in 
distinguishing annual expenses from capitalizable costs of self-developed intangibles. 
Further, in the United States the taxation of publicly-traded partnerships provides 
administrative experience with this approach. That experience teaches us that full pass-through 
models are extraordinarily complex to implement, largely because of the difficulties of relating 
income realization at the entity level (where income from the business first is determined) to 
realization events at the investor level, through secondary market trading in those partnership 
interests. When ownership interests are traded in time spans of a few seconds, or less, the pass-
through model breaks down completely. Many firms do not have systems to generate income 
figures on a daily basis, if that were the relevant time period to be allocated. “Hot potato” rules 
that allocate the income of a firm to the investor owning its stock at an appointed day or hour 
invite tax arbitrage. These are very difficult problems to resolve, as can be seen in the taxation of 
publicly-traded master limited partnerships today, but would of course be greatly exacerbated if 
extended to all publicly-traded securities. 
 
3. Entity-Driven Tax Models. Some of the leading capital income tax reform ideas that 
have been proposed, such as the “Comprehensive Business Income Tax” (CBIT), proposed by 
the U.S. Treasury Department in 1992, assume away the actual problem, by postulating that the 
tax base (e.g., business net income) is accurately measured, and presenting the issue as one 
simply of coordination between firms and investors. CBIT, for example, was a proposal to tax all 
the components of capital income, including normal returns, at the business enterprise level, and 
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(implicitly, because this side was never fully specified) to exempt normal returns at the investor 
level.61 To accomplish this, CBIT would disallow all interest expense deductions, and would 
offer no allowance for corporate capital beyond (ideally, economic) depreciation. 
 In a helpful comparison of CBIT to ACE systems (and by implication, profits taxes more 
generally), Ruud de Mooij and Michael Devereux summarized the consensus public finance 
view of the relative merits of the two as follows: 
 
 Among the two, economists typically favour ACE. This system grants equity 
holders a certain allowance equal to a notional risk-free return. This is attractive as it 
reduces the effective marginal tax rate to zero, implying that ACE is a tax on economic 
rent. As such, it does not distort decisions about the scale of investment, though even a 
tax on economic rent can affect discrete investment choices that depend on an effective 
average tax rate. A potential disadvantage of ACE is that its narrower tax base reduces 
corporate tax revenue, and thus requires higher tax rates to yield the same revenue.  
 By contrast, CBIT disallows the exemption of interest. It turns the corporate in- 
come tax into a broad-based tax on capital at the level of the firm. This raises the overall 
cost of capital so that investment declines. The broadening of the base under CBIT will 
raise corporate tax revenue and, if revenue is to be maintained, allows for a lower 
corporate tax rate. A lower rate will typically not be sufficient to prevent a rise in the 
effective marginal tax rate, which is why CBIT has not gained the same popularity as 
ACE.62  
Nonetheless, de Mooij and Devereux went on to argue that profit shifting by 
multinational firms in particular muddies the analysis, because it is highly responsive to statutory 
rates. The two therefore conclude that “it is attractive for individual countries to broaden their tax 
base and cut the rate, as under CBIT, as opposed to narrowing the tax base and raising the rate, 
as under ACE.”63  
I submit that the Dual BEIT allows Messrs. de Mooij and Devereux, and all the rest of us, 
to eat their cake and have it too. The Dual BEIT can generally narrow the enterprise-level base 
without raising the rate – indeed, the current U.S. corporate system is so porous that the proposal 
here is to narrow the base and reduce the rate – because the imposition of a worldwide 
superconsolidation base responds to the system’s most egregious source of hemorrhaging, and 
because the imposition of a consistent tax on normal returns that actually is collected annually 
makes up any enterprise-level shortfall. 
                                                 
61 Report of The Department of The Treasury on Integration of The Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing 
Business Income Once (Jan. 1992), Ch. 4. 
 
62 Ruud A. de Mooij and Michael P. Devereux, “An Applied Analysis of ACE and CBIT Reforms in the EU,” 18 
Int’l. Tax Pub. Fin. 93, 94 (2011). 
 
63 Id. 
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CBIT would have achieved its objectives only by getting what today is the corporate 
income tax exactly "right" – that is, to allow businesses a deduction only for economic 
depreciation, which is notoriously difficult to measure, and impossible to maintain as a political 
matter. It would also require much subtler approaches to the capitalization of expenditures than 
has ever been the case in U.S. business taxation.64 Recognizing CBIT’s limitations, its 
proponents argued for a magical “compensatory tax” scheme that would undo the imperfections 
in whatever business enterprise tax system Congress adopted, so as to produce, in the end, the 
same result as would be obtained under an ideal enterprise tax system in the first place.65 But 
such a magical compensatory tax would not eliminate the time value benefit of compounding 
within a firm, and more directly begs the question, if the magical compensatory tax were so easy 
to design and adopt, why would the firm level tax be defective in the first place? 
 What is more, by taxing normal returns at the firm level, CBIT makes its extension to 
international investment more fraught, by virtue of the mobility of capital within a multinational 
firm. Modern thinking points in the opposite direction, to tax normal returns at the investor level, 
both because those returns are easier to measure there and because individual investors are less 
mobile than is the capital of firms.66 The Dual BEIT reflects this modern thinking.  
 In a related vein, CBIT is a very unfavorable tax environment from a corporate 
manager’s perspective, because it pushes the combined taxation of investors and firms down to 
the firm level. The political economy claims of an “uncompetitive” corporate tax system would 
be redoubled when compared with a firm profits tax. This point in turn is exacerbated still further 
when one looks at a firm through the lens of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 
because the firm’s tax expense line would now include tax that today is imposed at the individual 
level. While this would be true of U.S. competitors as well, it would not necessarily be true for 
firms keeping their financial records under International Financial Reporting Standards. 
Recently, the majority staff of the Senate Finance Committee has worked on a “corporate 
integration” tax proposal based on a dividends-paid deduction. I have written extensively 
                                                 
64 If tax depreciation perfectly tracked economic depreciation, and tax law could perfectly distinguish expenses that 
relate to the current period from expenses that should be capitalized, a business enterprise could simply use that 
depreciation to measure normal returns at the entity level. CBIT would then be an attractive avenue to explore for 
administrability reasons; under that alternative, the issuer would obtain only a depreciation deduction in respect of 
the capital deployed in its business, and investors would receive returns out of tax-paid earnings free of additional 
tax. 
 
65  The CBIT's compensatory tax was completely unspecified, in keeping with its deus ex machina character -- 
leaving unanswered the question of how such a system could be fairly and practically applied across the broad 
spectrum of business enterprises. (There was also the not insignificant problem that the CBIT never addressed of 
how capital gains fit into the picture.) One might just as well have begun the CBIT presentation by writing, "Assume 
an ideal enterprise-level income tax. . . . "  
 
66 Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, “Shifting the Burden of Taxation from the Corporate to the Personal Level 
and Getting the Corporate Rate Down to 15 Percent,” 69 Nat’l Tax J. 643 (2016). 
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elsewhere about this proposal, and need not repeat that analysis here.67 Briefly, however, I 
summarized my understanding of the project as follows: 
 
 In reality, a dividends paid form of corporate integration would create more 
problems than it solves. It would not necessarily create parity between corporations and 
passthrough forms of business organizations regarding business tax preferences and 
incentives. It also by its terms would not create parity between distributed and retained 
earnings or between debt and equity. By the time optional bolt-on modules were added to 
deal with those important issues, the dividends paid proposal would increasingly 
resemble a Rube Goldberg construction, dominated both in theory and in elegance of 
implementation by any of several clean-sheet comprehensive capital income tax reform 
ideas. The withholding tax that is central to the plan might violate U.S. tax treaties 
regarding dividends paid to foreign investors, and would certainly violate tax treaties if it 
is extended to interest payments (as some proponents wish).68  
In the present context, it is important to recognize that corporate integration proposals, 
whether implemented through a dividends-paid deduction or a shareholder imputation credit, 
suffer from the same problem as does CBIT of starting from a real tax base that is likely to be 
highly imperfect, when viewed through normative capital income tax metrics. Integration 
models, like pass-through or entity-driven tax models, cannot measure capital income accurately 
without imagining a legislature with an uncanny ability and willingness to enact depreciation and 
capitalization rules that perfectly mirror economic reality. Compensatory taxes are exercises in 
magical thinking, or cumbersome ways of doing what could be done more directly through 
fundamentally different approaches.  
 
4. Mark-to-Market Models. Another approach to a comprehensive solution is to tax 
returns to capital solely at the investor level, by requiring investors to value all their financial 
assets at the end of the year and tax those gains not already realized.69 Under this “mark-to-
market” approach, business enterprises would not be taxed, because their economic income 
would be incorporated into prices, and thereby recognized currently by investors. Nearly every 
such proposal limits its reach to publicly traded instruments, which creates sharp dichotomies 
with private enterprises (and does not answer how capital income should be taxed in the second 
case). This sharp division into two separate regimes would introduce new instabilities into the 
tax code – new mountains and valleys in the tax topography – at least as troublesome as current 
                                                 
67 Edward D. Kleinbard, “The Trojan Horse of Corporate Integration,” 152 Tax Notes 957 (Aug. 15, 2016). Mi- 
chael J. Graetz and Alvin C. Warren Jr. took a more positive view in ‘‘Integration of Corporate and Shareholder 
Taxes,” ___ Nat’l Tax. J ___ (2016). The Trojan Horse of Corporate Integration considers the Graetz and Warren 
analysis.  
 
68 Id. at 958-59. 
 
69 Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality at ___ briefly summarizes the recent proposals of Mark Gergen (a mark-
to-market wealth tax) and Eric Toder and Alan Viard (a mark-to-market income tax) 
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law’s debt-equity distinction, as the next few paragraphs illustrate. Administrative solutions 
should point in the opposite direction – to have as flat a tax topography as possible, to minimize 
taxpayer gaming opportunities to shoehorn themselves into whichever result minimizes their tax 
liabilities. 
The intuition driving mark-to-market proposals is plain enough: the public trading of a 
firm’s securities provides new information not available when examining a privately-held firm. 
This information in turn can be put to work to measure annual income more precisely, typically 
through a mark-to-market (“accruals,” in the language of economists) regime, and it seems a pity 
to throw this information away by ignoring it. But practical realities are far more complex.  
A firm might be public in a technical sense, but the market for its securities might be so 
thinly traded, or the proportion of the firm’s stock that is in the public float so small, as to call 
into question the accuracy of the prices of trades in those securities as a proxy for the value the 
firm as a whole. For that matter, it must be remembered that there is a fundamental tension 
between mark-to-market valuations, on the one hand, and the annual tax accounting period, on 
the other. A mark-to-market valuation looks not only to changes in future projected cash flows or 
income, but also to the discount rate to apply to those projections. The resulting valuation is real 
enough, of course, and does represent an accession to or diminution of wealth from one period to 
another (if the markets in question are a close enough proxy for the valuation of the firm as a 
whole), but almost by definition the magnitude of year to year fluctuations in mark-to-market 
valuations will be far greater than changes in annual cash flows from the prior period to the 
current one.70 This in turn puts tremendous stress on how to handle tax losses to produce 
economically consistent outcomes (e.g. through immediate refunds), particularly in a period 
when government revenues might be far lower, and “automatic stabilizer” spending like 
unemployment insurance far higher, than in normal circumstances – just as happened in the 
Great Recession. 
If the public firm regime is more attractive than a private one, firms will accelerate plans 
to go public with a small floatation, and capital markets will be overrun by the tax-induced 
corporate living dead – firms that are public in only the most nominal of senses. If, as is more 
likely, the private firm environment is more congenial, then one must appreciate how radically 
the corporate finance environment has changed in recent years, through the proliferation of 
endless “rounds” of equity financing from private equity funds and other institutional investors. 
If the tax stakes are sufficiently high, the reasons that firms like Facebook go public – which are 
not to secure necessary equity financing, but rather to have a more attractive currency to offer 
employees through equity compensation plans, and to use in acquisitions – could be overcome. 
                                                 
70 Eric Toder and Alan D. Viard, “Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues With A Mark To Market Tax On Shareholder 
Income,” 69 Nat’l Tax J. 701 (2016), at 714-21. 
 
Readers whose investments survived the Great Recession will no doubt recall how much more volatile were their 
assets’ mark-to-market valuations than were fluctuations in period-to-period cash returns on those investments. 
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Phrased differently, how much tax would Mark Zuckerberg choose to absorb for the privilege of 
being a public firm, when no financial imperative required that outcome? 
To their great credit, Toder and Viard, in their recent proposal for mark to market income 
taxation, not only recognize both the volatility issue and the substantial differences in outcomes 
between their regimes for public and private firms, but suggest specific ameliorative policies.  
Nonetheless, the complexity of their “geometric smoothing” of mark-to-market volatility is a 
perfect example of how important it is, when moving from pure theory to actual policy advice, to 
work through how precisely that advice would be implemented in an administrable fashion, so 
that competing ideas can be compared fairly. To the same effect, their proposal to tax founders 
on the shares they retain when a firm goes public leaves unanswered the specific rate to apply 
(although they do suggest some metrics here) and begs the question, why would a founder ever 
do this? Rounds of private equity financing deal with the firm’s financing needs, and borrowing 
against one’s appreciated stock position puts cash into the pockets of the founders. By 
introducing an enormous gulf in the tax topography, mark-to-market taxation distorts taxpayer 
behavior in first-order ways. 
As an accounting system, mark-to-market accounting itself raises interesting (and largely 
unexamined) conceptual issues.  Even the mark-to-market accounting that should be easiest to 
implement – the application of that accounting method to the country’s largest securities dealers 
– has proven difficult in practice.  (For example, should mark-to-market taxation of over-the-
counter derivatives dealers include fluctuations in value attributable to changes in the dealer’s 
own credit rating?) The alternative idea of mark-to-market accounting at the entity level, and not 
separately taxing financial capital instrument holders, is even more problematic in that it would 
require annual valuations of real assets.   
 
 
III. THE LABOR-CAPITAL INCOME CENTRIFUGE. 
 
The BEIT mechanism summarized in Part II is designed to impose an annual tax on 
capital income tax is reasonably comprehensive and consistent, while preserving existing income 
tax norms as much as possible, and adopting as featureless a tax topography as the complexities 
of our modern economy permit. The dual income tax part of the Dual BEIT signals this project’s 
commitment to a different tax schedule for capital and labor income – in particular, for the 
reasons developed in the companion paper, a moderate flat rate on capital income (for example, 
25 percent), and higher graduated rates on labor income.71 But this in turn requires an explicit 
                                                 
71 It is perfectly feasible to implement the Dual BEIT with a lower tax rate on low-income taxpayers, so that 25 
percent (to continue with that example) is a ceiling rate. This paper largely abstracts from this issue for the simple 
reason that capital income is a perquisite of owning capital, which by definition the poor do not possess in great 
quantity. 
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tool for segregating labor from capital income – what this Article calls a labor-capital income 
centrifuge.  
A labor-capital income centrifuge is necessary because without one, an owner-
entrepreneur of a closely held firm will face strong incentives to pay herself as small a salary as 
possible, in order to treat the bulk of her total income as capital income taxed within the firm at a 
25 percent rate (to continue that example). The U.S. Treasury is exposed to this issue today, in 
the form of the Edwards – Gingrich Medicare tax avoidance stratagem that has attracted 
considerable attention, and which has proved resistant to attack using the conventional means 
available to the Internal Revenue Service.72 A more sophisticated mechanism is required. From 
the other direction, a labor-capital income centrifuge is unnecessary if the business enterprise tax 
rate is set at the top labor income marginal rate, but for the reasons developed in the companion 
paper, the Dual BEIT proceeds with a more moderate rate on firm income.73 
 Norway has been the leader in designing dual income taxes;  over the years it has 
implemented different systems that alternatively have taxed all capital income at one flat rate, or 
that more recently have taxed normal returns at a low rate while endeavoring to tax economic 
rents at basically the top rate on labor income.74 In doing so, Norway was forced to develop 
labor-capital income centrifuges of varying design and institutional success.75  
                                                 
72 Edward D. Kleinbard,  “Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate Environment,” 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239360. 
 
73 Capital Income in an Age of Inequality, Section I.E. 
 
74 Edward D. Kleinbard, “An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents,” 5 Northwestern J. of Law and Social 
Policy 41 (2010). 
 
There is a large public finance literature (predominantly authored by European economists) on the theory and 
practice of dual income taxes, much of which is summarized in the article just cited. Three helpful brief papers are 
Robin Boadway, “The Dual Income Tax System – An Overview,” CESifo DICE Report at 3 (Mar. 2004); Wolfgang 
Eggert and Bernd Genser, “Dual Income Taxation in EU Member Countries,” CESifo DICE Report at 41 (Jan. 
2005); Peter Birch Sorensen, “Dual Income Taxation: Why and How?,” 61 FinanzArchiv 559 (2005). 
 
75 Edward D. Kleinbard, “An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents,” 5 Northwestern J. of Law and Social 
Policy 41, 67-79 (2010); OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Norway 2012 (Feb. 2012) (hereinafter, OECD 2012 
Norway Survey). That monograph summarizes succinctly the economic case for dual income taxation at 70-74. 
 
Putting to one side the technical issues in Norway’s original labor-capital income centrifuge, the first generation of 
the Norwegian dual income tax attempted to reach a uniform flat tax on capital income by relying on an accurate 
specification of a firm’s income tax base (as did the U.S. Treasury’s Comprehensive Business Income Tax), and 
marrying that to a dividend imputation system (so that dividends ideally would not be double taxed), and providing 
that other capital income of an investor (such as interest income) would be eligible for the same flat rate as that 
imposed on firms. It also employed a complex basis adjustment mechanism (the “RISK” mechanism, which had 
nothing to do with the English word “risk”) effectively to give investors a ratcheting stock basis (up or down) 
reflecting corporate retained profits or losses, to avoid a double tax when stock was sold at a gain.  Mechanically, 
the original dual income tax operated principally by taxing all income from whatever source derived at a flat rate (28 
percent), and then imposing a surtax on labor incomes above a certain level.  
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 The United States also has made desultory efforts to disentangle labor from capital 
income. Our rules disallowing deductions for excessive compensation paid to owner-
entrepreneurs are one example, but are highly subjective in application and point in one 
direction: that is, the opposite condition, which I call “labor stuffing,” is not addressed.76  The 
more one looks, in fact, the more acute (and understudied) the problem is under current law. 
“Carried interest” is one particular instantiation of the phenomenon, but probably not the most 
important in aggregate size. The example given earlier of the hard-working chef who turns her 
labor into her restaurant’s goodwill, on which she can realize a direct return when she sells her 
restaurant, is a much more typical fact pattern that raises the same basic question. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The current Norwegian implementation of its dual income tax introduces a novel variant, the “rate of return 
allowance” (RRA). The RRA system turns the proposal in this article upside down, by taxing normal returns to the 
firm, taxing inframarginal returns to the firm at the same rate as normal returns, and then in effect imposing a surtax 
on economic profits when realized at the investor level.  
 
More specifically, the RRA dual income tax system taxes all capital income, including corporate net income, at one 
flat rate (28 percent), but deliberately imposes a double tax on corporate dividends and capital gains, after taking 
into account an investor-level deduction for a normal rate of return (the RRA). The net result is that interest and 
other forms of capital income generally are taxed at 28 percent, corporate net income is taxed at 28 percent at the 
corporate level, dividends and capital gains from the sale of stock are tax exempt in the hands of investors to the 
extent of a normal return on their investments, and those dividends or capital gains are fully subject to another 28 
percent tax to the extent they exceed that normal return. This brings the tax on such income to a level similar to the 
highest tax rate on labor income. 
 
The idea is twofold. First, it solves what I call the “labor stuffing” problem that bedeviled the first iteration of the 
Norwegian dual income tax, by taxing any extractions from corporate solution at rates closely comparable to labor 
tax rates. (“Labor stuffing” is the problem that, whenever firm income is taxed at lower effective tax rates than 
individual labor income, owner-entrepreneurs of closely held firms will have an incentive to recast their labor inputs 
as returns on their capital in the firm.) Edward Kleinbard, “Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate 
Environment,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239360.The labor stuffing problem under the first Norwegian dual income 
tax system was not technical, but rather political – the labor-capital income centrifuge rules by design were easily 
evaded.  Under the new system, an owner-entrepreneur’s returns to labor will be taxed twice, once at the firm level, 
and once at the individual level (assuming the returns exceed the normal return to the individual’s capital 
investment).  
 
Second, the new system taxes economic rents at close to labor rates. This is its chief policy virtue, as the labor 
stuffing problems under the original system could easily have been solved by more adroit legislative drafting. It does 
so by virtue of the fact that dividends and capital gains attributable to inframarginal returns are unshielded from the 
second-level investor tax. 
 
Kleinbard and OECD, supra, both raise objections to the new system, including the introduction of asymmetrical 
payoffs, and the fact that, if inflation is taken into account, normal returns may be taxed at rates comparable to those 
imposed on economic rents. The firm-level tax system is as vulnerable as any other to getting asset capitalization 
and depreciation wrong, and further is susceptible to overleveraging (subject only to a limited antiabuse rule). 
Finally, the OECD review pointed out that a system like the BEIT has very important advantages over the RRA 
approach, in that it moves the tax exemption for normal returns to the firm level. In the case of open economies this 
makes the system’s exemption of normal returns available to all investors, including foreign investors, which is not 
true of the exemption for normal returns offered to Norwegian domestic investors. 
 
76 Edward D. Kleinbard,  “Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate Environment,” 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239360. 
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 It is possible to do better than any of the existing precedents. The starting point – a labor-
capital income centrifuge, version 1.0 – might resemble the mechanism adopted (at least for a 
period of time) by Norway, in which a reasonable return to capital is imputed, and the remaining 
income treated as labor income.  The idea of this form of labor-capital income centrifuge is that, 
in those cases where markets cannot be expected reliably to separate labor from capital income – 
that is, in the case of closely held companies – an owner-manager of a firm determines the 
portion of her total returns that are attributable to her capital invested in the firm by multiplying 
that capital by a fraction (which typically could be determined by a formula tied to one-year 
government securities); the result would be the deemed return to capital, and the remainder a 
deemed return to her labor. Actual Nordic implementations rapidly grew more complex, for 
example to deal with whether the asset base should be a net or gross asset concept, and how to 
determine when a company was sufficiently closely held as to invoke the labor-capital income 
centrifuge, but as these questions have been considered in great detail elsewhere, they will not be 
repeated here.77 
 Widely held firms would be presumed to compensate employees fully; as a result, no 
further emendation to the BEIT principles outlined earlier would be needed. In particular, the 
labor-capital income centrifuge would not apply.78 As a result, all of a widely held firm’s post-
compensation income would be treated as capital income. The COCA allowance, in conjunction 
with depreciation, would be employed simply to separate out the normal return component and 
tax that component at the firm level at an effective rate of zero.  
 Closely held firms would be subject to a different regime, but one with the same ultimate 
objective. The COCA mechanism would be applied to a closely held firm in the same general 
manner as under the standard BEIT: the firm would multiply its tax basis in its assets by the 
COCA rate. The resulting figure, however, would now be used for a slightly different purpose: 
not simply to provide (in conjunction with depreciation) an effective firm-level deduction for 
normal returns to capital, but rather to separate the closely held firm’s income into capital and 
labor components.  
 A labor-capital income centrifuge along the lines summarized above follows early Nordic 
precedents, but has several major drawbacks. First, it violates the strong preference for a 
featureless tax topography, by distinguishing sharply between private and public firms. A public 
firm like Facebook Inc., with a founder who actively manages the business and still owns a large 
percentage of its stock, might be mischaracterized under this division. It certainly would 
                                                 
77 Edward D. Kleinbard, “An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents,” Northwestern Journal of Law and 
Social Policy 5, no. 1 (2010): 41–86 (2010). 
 
78 This distinction is consistent with Nordic models. The late Steve Jobs might be offered as an exception that proves 
the rule, in light of his nominal cash compensation. In fact, he received substantial deferred compensation in the 
form of stock options. To the extent that he in fact was undercompensated for his services, and thereby enriched 
other shareholders, that income in fact became their capital income, and would be reflected in their Includible 
Amounts as those shares turned over. 
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incentivize startups to become public as soon as possible, to turn off the special income 
recharacterization rule. Further, the Nordic-style rule summarized above is an all-or-nothing rule: 
that is, it recharacterizes all of an affected private firm’s income beyond normal returns (as 
determined through the COCA style mechanism) as labor income. This will be wrong in fact in 
many cases, and will be unfair in every case to investors in such firms who are not owner-
managers. 
 A superior labor-capital income centrifuge can be developed along the following lines. 
First, business enterprises would all be taxed identically – that is, income at the firm level would 
not be recharacterized as labor income, and all firms would face the same profits-only tax (in the 
running example, at a 25 percent tax rate). Public and private firms would face the same tax 
system and the same tax rates. 
 The statute would define a new class of individual: A Participating Controlling Owner. 
Again resorting to U.S. tax shorthand, a “Participating Controlling Owner” would be defined as a 
material participant in the management of a business enterprise who owns at least five percent of 
the enterprise (by vote or value), and where 50 percent or more of the ownership of such 
enterprise (by vote or value) is owned by five or fewer such material participants. The definition 
would not turn on whether a firm were privately-held or a public company. 
 Both parts of this compound definition are drawn from existing U.S. tax rules; 
redeploying existing standards gives comfort that the detailed rules in fact can be drafted and 
administered. “Material participation” is a concept embodied in Internal Revenue Code section 
469, setting out rules limiting the deductibility of losses incurred in the “passive” participation in 
a trade or business. The concentrated ownership standard is drawn from the personal holding 
company rules of section 542.  The five percent ownership threshold is intended to simplify 
compliance by weeding out from the class of employees who might be subject to the operative 
rules described below those with relatively small ownership interests.  
 One aspect of tax system design that the United States does very well (and that the 
Nordics, for example, handled quite poorly) is to incorporate broad “attribution” rules in 
ownership standards. The purpose of these attribution rules (phrased for convenience with 
respect to corporate stock) is to treat a party as owning shares actually owned by another, where 
by virtue of a personal relationship (parents and children) or impersonal ownership (individual 
and corporation owned by that individual) doing so accords with commercial reality. What is 
more, in their most fulsome form these rules treat stock constructively owned by one party as 
actually owned by that party, for purposes of reattributing the stock yet again. The Internal 
Revenue Code is festooned with these sorts of attribution rules;79 the point here is not to engage 
                                                 
79 E.g., section 544; section 318. 
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in statutory drafting, but rather to signal that incorporating these principles is central to the 
proposal.80 
 If an individual is a Participating Controlling Owner, then she is subject to a special 
annual “basis bump,” under which she adds to her basis in her ownership interest (1) a specified 
fraction of (2) her share of the firm’s income after its profits-only tax, retroactive to the start of 
the year. The new higher basis would attract larger Includible Amounts.  
 The individual’s share of post-profits tax firm profits would be determined simply by 
reference to her ownership interest in the firm (actually and constructively owned). The specified 
fraction would be (LT - CT)  ÷ [CT x (1- CT)],  where LT and CT are the maximum labor tax 
and capital tax rates, respectively. Where the labor tax rate is 40 percent and the capital tax rate 
is 25 percent, the individual would be subject to a basis bump of 80 percent of her share of firm 
post-profits tax income.  
 For example, imagine that Participating Controlling Owner puts $1 into a wholly-owned 
firm. The firm develops a new app, attributable in fact to the work of the PCO. The firm earns 
$100,000 after all business deductions but before the COCA. Here, the COCA would be zero, 
because the firm has no basis in assets, and the firm would be left with $75,000 after profits-only 
tax. The PCO would receive a basis bump retroactive to January 1st of 80 percent x 100 percent x 
$75,000, or $60,000. The PCO would pay tax at the 25 percent capital income rate x her basis of 
$60,000 in perpetuity (all other things being equal). That is the same as taxing her $60,000 at 25 
percent today, or $15,000. As a result, the total tax paid is $25,000 (firm profits-only tax), plus 
$15,000 (in present value terms) investor-level tax, for a total of $40,000 – the same as the labor 
tax rate. 
 The Participating Controlling Owner mechanism sounds complex, but it is not really 
difficult in practice, given that the specified percentage will be an invariant fraction, in the 
absence of tax rate changes. It has the great advantage of not drawing any distinctions between 
private and public firms (that is, the mechanism can continue indefinitely, provided that the 
material participation and ownership concentration standards are satisfied, regardless of whether 
the company is publicly held). It focuses on material participation as a requirement, and does not 
apply to rents or other profits earned by a firm with concentrated ownership and great business 
acumen. And most important, it does not subject passive investors to any incremental tax burden. 
I therefore believe it is the key to implementing a practical labor-capital income centrifuge. 
                                                 
80 When applied in their usual settings, these attribution rules can cause multiple parties to be treated as owners of 
the same shares. For example, mother, father and adult daughter all participate materially in the management of 
Firm X; daughter owns 30 percent of the firm, and mother and father own none. The usual attribution rules would 
treat mother, father and daughter as each owning 30 percent of Firm X, thereby subjecting it to the special 
Participating Controlling Owner rules. This obviously is not intended, and so one would adopt a rule under which 
stock actually or constructively owned by one material participant will not be treated as constructively owned by 
another material participant. The rule would have a failsafe that when all the attributing was finished, no more than 
100 percent of the firm’s ownership interests could be accounted for. This sort of thing actually borders on 
commonplace in U.S. tax law practice.  
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 It might be objected that this mechanism does not address the modern world of 
enterprises like “unicorn” start-ups – private firms without any net income that nonetheless are 
valued in excess of $1 billion. This is true, in the sense that in the absence of firm income there is 
no basis bump to a Participating Controlling Owner. But a labor-capital income centrifuge of the 
first sort also would not operate to divide income between its labor and capital components when 
again there was no net income to divide.  
 A mark-to-market basis bump for Participating Controlling Owners when such a firm 
goes public would be responsive at one level, but would then lead to strong incentives not to go 
public, and to ersatz financing arrangements designed to arbitrage the distinction. Readers 
familiar with the multiple “rounds” of financing now considered standard practice in Silicon 
Valley, as venture capital investors are replaced over time by private equity firms, will appreciate 
the byzantine (and deep pocketed) forms of private market equity financing already deployed in 
practice.  
 One small useful rule that could be adopted would be to treat any “monetization” of stock 
by a Participating Controlling Owner, through borrowings secured directly or indirectly by the 
owner’s stock, would be treated as a mark-to-market event in respect of all of the Participating 
Controlling Owner’s investment, thereby creating the basis to which the COCA/Includible 
Amounts regime could apply. Such a mark to market event would not raise difficult valuation 
issues, given that the lending institution must express an opinion on value in conjunction with its 
extension of credit. 
 
IV. WHAT IS A NORMAL RETURN, ANYWAY? 
 
 A. Different Implementations of Profits Taxes. 
The COCA rate is the mechanism that makes the Dual BEIT a neutral profits tax at the 
firm level, and that measures normal (taxable) returns to investors. As described in Part II, the 
COCA mechanism does this by affording a firm an annual deduction equal to the aggregate 
capital invested in the firm multiplied by the COCA rate, and from the other direction requires 
investors to include in income each year the amount of their unrecovered investments in firms 
multiplied by the same COCA rate. It obviously follows from this that specifying the COCA rate 
properly is essential to the intended operation of the Dual BEIT.   
 A business cash flow tax is the best-known and most closely studied example of a 
practical profits tax. In thinking about the COCA rate, it therefore is helpful to consider why a 
cash flow tax operates as a profits tax, in order to illumine what COCA rate is required to 
produce economic equivalence. 
There is a vast literature exploring the taxation of capital income under idealized tax 
systems, both from a tax law and a public finance economics perspective, that relies on this 
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decomposition.81 Painting with a broad brush, much of the literature begins with the 
decomposition of capital income described in Part I (normal returns, returns to risk, and rents), 
and then proceeds to consider how each of these types of returns is taxed under an ideal income 
tax, or, alternatively an ideal profits tax implemented as a cash-flow tax.  
A cash-flow tax looks very much like a Haig-Simons income tax, except that taxpayers 
are permitted an immediate deduction for any investments that they make, and include in income 
all returns in respect of that investment, including the return of the original amount invested.82 
By contrast, in an ideal income tax all investments are capitalized, and those capitalized amounts 
are recovered only through depreciation (which is meant to accord with the economic loss 
incurred in respect of wear and tear on a real asset) or on sale of the asset. For this purpose, an 
ideal income tax comprises a comprehensive Haig-Simons type income tax, with one rate 
schedule for both labor and capital income. Both an ideal income and an ideal cash-flow tax tax 
allow for an immediate cash refund of the tax benefit of any losses.83 
Under the “Cary Brown Theorem,” the step of permitting the full expensing of a firm’s 
capital investments is understood to exempt from tax the firm’s normal returns on its 
investments.84 The tax benefit afforded by the immediate write-off of investments that yield a 
normal return under a cash flow tax means that the government theoretically funds the scaling up 
                                                 
81 See for example David Hasen, “Income Taxation and Risk-Taking,” unpublished manuscript, at fn 1; Theodore 
Sims, “Capital Income, Risky Investments, and Income and Cash Flow Taxation,” 67 Tax L. Rev. 3 fns. 2 – 5 
(2014), and John R. Brooks II, “Taxation, Risk and Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns to Risk Under a 
Normative Income Tax,” 66 Tax L. Rev. 255, fns 2 -6 (2013) for references to much of the tax law and public 
finance literature. 
 
82 The cash-flow tax just described is described as an “R” based cash-flow tax if it ignores financial flows entirely 
(such as borrowing money, paying interest thereon and ultimately repaying the loan), and an “R+F” base if financial 
flows are included in income when received (e.g., when borrowing money) and deducted when repaid. 
 
83 John Brooks specifies in more detail the key terms of the idealized income tax that most authors appear to assume. 
Brooks at 263. 
 
84 Cary Brown demonstrated that, under certain plausible assumptions, expensing an investment that yielded normal 
returns was the same as exempting the investment’s yield.  E. Cary Brown, “Business-Income Taxation and 
Investment Incentives,” in Income, Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen 300, 309-
10 (1948). What is today called the Cary Brown Theorem was introduced to tax law specialists by William D. 
Andrews, “A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,” 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974). This of course 
exactly describes how a cash-flow tax operates. By expensing all investments, therefore, it is said that a cash-flow 
tax exempts from tax the normal return on those investments. 
 
Cary Brown’s insight was sufficiently straightforward that it is taught in most introductory income tax courses. An 
investor permitted to expense an investment – that is, an investor operating in a cash flow tax environment – 
receives an immediate cash refund of the tax benefit of that deduction, which can be used to buy more of the same 
investment (the simplest assumption being that, since the investment yields only normal returns, there should be 
infinitely elastic supply84), which in turn generates a second deduction, and so on, until the investor has a total 
investment, not of her original pretax investment of I, but rather of I/(1 – T), where T is the tax rate. The cash flow 
tax applied to this scaled-up investment yields a return r equal to the investor’s pretax rate of return: that is, r(1 – T) 
x I/(1 – T) = r I.  
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(or alternatively “grossing up”) of a firm’s marginal investments without cost to the firm, to the 
point where the firm’s after-tax and pre-tax yields on its marginal investments are equivalent. 
Another formulation of the same point is that the government has acquired a partial interest in 
the investment, so that the investor’s after-tax investment (immediately following her original 
investment) is simply smaller than her pretax investment, and she therefore can acquire more of 
the asset than she could in a tax-free environment. Finally, the government can be described as 
making an interest-free loan to the firm, repayable when the investment is sold, which loan the 
firm uses to buy more of its marginal investment opportunity. All are simply different phrasings 
of the same phenomenon, which is that a cash flow tax (or other profits tax) exempts the firm’s 
normal yield on investment. 
In contrast, an ideal income tax does not permit an investor to deduct the amount of an 
investment when made, but instead requires that the investment be capitalized; as a result, the tax 
system does not provide any mechanism by which the taxpayer can costlessly scale up her 
investment yielding normal returns in the face of the imposition of an income tax. It follows that 
the income tax burdens normal returns, while a cash flow (or other profits tax) does not. 85  
In fact, the consensus view is that this is the only important difference between a well-
designed income tax and a cash-flow or other profits-only tax: by design, the former taxes time-
value-of-money returns, whereas the latter exempts them from the tax base. The measure of 
success of a capital income tax under this view is its ability to measure and tax normal returns 
consistently. 
Authors describing this standard analysis usually set up their analyses in terms of the 
construction of a portfolio, comprising a risk-free asset and a risky asset, where the agent’s 
strategy in response to different idealized taxes is to readjust her portfolio from her pre-tax 
optimum to accomplish this scaling up, and thereby return as nearly as possible to her status quo 
ante.86 The risky asset has known alternative payouts, and therefore has no element of 
uncertainty associated with its returns. Many of the apparent differences in results hinge on the 
fact that authors make different assumptions as to whether the risk-free asset earns any positive 
return at all; in some cases, authors seem to shift their assumptions on this key point as they 
work from example to example.  
                                                 
85 Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, “The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income 
Tax,” 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413 (2006);” Daniel N. Shaviro, “Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive 
Consumption Tax,” Tax Notes 103, no. 1 (2004): 91–113; Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, “Consumption 
Taxation is Still Superior to Income Taxation,”  60 Stan. L. Rev. 789 (2007-2008); Joseph Bankman & Thomas 
Griffith, “Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?,” 47 
Tax L. Rev. 377 (1991-1992).  
 
86 David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2004); Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of 
Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 Tax. L. Rev. 17 (1996); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital 
Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1996). 
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A corollary to this standard analysis is that rents are taxed under both a cash flow tax (or 
other profits tax) and an income tax. In the income tax case rents are taxed as income, and in a 
profits-only tax, whether implemented as a cash flow tax or otherwise, those returns either are 
taxed directly or fund consumption (which is all that money is supposed to be good for), which 
in turn is taxed. The critical assumption here is that an investor has already exploited all the rents 
available to him, and that under a cash flow tax the investor therefore can expect to earn only 
normal returns on his government-funded additional investment. Because rents cannot be scaled 
up (there being no additional rent-bearing investments to make), rents are taxed under both the 
ideal income tax and the ideal cash flow tax. Taxing rents is viewed as unproblematic, because, 
even after a substantial tax burden, rents are more desirable than the next best alternative 
(investing in generally-available normal returns).87  
The analysis to this point is well-settled. The bulk of the tax law literature in this area 
therefore has focused primarily on the taxation of risky returns. (As previously noted, these 
returns are presented as known alternative payoffs from the investment, so that the analyses 
abstract from authentic uncertainty.) Again the scale-up strategy takes central stage, but the 
analysis becomes more complex than in the case of a simple investment in an asset bearing 
normal returns, because the investor in the models considered in the literature invariably holds 
two assets – a risk-free asset (which may or may not have positive returns ascribed to it in the 
model), and a risky one, where the scaling up of the risky asset in response to the introduction of 
taxation is funded by the sale of the risk-free investment.  
This stream of analysis can be traced to a 1944 paper by Domar and Musgrave,88 and 
entered the tax law literature through an early paper by Alvin Warren.89 The analysis was 
extended by Bankman and Griffith, Cunningham, and many others, and reached its apogee in 
David Weisbach’s influential paper, The (Non)Taxation of Risk90 The idea in every case was that 
when moving from a nontax environment to one that purported to tax risk, an investor could 
rearrange her investments by scaling up her risky investment, typically by selling some of her 
risk-free investment, and thereby avoid the tax burden on returns to risk.91  
                                                 
87 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax Really a 
Debate About Risk? Does It Matter, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 406 (1992) (arguing that “taxation of [economic rents] is 
much less troublesome than taxation of” normal returns). 
 
88 Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. Econ. 388 
(1944). 
 
89 Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L.J. 1081 (1980). 
 
90 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, “Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax Really a 
Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?,” 47 Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992); Noel B. Cunningham, “The Taxation of Capital 
Income and the Choice of Tax Base,” 52 Tax L. Rev. 17, 29 n.51 (1995); David A. Weisbach, “The (Non)Taxation 
of Risk,” 58 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2004). 
 
91 The “scaling up” strategy is thus deployed in two different contexts: in profits-only taxes, to avoid tax on normal 
returns, and in both ideal income and profits-only taxes, to avoid tax on ex-post returns to risk. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., 
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Louis Kaplow extended the analysis by considering the question, where will all these new 
risky investments come from? That is, the scaling up strategy requires that the investor be able to 
buy more of the same risky investment at the same price as the original investment, but in the 
absence of some new seller entering the market, the additional demand for such assets would 
push up price. Kaplow showed that, at least in an idealized model, the government itself could be 
that new seller. That is, the imposition of a tax on risky returns (in the presence of full loss 
offsets) can be analyzed as the government buying a slice of every risky investment; if one 
hypothesizes that the government has no interest in holding all those assets, it could in turn sell 
them short into the marketplace, thereby ensuring a general equilibrium result in which scaling 
up had no effect on prices.92 
Once the general equilibrium problem was solved, at least in theory, it followed that a 
cash flow tax would not burden risky returns any more than it did riskless (normal) returns, 
because the Cary Brown Theorem could operate to scale up both normal and risky returns – 
assuming again, for emphasis, that the risky investment could, conceptually at least, be scaled up 
without affecting the price of the investment, and the tax system treated losses symmetrically 
with gains, which requires both a refund mechanism and a proportional tax.93   
What is more, if the risky investments in question are pure bets (for example, derivatives 
in which no variation margin is required), then (under the assumption made in the models that 
investors have unlimited borrowing capacity, and therefore constant creditworthiness) the 
income tax analysis is the same as in the cash flow tax case.  Because there is no cost to scaling 
up, an investor can do so costlessly under an income tax as well as a cash flow tax, and thereby 
neutralize the effect of the imposition of the tax on returns to risk.  
When the risky assets have capital invested in them, however, then the income tax scale-
up story becomes more complex, because the investor incurs a cost to scaling up – the 
government does not provide a hypothetical interest-free loan, as in the cash flow tax case. As 
noted earlier, the setup in the models invariably assumes that the investor starts by holding two 
assets, a risk-free asset yielding normal returns and a risky one. The investor funds the additional 
scale-up of the risky asset required to restore her pretax risk profile by selling the risk-free one. 
                                                                                                                                                             
How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1 
(1996), explores these two different applications of the scaling up principle. 
 
92 Louis Kaplow, “Taxation and Risk: A General Equilibrium Perspective,” 47 Nat’l. Tax J.  789 (1994). 
 
93 David A. Weisbach, “The (Non)Taxation of Risk,” 58 Tax L. Rev. 1  (2004). Neutrality is achieved only if firms 
have an absolute certainty of recovering from the government the tax benefit of losses, which requires either 
immediate refundability (a nonstarter everywhere as a practical matter) or an interest charge and ultimate 
refundability on windup of the business. Bond, S. R., and Devereux, M. P. (1995), On the Design of a Neutral 
Business Tax Under Uncertainty, Journal of Public Economics 58, 57–71;  Peter Birch Sorensen, Dual Income 
Taxation: Why and How?,  FinanzArchiv 61 (2005), 559—586,  at 574; Peter Birch Sorensen, Neutral Taxation of 
Shareholder Income,  International Tax and Public Finance, 12, 777–801, 2005, at 784–86; S.R. Bond and M.P. 
Devereux, “Generalized R-Based and S-Based Taxes Under Uncertainty,” 87 J. of Public Economics 1291, 1296 
(2001). 
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Further, the models usually assume that the investor can borrow at the risk-free normal rate of 
return.  
From these assumptions, the conclusion usually is phrased that the investor under an 
income tax bears tax on the normal return on the entirety of her invested capital, whether held in 
riskless or risky assets.94 This conclusion can be explained in a variety of ways, but the simplest 
is that a risky asset must have an expected return greater than the normal return, so that all risky 
assets can be decomposed into a pure capital investment, bearing a riskless normal return, stapled 
to a bet. 95 The former component is taxed, just as a straightforward investment in riskless assets 
is taxed, and the latter component is not, by virtue of scaling up the size of the risky bet. The 
investor who sells the riskless asset to increase her investment in the risky one cannot escape tax 
on the normal return to capital implicit in all the capital she has invested.96 
 
 
                                                 
94 Sims describes this as the “conventional wisdom.” Sims, supra, at n. 7. See also Daniel N. Shaviro “Replacing the 
Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax,” 103 Tax Notes 91 (April 5, 2004) (summarizing consensus). 
 
95 This decomposition has echoes in the Black-Scholes option pricing model.  
 
96 A recent wave of academic papers in this area takes issue with the scaling up story as a matter of economic logic. 
Theodore Sims and John Brooks both emphasize that the wealth effect of the income tax means that the investor 
cannot simply replicate the same risk profile after tax as she could in a world without tax, even though the variance 
of her returns on her risky investment (after scale-up and after tax) would be constant, because in all states of the 
world she will be poorer – the same investment has become less attractive, and she therefore would decline to scale 
up, at least to the full extent necessary to hold her after-tax amount at risk constant.  
 
Brooks goes on to consider the implications of modern portfolio theory, which incorporates the fact that most people 
are more loss averse than they are risk averse, and therefore weight the risk of loss more heavily than the prospect 
for gain. Again, the consequence is that rational investors would not fully scale up (because doing so exposes them 
to the possibility of a greater absolute after-tax loss), and to the extent they do not fully scale up in the presence of 
an income tax, the pure risk component of their investment does bear a tax burden. 
 
David Hasen, among other points, adds to Sims and Brooks by making the sensible observation that it is unrealistic 
to imagine that the government imposes a tax on risky returns only to undo the consequences of that tax by selling 
the risky assets short. He further relates the government’s risk profile to its budget constraints; once one allows 
revenues to fluctuate with returns to risk (financed when necessary by riskless government borrowing), there is no 
logical reason for the government to sell risk short, and the general equilibrium conditions specified by Kaplow may 
not hold. Indeed, Hasen concludes, extensive real world government borrowing can be construed as the government 
selling the riskless asset short, and retaining an interest through the tax system in risky ones.  
 
What follows from these recent papers is that the conventional wisdom – that an income tax, like a profits tax, does 
not burden the pure return to risk, but rather only the normal return – may be an incomplete picture, although more 
work (including empirical research) would be desirable here. Rational investors have good reason not to scale up 
completely, and government behaves precisely the opposite of what general equilibrium theory requires, by selling 
fixed returns short (borrowing more money) and retaining volatile tax returns. Even under the conventional view, 
normal returns may be higher than is generally supposed, because the relevant metric should be the yield on 
medium-term rather than short-term government obligations.   
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B. Normal Returns Are Not Necessarily Riskless Returns. 
 
The formulation described at the end of the last Section conflates normal returns with 
riskless ones. Often, this conflation follows from the models themselves, which for simplicity 
assume that an investor can borrow at the risk-free rate (or funds new risky investments by 
selling risk-free assets). The narrowest instance of the time value of money is a government bond 
risk-free return, but the normal return to business capital is a more elusive concept than this one 
case, because it also encompasses the ex ante expected return on a marginal investment by a 
firm. Thus, a recent working paper published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development noted that: 
“While there is no universally accepted meaning of the expressions normal and excess 
returns, a common thread in these references is the implicit agreement that a normal 
return should include a risk element. In the absence of a specific definition, the normal 
rate of return on equity is often linked to a risk- free rate of return or the interest an 
investor would receive from holding a long-term government bond. Investors are unlikely 
to consider this a fair measure for the opportunity cost of the next best alternative 
investment. Equally, a firm is not likely to consider this a fair return when returns are 
generated by active management and services provided.”97 
 
Firms exist to take risk, and their cost of capital reflects this fact. From a firm’s 
perspective, when looking at a new marginal investment, the normal return can be understood as 
the risky return whose expected returns will just cover its own existing cost of capital (which in 
turn reflects the composition of its assets, until equilibrium is reached); anything less means that 
it is engaged in systematic negative arbitrage (when viewed from the perspective of the asset), 
since its own capital will be priced by investors at some spread to riskless government bonds,  as 
is any other risky asset. 
A more useful formulation is that an income tax burdens a firm’s risk-adjusted normal 
returns – that is to say, its marginal returns –  whatever they might be, in light of the firm’s 
overall exposure to risk. As Ethan Yale has observed, in efficient markets ex-ante expected 
returns to risk and normal riskless returns are fair trades for one another: from the perspective of 
ex ante opportunities, expected returns increase with risk, but the market value of that expected 
return is the same as that of the riskless government investment.98 An investor with $1000 to 
invest might choose to buy a government bond yielding two percent, or 20 shares of common 
stock of a corporation with an attractive but untested business plan that the market values at 
$50/share. The latter might have an expected return of 7 percent, but its value remains $1,000. In 
this second use, the normal return is a risk-adjusted normal return.  
                                                 
97 Hayley Reynolds and Thomas Neubig, Distinguishing Between “Normal” And “Excess” Returns for Tax Policy, 
OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 28 (2016), at 6. 
 
98 Ethan Yale, “Investment Risk and Deferred Compensation,” 62 Tax L. Rev. 362, 390-91 (2009). 
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The two assets have different ex ante expected payouts (to compensate for the 
assumption of risk), and different ex post actual returns, but equivalent values. For example, if 
the government were to auction off a perpetual “outperformance” contract on risky investments, 
in which a perfectly creditworthy buyer would receive all tax revenues above the riskless 
threshold, but would pay to the government all shortfalls below that rate (including immediate 
refunds in respect of losses), the winning bid should be approximately zero. But equivalence in 
value is not the metric by which to establish the COCA rate, for the reasons described below. 
All tax systems of course tax ex-post results, not ex ante expectations. Given that a firm’s 
investment outcomes will diverge from ex ante expectations in all cases involving the 
assumption of risk, how can we relate a tax on ex post outcomes to pretax ex ante expected 
returns from that same investment? The answer is that we would ideally choose an ex post 
business firm-level tax that leads to the same ex ante investments as would be true in a world 
without that firm level tax. A proportional (flat rate) tax system, full credit for losses (or as close 
to that as possible), and an exemption from tax for ex ante marginal returns does the trick. Only 
in such a system does a firm hold the same portfolio of investments in a world with the tax as in 
a world without it. That is exactly the outcome envisioned by a cash flow business tax, or 
alternatively the firm-level operation of the Dual BEIT (or other capital account allowance 
profits tax). (The fact that investors (savers) are taxed on their returns may affect the supply of 
investment capital (subject to the usual observation that investment abhors a vacuum, and capital 
from outside the United States would flow into the country until global after-tax returns were 
equalized), but does not change the portfolio of what a firm would invest in, up to the limit of the 
cost of its capital.99) But to accomplish this, the Dual BEIT, or any capital account allowance, 
must offer an allowance sufficient to exempt from tax the entirety of a firm’s ex ante marginal 
expected returns. These in turn will always exceed risk free returns, because that is what it means 
to be in business. 
In other words, the standard analysis of why a cash flow tax is a profits tax relies on the 
scaling up metaphor presented earlier, but does not by itself describe what it is that the firm is 
scaling up. The answer cannot be that the hypothetical firm is loading up on government bonds. 
It is clear that the scaling-up analysis cannot apply to rents, because any rational firm would 
already have exhausted its opportunities to capture them, but that observation does not mean that 
a firm’s only available marginal investment is a riskless one. To the contrary, firms have a great 
many risk-adjusted marginal investments available to them, and the choice of which to make 
reflects the firm’s appetite for risk, as mediated through investors’ tolerance for accepting that 
risk (in turn reflected in the firm’s cost of capital). 
To summarize, a firm does not invest in risk-free assets, just as its own cost of capital 
will never equal the government’s risk-free rate. For a firm to do so would be to engage in 
                                                 
99 Mihir A. Desai and James R. Hines, Jr., “Evaluating International Tax Reform,” 56 Nat’l. Tax J. 487 (2003). 
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negative arbitrage.100 And from the firm’s perspective, its cost of capital (which is to say, the 
minimum return demanded by investors in the firm) is an existential priority to the firm. From 
inside the perspective of the firm, its own cost of capital is riskless, in the sense that the firm 
itself cannot survive without covering that cost. The investor’s risky investment thus is the firm’s 
existential imperative. 
Noel Cunningham pointed in this direction in an early article in this field, in which he 
demonstrated that under an ideal income tax and the scaling-up strategy described earlier, a firm 
that financed the scaling up of its risky investment at market rates of interest (that is, at rates 
above the riskless rate), incurred a tax cost (and revenue to the government) equal to the after-tax 
cost of that borrowing.101 (A more complete description of the income tax burden on risky 
returns within the confines of the models in this strand of the literature is that the burden equals 
the after-tax cost of scaling up plus any tax on the returns to the scaled-down investment.102) 
 
C. Application to the COCA Rate. 
 
The distinction between riskless returns and risk-adjusted normal returns – that is to say, 
a firm’s marginal returns – becomes important when implementing a profits tax through any 
capital account allowance framework (including the Cost of Capital Allowance Mechanism 
employed by the Dual BEIT), or for that matter, an Allowance for Corporate Equity, which 
provides a firm with full interest deductions plus an additional allowance in respect of its equity 
capital. A cash flow tax affords taxpayers costless scaling up through expensing, in which 
government can be viewed as purchasing a share of each asset outright. Allowances for corporate 
capital instead offer taxpayers a direct government subsidy for the marginal cost of capital 
expended to acquire the asset. For the two systems to be economic equivalents, the subsidy rate 
must be specified by reference to some assumed return on marginal investments or cost of 
finance such that taxpayers could obtain the same costless scaling up available through 
expensing in a cash flow tax. 
A cash flow tax has the great virtue of completely sidestepping the issue of what 
constitutes a normal return. The scaling up principle simply permits a firm to scale up its 
                                                 
100 An exotic exception would be a securities dealer borrowing on a short-term basis to hold government bonds, and 
using secured “repo” financing, which has a special creditor-friendly status under bankruptcy law, to do so. 
 
101 Noel B. Cunningham, “The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base,” 52 Tax L. Rev. 17 (1996).  
 
102 Brooks, at 265, points in this direction as well. When dealing with a firm that scales up a risky investment by 
issuing equity rather than debt, the preferred description explains the apparent anomaly that a cash flow tax and an 
income tax appear to produce the same after-tax result. The difference is that in the cash flow tax the scaling up is 
authentically costless, while in the income tax case the burden to the firm is the cost of that equity. In turn the 
returns to that equity will appear as revenue to the government at the investor level. 
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marginal investment, whatever that investment may be. In practice the marginal investment will 
bear a risk adjusted ex ante expected return greater than the riskless return.  
Because a capital account allowance like the COCA deduction is designed to have the 
same value to a firm as expensing, which is to say, the ability costlessly to scale up its marginal 
investment, so as to have an effective marginal tax rate on that investment of zero, the allowance 
must be specified at a rate commensurate with a firm’s marginal cost of finance (which in 
equilibrium also should be the return on a marginal investment). This would suggest that the 
COCA rate (or any competing cost of capital allowance proposal) should approximate a typical 
firm’s cost of funds – by way of arbitrary example, 1-year Treasuries + 300 basis points 
Much of the relevant literature in this field comes to a different conclusion, and instead  
recommends that a cost of capital allowance should reflect a riskless rate of return. 103  In some 
cases this assertion reflects the misapprehension that a normal return necessarily is a riskless one, 
thereby assuming the conclusion.104 (As noted, this misapprehension often follows from the 
                                                 
103 In particular, it frequently is assumed that the relevant measure, as applied to the United States, is the (inflation 
adjusted) return on short-term Treasury bills – from which follows the observation that the income tax burden on 
normal returns is basically inconsequential. Bankman and Griffith; Cunningham; Zelenak (observing that inflation-
adjusted average return on Treasury Bills from 1926 – 2004 was 0.7%). A separate question in the literature begins 
by assuming that a normal return is a government bond return (on the theory that this is as close to a riskless 
investment as can be obtained), but then questions whether the relevant comparison is to a short-term or long-term 
government instrument. The Mirrlees Review, for example, concluded that the relevant comparison is to a medium-
term (7-year?) government bond rate.  James Mirrlees et al., TAX BY DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW, at 
298, 302. (The Mirrlees Review was a comprehensive rethink by some of the world’s leading public 
finance economists, and chaired by Sir James Mirrlees, of the lessons for actual tax policies to be drawn 
from the current state of the art in public finance economic analyses.) In this regard, Lawrence Zelenak has 
observed that the historic return on inflation-protected Treasury bonds is in the neighborhood of 1.5 – 2.0 percent. 
 
104 At the same time, the term “normal return” is sometimes used (more appropriately, in this context) as 
synonymous with a firm’s marginal cost of capital, or alternatively (and equivalently) the minimum expected return 
required for an investment to break even. Thus the Mirrlees Review refers to “the normal or required rate of return 
on investments financed by equity” [by which it presumably means a risk-adjusted return], Mirrlees Review p. 436-
7. and observes that exempting the “normal return on corporate investments” from tax means that “[corporate] 
[m]arginal investments, which just earn the minimum required rate of return in the absence of tax, remain marginal 
investments in the presence of the tax.” Id. p. 419. Again, this latter usage implicitly looks to a firm’s cost of capital, 
not the government’s. 
 
To similar effect, Peter Birch Sorenson writes: 
 
By definition, rents are ‘‘pure profits’’ in excess of the going market rate of return on capital. For debt 
capital, the normal return is the market rate of interest on debt in the relevant risk class, and for equity it is 
the required market rate of return on stocks with the relevant risk characteristics. If markets for risk pooling 
are underdeveloped, the required risk premia will tend to be higher, and so will the normal return.  
 
Peter Birch Sorenson, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?, CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 53, 
2/2007, 172–228, at 176. 
 
This again is a risk-adjusted concept of a normal return, viewed from the perspective of a firm’s cost of capital. As 
one final example, Alvin Warren offers two competing definitions of “normal returns,” as either “riskless returns,” 
or alternatively as “what the investor could earn on [a] marginal investment,” which in the latter case could equal the 
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extension to policy of assumptions in models that for simplicity assume that a firm borrows at 
the risk free rate, or sells risk-free assets to fund the scaling up feature.) In other cases, however, 
the reasoning relies on a different point of confusion, by misapprehending the value to a firm of 
its “tax receivable” – the present value to the firm of its future capital account allowances.  
 Boadway and Tremblay, for example, in an excellent review of business tax reform in 
the Canadian context, argue that a Capital Account Allowance mechanism like the COCA should 
employ the government risk-free rate.105 Their reasoning relies on the belief that the 
government’s promise of future capital account allowances – the tax receivable – is the same as 
any other government IOU (abstracting from political risk as to future tax law), and therefore 
should yield the same rate as a government bond.106  
 The intuition is attractive, but in the end is simply an imperfect metaphor. A firm’s tax 
receivable – the promise of future tax deductions through the COCA system – is a claim against 
the government, and thus in a creditworthiness sense can be analogized to holding a notional 
government bond (abstracting from political risk as to future tax law, as Boadway and Tremblay 
note). The difficulty with this metaphor, however, is that firms have no choice but to hold this 
risk-free receivable. That is, unlike an actual Treasury security, the notional stream of 
government subsidy cannot be monetized through sale or rehypothecation, any more than can 
future depreciation deductions under an income tax.107  
If firms could somehow monetize their claims to future capital account allowances, then 
in fact they could reduce those claims to cash equal in value to the cost of the marginal 
investment they actually wish to make. By doing so, they would put themselves in the same 
position as they would have been enjoyed in a cash flow tax. But firms cannot do so; there is no 
market in tax receivables, because a tax receivable cannot be stripped from the property to which 
it relates in order to be sold or collateralized. This in turn means that a firm’s marginal 
investment must be financed at the firm’s marginal cost of finance – and firms do not finance 
their operations at the risk-free rate.  
                                                                                                                                                             
investor’s own cost of borrowing (through an investment taking the form of a reduction thereof).  Alvin C. Warren, 
“How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?,” 52 Tax L. Rev. 1 
(1996). 
 
105 Robin Boadway and Jean-Francois Tremblay, Corporate Tax Reform, Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, 
School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, (2012) at 45. 
 
106  Stephen R. Bond and Michael P. Devereux, “On the Design of a Neutral Business Tax Under Uncertainty,” 58 J. 
of Pub. Economics 57 (1995). 
 
107 One can view “safe harbor leasing,” an experiment tried in the United States in 1981 and repealed two years later, 
as a mechanism that by statute permitted firms to sell future depreciation deductions as if they were pure claims 
against the government. In the absence of some such creature of statute, however, firms cannot monetize their future 
cost of capital allowances by selling them, because those allowances are attributes of owning the underlying capital 
assets. Firms further cannot borrow at risk free rates against those tax receivables, because in practice the tax 
receivable cannot be segregated from the assets to with the receivable appertains. 
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In this connection, it should be noted that an Allowance for Corporate Equity, which is 
viewed as a form of profits-only taxation, yields a government subsidy far greater than a risk-free 
rate, because under an ACE a firm deducts its actual cost of debt capital plus a statutory 
allowance in respect of equity capital. The ACE mechanism cannot be correct as a matter of 
theory and at the same time a neutral capital account allowance be conceptualized as a risk-free 
rate. 
Admittedly, a trading market in tax receivables could be created by statute, although I am 
not aware of any capital account allowance proposal that has thought through how such a market 
would be designed and function. In light, however, of the enormous political pushback to safe 
harbor leasing, which was a brief and inglorious experiment along similar lines in the United 
States, it does not seem profitable to tie the fate of the Dual BEIT or any other capital account 
allowance system to the parallel creation of a free trading market in tax receivables, especially 
when an alternative mechanism is at hand.  
In short, the risk-free notional government bond embodied as a tax receivable might have 
a theoretical value equal to the risk-adjusted normal return on the assets in which a firm invests, 
but a firm’s actual cost of capital will follow from its risk profile, and that always will be higher 
than a risk-free investment. A firm therefore will go broke quickly investing in notional risk-free 
assets with liabilities (its capital structure) priced as risky investments to the holders of those 
investments. Perhaps for this reason David Bradford contemplated a capital account allowance 
set at rates close to an issuer’s cost of funds, to reflect some of these pragmatic issues: 
“Conceptually, the interest rate called for is the one that would make the taxpayer indifferent 
between expensing and capitalization with interest allowance (in a constant tax rate 
environment).”108 
The neutral COCA rate therefore must be one that just covers the cost of investing in 
assets with similar risk characteristics, which is to say a representative weighted average cost of 
capital for domestic firms. That formulation admittedly is imperfect, because a particular firm’s 
cost of capital will depend on the riskiness of the particular portfolio of investments that it 
makes, but it seems to be as close as can be expected of an administrable tax. As a result, the 
COCA, and other allowances for corporate capital, will always suffer from the problem that a 
statutory allowance of this nature will never be perfectly attuned to each firm’s circumstances.  
To some extent, the Dual BEIT mitigates this concern by using the same COCA rate for 
firms and investors; if the COCA rate is too low from a firm’s perspective, because its 
investments are quite risky, then by the same token investors will enjoy a somewhat lower 
annual income inclusion than would be the case if their expected returns were measured more 
                                                 
108 David Bradford, A Tax System for the Twenty-First Century, in Toward Fundamental Tax Reform (Alan J. 
Auerbach and Kevin A. Hassett, eds) (AEI Press 2005), 11- 33, at 23; see also Bradford, Transition To and Tax-Rate 
Flexibility In a Cash-Flow-Type Tax, in Taxation, Wealth, and Saving (Collected Essays), 311 – 331, at 321 (MIT 
Press 2000). 
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granularly. At an economy-wide level, these distinctions should more or less cancel out, and 
provided that the tax rate is not particularly high, any attendant distortions within a firm’s 
decision calculus should not be all that large. 
Further, the higher cost of capital to small firms can be recognized through special 
concessionary higher Cost of Capital Allowance rates. Thus the first $X million of firm capital 
might enjoy a high COCA rate, and the remainder a lower rate – with or without phaseouts. This 
idea does fairly reflect the much higher costs of financing to which small firms are subject. More 
generally, the system is adaptable to a range of policy and political economy concerns. In this 
regard, a system whose design cannot easily accommodate special concessionary rates for small 
business is not a system likely to be enacted into actual law. 
As suggested above, the COCA rate used to calculate investors’ Includible Amounts 
should be the same as the base COCA rate used by business enterprises. This has three great 
advantages. First, the rate should be to a first degree of approximation a good estimate of real-
world normal returns. Second, using the same COCA rate, along with one base tax rate on both 
business income and Includible Amounts, minimizes the economic distortions and risk to the fisc 
of getting that rate wrong. Third, legislatures should find it relatively easy to approximate an 
appropriate COCA formula simply by weighing the whines of investors against the opportuning 
of firms, until their volumes are in balance.109 
 
V. THE DUAL BEIT IN INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION. 
A. A Residence Based Tax. 
Most tax administrations and academics agree that corporate income tax systems today 
are largely dysfunctional in measuring and taxing appropriately the income of multinational 
enterprises. The problems are income shifting from business operations in the jurisdiction in 
which the multinational enterprise is domiciled to low-tax foreign countries, and stateless 
income: income derived by a multinational enterprise from business activities in a country other 
                                                 
109 In the absence of an anti-abuse mechanism, one might speculate that firms would be established to invest only in 
Treasury securities. Following the recommendations in Part II, such a firm would obtain a COCA deduction greater 
than Treasury rates, but have income inclusions only at the Treasury rate. Not all investors would find this structure 
attractive relative to owning the Treasuries outright, because were an investor simply to purchase a Treasury 
obligation herself, her annual income inclusion would be limited to the Treasury’s actual interest, rather than the 
higher COCA rate. Nonetheless, such a firm might be expected to trade like a closed-end government bond mutual 
fund, and therefore have a low cost of capital; this would suggest that it might generate annual losses available for 
other activities. If this is thought to be problematic, the most straightforward solution is to limit a firm’s COCA 
deduction in respect of non-business financial assets (e.g. Treasury securities) to the yield actually earned on those 
securities (the obverse of today’s arbitrage regulations for state and local governments that seek to borrow at tax-
exempt bond rates and invest in Treasury securities). 
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than its ultimate domicile, but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that is neither that 
domicile nor the location of the customers or the factors of production through which the income 
was derived.110  
The pervasiveness of stateless income tax planning upends standard characterizations of 
how U.S. tax law operates, as well as the case for the United States to move to a territorial tax 
system, unless accompanied by strong antiabuse rules. U.S. tax rules do not operate as a 
worldwide system, but rather as an ersatz variant on territorial systems, with hidden benefits and 
costs when compared with standard territorial regimes. That claim holds whether one analyzes 
the rules as a cash tax matter, or through the lens of financial accounting standards. Under 
current law, effective foreign tax rates do not disadvantage U.S. multinational companies when 
compared with their territorial-based competitors.  
Stateless income prefers U.S.-based multinational companies over domestic ones by 
allowing the former to capture tax rents, or low-risk inframarginal returns derived by moving 
income from high-tax foreign countries to low-tax ones. Other important features of stateless 
income include the dissolution of any coherence to the concept of geographic source (in turn the 
exclusive basis for the allocation of taxing authority in territorial tax systems); the systematic 
bias toward offshore rather than domestic investment; the bias in favor of investment in high-tax 
foreign countries to provide the raw feedstock for the generation of low-tax foreign income in 
other countries; the erosion of the U.S. domestic tax base through debt-financed tax arbitrage; 
many instances of deadweight loss; and, unique to the United States, the exacerbation of the 
lockout phenomenon, under which the price that U.S. companies pay to enjoy the benefits of 
dramatically low foreign tax rates is the accumulation of extraordinary amounts of earnings 
(about $2.6 trillion) and cash outside the United States.111  
U.S. policymakers and observers sometimes think the United States should not object if 
U.S.-based multinational companies successfully game the tax laws of foreign jurisdictions in 
which they do business, but the preceding paragraph demonstrates why the United States would 
lose if it were to follow that strategy. By generating tax rents by moving income from high-tax 
foreign countries in which they actually do business to low-tax jurisdictions, U.S. multinational 
companies have an incentive to locate investment in high-tax foreign countries. And by leaving 
their global interest expenses in particular in the United States without significant tax constraints, 
U.S.-based multinationals in turn can erode the U.S. tax payable on their domestic operations.  
At the request of the G-20 countries, the OECD embarked on an urgent project to develop 
comprehensive recommendations to address “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,” and the United 
                                                 
110 See Edward Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 11 Florida Tax Review 699 (2011); see also Edward Kleinbard, “The 
Lessons of Stateless Income,” 65 Tax Law Review 99 (2011).  
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States in May 2015 announced major proposed revisions to its model income tax treaty to 
address stateless income. A 2015 study by the Congressional Research Service found that in 
2012, about one-half of all international earnings of U.S. firms ($600 billion out of $1.2 trillion) 
was attributable to seven countries ordinarily considered tax havens.112 That same report found 
that base erosion and profit shifting was a global sport, not confined to U.S.-domiciled firms. To 
the same effect, recent work by Kimberly Clausing has estimated the U.S. tax revenue loss to 
profit shifting exceeds $100 billion per year.113  
More recently, the Competition Commission of the European Union in 2016 concluded 
that Apple Inc. had been the recipient of illegal state aid from Ireland, in the form of a tax 
transfer pricing agreement that permitted an Apple’s Irish subsidiary that functioned as Apple’s 
principal sales subsidiary in Europe to enjoy extremely low Irish effective tax rates – in fact, 
below 1 percent.114 The controversy surrounding whether EU competition law was an 
appropriate policy instrument in this case overshadowed the Competition Commission’s 
substantive tax findings, which were that the Irish subsidiary in question derived most of Apple’s 
income from the entirety of its European operations, and paid very little tax anywhere; by one 
estimate, Apple paid tax to all foreign jurisdictions combined on $200 billion of profits at an 
effective rate of about 4 percent per year over a 10-year period. 115 
As these examples suggest, there is a widespread consensus that existing “arm’s-length 
pricing” tools are insufficient to the task confronting tax administrations, and that new tax 
instruments are required. In the United States, the tax-writing committees of the Congress have 
over the last several years released discussion drafts of comprehensive revisions to the U.S. 
corporate tax system that would lower corporate statutory rates and make other major changes, 
and more relevantly here would rewrite the tax rules applicable to the international income of 
                                                 
112 Mark P. Keightley and Jeffrey M. Stupak, Congressional Research Service, Corporate Tax Base Erosion and 
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U.S.-based multinationals.116 Similarly, the President’s 2016 Fiscal Year Budget proposed to 
rewrite these same rules, in ways that were not that far apart from the most comprehensive 
proposal made by the Republican party (the discussion draft released by former House Ways and 
Means Committee chairman Dave Camp).117  
Very generally, the thrust of these legislative proposals is for the United States to adopt a 
“territorial” tax system for outbound foreign direct investment, but to couple that approach with 
stringent anti-avoidance provisions.118 In particular, the President’s 2016 Fiscal Year Budget 
proposed that the United States impose a country-by-country 19 percent profits tax as a 
minimum tax on the income of U.S. controlled foreign corporations.119 (The 2014 Camp 
proposal recommended a minimum tax as one possible anti-abuse rule as well.) The minimum 
tax would operate as a soak-up tax, bringing the effective tax rate on the foreign operations of a 
U.S. multinational up to the level of the 19 percent profits tax in each country in which it did 
business. In practice, this floor would operate as a ceiling: tax directors at U.S. multinationals 
would not long hold their jobs if they consistently missed that target. Of course, a minimum tax 
like this in fact is a worldwide residence-based tax system, and so one has the ironic result of an 
ostensible territorial tax system, protected from the easy gaming that follows from simplistic 
territorial designs by a worldwide residence based country by country minimum tax that in 
practice will be the binding policy. 
While these proposals were framed as income taxes, similar transfer pricing problems can 
arise in value added taxes or profits taxes. David Bradford struggled to develop a workable 
origin based framework for the international aspects of his X Tax, but the results were complex 
and uncertain of success.120 Destination-based value added taxes or the destination based cash 
flow tax described in Section V.B. largely avoid exposure to transfer pricing problems, but 
arguably surrender too much taxing jurisdiction when applied to the United States, whose 
technology, pharmaceutical and other firms have led the world in the development of highly 
valuable intangibles in recent decades.121 
                                                 
116 Edward D. Kleinbard, “Why Corporate Tax Reform Can Happen,” 146 Tax Notes 91 (Apr. 6, 2015). 
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120 Compare David F. Bradford, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: GOING GLOBAL WITH A SIMPLE, 
PROGRESSIVE TAX (2004) with David Weisbach, Does the X Tax Mark the Spot?, 56 SMU L. Rev. 2001 (2003) 
(criticizing the X Tax’s international operation). Robert Carroll and Alan D.Viard, PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION 
TAXATION: THE X TAX REVISITED (2012), at 111-14, describes the transfer pricing abuses to which the origin-based 
X Tax could be subject, but concludes that the solutions proposed by Bradford are feasible. 
  
121 It can be argued that the apparent gratuitous surrender of taxing jurisdiction over exports of high-value 
intangibles in a destination based VAT or cash flow tax is not in fact a loss to the U.S. fisc, because the returns from 
those intangibles ultimately will fund consumption by the firm’s owners, and to the extent they are U.S. persons the 
 
 
62 
For these reasons I believe it useful to explore another fundamental direction in 
international tax design that is stable, that does not involve perpetuating the lock-out effect of 
current law, and that constrains stateless income planning – a worldwide residence-based profits 
tax.  
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that such a tax falls into neither the pure 
destination nor pure origin cubbyholes through which most profits taxes (including value added 
taxes) are analyzed.122 Nonetheless, if one accepts that corporate residence is stickier than is 
sometimes supposed, it is not clear why this novelty is fatal. It is driven from one direction by 
the limits of destination based profits taxes (as discussed here and in Section V.B.), and from the 
other direction by the political economy necessity that standard “territorial” tax proposals are 
easily gamed, and that the result of such gaming is the capture of tax rents – that is, the capture in 
a low tax country of returns priced under the expectation that they would be taxed in a high-tax 
                                                                                                                                                             
United States will capture that revenue through increased consumption in the United States. This has merit, but 
overlooks the significant minority interests held by foreign investors. As applied to a company like Microsoft or 
Facebook, the question here ultimately is whether a rigorous consumption base is appropriate, or whether instead we 
can fairly treat those companies as entirely U.S. juridical persons, notwithstanding their global stock ownership, in 
order to assert at least residual taxing jurisdiction over the entirety of their value added. Tax law academics have 
been quick to deride the concept of a firm having a nationality, but outside of tax law there is much less confusion.  
 
Another way to pose the question is to begin with the iron law of trade economics that the present value of a 
country’s exports must equal the present value of its imports. (Phrased alternatively, exports have value because 
they pay for imports; any other theory is an expression of long-discredited mercantilism by another name. Robert 
Carroll and Alan D. Viard, PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAXATION: THE X TAX REVISITED (2012) at 106-07.)  Then 
the question is, how should one apply this principle to a U.S. firm that generates economic rents on exports, but 
where the firm itself is (for example) 20 percent owned by foreign investors? Are 100 percent of the firm’s sales 
outside the United States properly viewed as exports, or only 80 percent? The firm itself is an actor, with its own 
imports. Moreover, the firm employs the U.S. dollar as its functional currency, and in this respect the firm is in the 
same position as a U.S. individual: purchases of imports require foreign currency, and sales of U.S. exports require 
the foreign purchaser to obtain U.S. dollars. At the same time, however, its owners ultimately reap the benefits of 
the economic rents it captures. The Dual BEIT effectively treats this firm as entirely U.S. resident. 
 
Destination based frameworks are one logical approach when applied to value added or cash flow taxes. Harry 
Grubert has convincingly argued, however, that they are internally inconsistent in important respects when married 
to income taxes. Harry Grubert, Destination-Based Income Taxes: A Mismatch Made in Heaven?, 69 Tax L. Rev. 43 
(2015). One way to see the problem is to ask why normal returns to capital (the unique identifier of an income tax) 
should belong to the jurisdiction of consumption, rather than the jurisdiction of production or ownership of the 
capital asset in question. 
 
122 As between the two, worldwide profits tax consolidation can best be seen as an extension of origin-based profits 
tax frameworks, in which an irrebuttable presumption is employed that rent-bearing intangible assets of a firm 
ultimately have their origin in the home country jurisdiction, and therefore can appropriately be reached by a 
residual residence-based tax. This, for example, is entirely consistent with Apple Inc.’s claims in connection with its 
EU State Aid case as to where that firm’s core intangible assets are developed, even today.  
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country.123 This in turn paradoxically creates an incentive to situate activities in high-tax foreign 
countries, as the raw feedstock for the tax rents capture machinery.124  
Put another way, a worldwide residence-based profits tax can be rephrased as a territorial 
tax with a per-country minimum tax as an anti-abuse rule, where the minimum tax happens to be 
imposed at the same rate and on the same base as the domestic tax (net of foreign taxes). This 
statement is less facetious than it may at first appear, because the purpose of the minimum tax is 
not to collect revenues so much as it is to vitiate the returns to planning strategies designed to 
capture tax rents. The foreign tax credit preserves the primacy of source country taxation, which 
is a concept firmly embedded in existing international tax norms.  
Unlike destination-based profits taxes, worldwide residence-based profits tax retains 
residual taxing jurisdiction over the export of high-value intangible assets, which after all are the 
drivers of most real economic rents in the modern economy. Unlike origin-based profits taxes 
along the lines of Bradford’s X Tax, worldwide tax consolidation exposes the fisc to very little in 
the way of tax gaming. And finally, because the tax is a profits tax, and one imposed at middling 
tax rates, the worldwide consolidation approach recommended for the Dual BEIT should 
introduce very little in the way of deadweight loss: by virtue of the foreign tax credit, foreign 
direct investment is not discouraged, and by virtue of the worldwide design foreign direct 
investment is not encouraged vis a vis domestic investment. It is true that the system might 
impose a higher tax burden on genuine investment in low-tax Freedonia than would be the case 
in a destination based or pure territorial tax system, but this complaint should be tempered by 
inspection as to how much real investment (in the form of property, plant and equipment, or 
employees) actually takes place in the tax havens currently favored by U.S. multinational firms. 
Under the proposed international tax module of the Dual BEIT, a U.S.-resident 
multinational business enterprise would be taxed on the profits arising from its consolidated 
worldwide income, including all of its subsidiaries wherever located. 125  This rule mirrors how a 
multinational firm today presents its activities to investors, through the lens of financial 
accounting. By virtue of true worldwide consolidation, all group income and assets would be 
treated as owned by the U.S. parent for purposes of its U.S. tax bill, and intercompany interest, 
rents, royalties or dividends would be ignored. Foreign losses would be immediately deductible 
in the United States, which leads to more neutral after-tax outcomes from returns to risk. 
It is true that a comprehensive worldwide superconsolidation regime puts pressure on 
what it means to be a “U.S.” as opposed to a foreign firm, which pressure does not exist in the 
                                                 
123 Edward D. Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 11 Florida Tax Rev. 1 (2011). 
 
124 Id. 
 
125 See Edward D. Kleinbard, “Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax,” The Hamilton Project at the Brookings 
Institution, (2007) (laying out in more detail the standards of consolidation, the definition of a “U.S.” firm, and other 
technical issues). 
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Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, discussed in the next section. It has been suggested that the 
identity of a firm’s residence as the United States is as artificial as is the construct of “source” 
under current international tax norms. This is an overstatement today, and one that in any event 
is made less fraught by the Dual BEIT, because the firm level tax will become an attraction, 
rather than a source of frustration, for U.S. enterprises.126 Most of us are not confused that 
General Electric is “American,” and Philips Electronics “Dutch.” Similarly, no person or 
institution except the tax law is confused that Mylan, headquartered in Minneapolis, and with a 
predominantly U.S. shareholder base, is not an Irish corporation in substance. At the same time, 
there is little evidence that new U.S. business enterprises are organized in foreign 
jurisdictions.127 
It is true that the U.S. definition of residence is outmoded in not embracing a “mind and 
management” alternative leg to the analysis, but that is easily remedied.128 To this can be added a 
rebuttable presumption that firms that employ the U.S. dollar as their functional currency and 
that have some managerial presence in the United States are U.S.-resident for tax purposes. Too 
many critics are too quick to overlook the practical power of presumptions such as this. 
Once normal returns are “kicked upstairs” to investors, the entire question becomes less 
urgent, because the remaining tax base is neutral in the technical sense, and moderate (if this 
Article’s recommendations are heeded) as applied to profits. When combined with robust anti-
inversion rules, the result is an environment in which there would remain little incentive for a 
foreign firm to acquire a U.S. one simply to create value by liberating the U.S. firm from the 
reach of the Dual BEIT.  
At one blow, and without further international coordination, the returns to stateless 
income planning across foreign jurisdictions would be vitiated, because low-taxed foreign 
income would be taxed on a current basis in the United States. Moreover, because the Dual BEIT 
contemplates that all business enterprises, however organized, would be subject to the same tax 
regime, there is no risk of tax arbitrage across different forms of business organization within the 
United States. Finally, the residence basis for the firm-level tax in the Dual BEIT does not 
require any coordination across countries, or international clearing houses to transfer tax 
                                                 
126 For a summary of the issue under current law, and straightforward suggestions for clarifying corporate residence, 
see Edward Kleinbard, “The Lessons of Stateless Income,” 65 Tax Law Review 99 (2011); Edward Kleinbard, 
“Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do With It,” 144 Tax Notes 1055 (Sep. 1, 2014). For a contrasting point of view, 
compare Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 Tax L. Rev. 
155, 178 (2007). 
  
127 Susan C. Morse, “Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location,” 14 Florida Tax Rev. 319 
(2013). 
 
128 Cf., International Tax Competitiveness Act of 2010, H.R. 5328, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010). 
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payments collected by one country to another.129 These are all sound practical reasons to prefer a 
true worldwide tax system relying on full global tax consolidation. 
 The Dual BEIT is a profits-only tax, and that principle would apply from a U.S. 
perspective to the entirety of the group’s operations, so that normal returns wherever earned 
would be exempt from U.S. tax. In turn, the Dual BEIT contemplates that U.S. investors would 
include in income their Includible Amounts in respect of all financial investments, whether in a 
U.S. or a foreign firm. This moves the core of capital income taxation to the least mobile 
taxpayers (resident individuals), and presents a uniform tax environment for domestic investors, 
so that portfolio investment decisions are not systematically distorted.130  
Foreign investors in U.S. firms will obtain the full benefit of U.S. profits-only business 
taxation, because that is the base of the business enterprise tax, and those foreign investors will 
not be subject to U.S. Includible Amount taxation or compensatory withholding taxes. This 
makes investment in U.S. domestic business operations attractive to foreign investors and U.S. 
investors alike – particularly if the U.S. profits-only tax rate is in the range suggested by this 
paper (around 25 percent). Thus, unlike CBIT, shifting the taxation of normal returns to investors 
leads to neutrality in cross-border portfolio investment decisions, in both directions. 
The Dual BEIT contemplates that U.S. enterprises would obtain a foreign tax credit 
against foreign income or profits taxes, subject to the same ceiling that applies today, under 
which a foreign tax credit can only be used up to the tentative U.S. tax on that foreign income. 
This is the “foreign tax credit limitation” of section 904(d).   
 As applied to the Dual BEIT, the foreign tax credit limitation would be measured by a 
fraction, the numerator of which is the firm’s foreign profits tax base, and the denominator of 
which is the firm’s worldwide profits tax base, determined under the same principles. In order to 
address vestigial stateless income planning opportunities, this foreign tax credit would be applied 
on a country-by-country basis.131  
A U.S. firm’s foreign profits tax base employed to measure the availability of foreign tax 
credits would be determined using U.S. tax principles in general, including the disallowance of 
all local interest expense, and would apply the COCA deduction to the firm’s basis in foreign 
                                                 
129 Compare Michael Devereux & Rita de la Feria, “Designing and Implementing a Destination-Based Corporate 
Tax,” Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, working paper 14/07, May, 2014.  
 
130 Obviously different jurisdictions will impose different business entity level effective tax rates, but that is both 
true today and unavoidable. The point in the text is that U.S. investors’ decisions to buy one or another post-business 
tax income streams will not be distorted by the Dual BEIT. 
 
131 This actually parallels recent U.S. proposals to “backstop” a territorial tax system with a country-by-country 
minimum tax. In practice the combination of foreign taxes and this minimum tax would produce an effective tax rate 
on all current non-U.S. income of a U.S. group no lower than the minimum tax rate, combined with country-by-
country foreign tax credits.  
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business assets as so determined.132 The result is that a U.S. multinational enterprise would 
apportion its COCA expense for foreign tax credit limitation purposes to its worldwide assets 
based on its real investments in each country.  
The ultimate idea is that foreign income taxes on normal returns technically could be 
credited against U.S. taxes on foreign profits, but foreign taxes on normal returns would not 
offset U.S. taxes on U.S. profits. In practice, however, foreign taxes paid on foreign normal 
returns would be utilizable to reduce a tentative U.S. tax bill only where the foreign operations 
generated profits as well as normal returns, and where the blended foreign tax rate were 
sufficiently low that the total foreign tax burden on the sum of normal returns and profits were 
lower than the U.S. tentative tax on those foreign profits alone.  
It is true that multinational firms might find themselves with excess foreign tax credits, 
particularly if foreign countries retain firm-level taxes on normal returns, but I have reluctantly 
concluded that this is largely unavoidable. No unilateral tax system can create international 
harmony out of disharmonious competing tax regimes.133 
                                                 
132 The international application of the COCA deduction should not be problematic as an administrative matter. The 
COCA deduction is calculated in respect of investment (basis) in business assets, and those assets generally have a 
known location. Moreover, the firm itself has detailed records of its costs. It would, however, be desirable to explore 
in more detail the viability of following local tax law depreciation rules in calculating the COCA deduction 
attributable to a jurisdiction. The reason for this hybrid approach would be that to use U.S. tax depreciation 
accounting rules here might create unnecessary volatility in foreign effective tax rates.  
 
133 One of my original concerns in an early version of the BEIT had been to minimize the risk that an enterprise 
would face tax on its normal returns anywhere in the world, in particular by systematically incurring excess foreign 
tax credits attributable to taxation of foreign normal returns. I therefore conceived an overgenerous foreign tax credit 
system, under which foreign taxes on foreign normal returns could in some cases offset tax otherwise due the United 
States in respect of U.S.-source profits. The particular mechanism to accomplish this was to treat a U.S. firm’s 
worldwide COCA deduction as allocable entirely against U.S. domestic source income for purposes of determining 
the effective tax rate imposed by the United States on foreign income. 
 
I have come to the view that this was a mistake, and instead here propose that foreign taxes on foreign normal 
returns can be used as tax credits only against foreign profits. In particular, I have focused more closely on the 
implications flowing from the idea that in a small open economy, a tax on normal returns should lead to a reduction 
of investment and an increase in pretax yield, to preserve a constant global post-tax normal return. (Some of these 
implications are developed in “The Lessons of Stateless Income,” 65 Tax Law Review 99 (2011).) As a result, the 
incidence of such a tax would not come to rest on the multinational enterprise doing business in that small open 
economy, but rather on labor in that country. If this is correct, then there is no reason to feel sympathy for firms that 
find themselves unable to claim a foreign tax credit in respect of taxes whose incidence did not fall on them in the 
first place. 
 
The discussion in the text also has benefitted from rereading an exchange of letters with Alvin Warren of Harvard 
Law School. See Edward D. Kleinbard, letter to the editor, Tax Notes, Mar. 3, 2008, p. 1043, Doc 2008-4155, 2008 
TNT 43-48; Daniel Shaviro, letter to the editor, Tax Notes, Mar. 3, 2008, p. 1048, Doc 2008-4031, 2008 TNT 43-47; 
Alvin C. Warren, “The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A First Appraisal,” Tax Notes, Feb. 25, 2008, p. 921; Alvin 
C. Warren, “How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?” 52 Tax 
L. Rev. 2 (1996-1997). I have taken both my own work on the pervasiveness of stateless income today and Prof. 
Warren’s concerns to heart in revising my earlier suggestions here.  
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The prospect that a U.S. firm operating in the new profits-only tax environment could in 
some cases obtain a tax credit for income taxes paid to a foreign jurisdiction in respect of foreign 
normal returns requires elaboration. The basic rationale is that normal returns attributable to 
foreign operations are not tax exempt at all, at least in the hands of U.S. investors. A U.S. 
investor will include in income as Includible Amounts a normal return on the entirety of her 
investment in a multinational firm, which investment has gone to fund the enterprise’s foreign as 
well as domestic assets. The U.S. investor’s Includible Amounts are not sheltered by any foreign 
tax credits at the investor level.134 As a result, normal returns on financial investment indirectly 
representing the entirety of a multinational enterprise’s asset base are fully subject to U.S. 
taxation when owned by U.S. investors. 
In turn, the foreign tax credit limitation operates to ensure that foreign income taxes on 
foreign normal returns do not reduce a U.S. firm’s tax liabilities in respect of economic rents. To 
the contrary, it means that in practice U.S. firms often will face excess tax credits, in the absence 
of self-help.  
For example, imagine that a U.S. firm all of whose owners are U.S. individuals earns 
$100 in the United States and $100 in Freedonia, before COCA. It has $1,000 of assets in each 
country, and a total COCA deduction (at 4 percent) of $80. (The firm thus has earned significant 
profits.) The firm’s U.S. tax base on its global operations is $120; assuming a 25 percent tax rate, 
its pre-foreign tax credit tax bill will be $30.  Meanwhile, if the U.S. owners happen also to have 
$2000 invested in the firm, their Includible Amounts will be $80, and their tax bill $20, for a 
total integrated tax charge of $50.   
Imagine that Freedonia taxes the firm $25 (i.e. 25 percent of $100), because Freedonia 
employs a corporate income tax, and the firm is equity funded (and holds perpetual assets – the 
most extreme case). If that amount were fully creditable, the total integrated tax bill would 
remain $50, but Freedonia would capture $25, and the United States only $5, of firm-level tax.135 
Here is where the foreign tax credit limitation comes into play. The Freedonian tax bill would be 
creditable only to the extent of $60/$120 x $30, or $15. Total firm taxes would rise to $40, and 
the total integrated tax bill to $60.  
The U.S. firm would be required to employ self-help to reduce its tax bill back to $30 – 
for example, by capitalizing its investment in Freedonia in part with intercompany debt, the 
interest on which is deductible in Freedonia. (Since the United States would employ worldwide 
tax superconsolidation, under which intercompany interest payments would be ignored, this 
would have no U.S. tax meaning.) The practical risk is double taxation, even with the foreign tax 
credit. This is particularly the case with a country-by-country foreign tax credit, but that 
                                                 
134 An exception might be made for withholding taxes on dividends from foreign corporations, to preserve neutrality 
in post-enterprise tax investment environments. 
 
135 This essentially tracks an example suggested by Professor Warren, supra n. 120. 
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restriction is needed to remove any incentive to produce large streams of low-taxed foreign-
source rents to absorb excess foreign tax credits from operations elsewhere. 
Now imagine the same facts, except that Freedonian operations earn only a normal return 
of $40, on which tax is due of $10. The U.S. profits-only tax on this would be zero, after the 
COCA deduction. What should the foreign tax credit be? If the $10 were allowable as a credit, it 
would offset $10 of the tentative $15 U.S. tax on U.S. profits, leaving a U.S. tax bill of $5 and a 
Freedonian tax bill of $10. If the foreign tax credit is zero, then total taxes rise to $60, as in the 
first part of the example. (That is, the normal return from Freedonian operations in either case is 
subject to firm-level tax.) 
On the one hand, allowing the credit in full would preserve a system under which the 
total integrated tax burden would remain $50 – or, phrased alternatively, under which normal 
returns are taxed once, and once only, to investors. On the other hand, if U.S. investors made 
portfolio investments in a standalone Freedonian firm with exactly the same income and assets as 
the Freedonian operations of the U.S. multinational in this example, those U.S. investors would 
face a firm that incurred the same $10 enterprise level tax, and would pay $10 of tax in respect of 
Includible Amounts to boot.  
In the end, the second argument is more convincing: it is not sustainable to use the 
foreign tax credit system to hold U.S. portfolio investors harmless from a tax charge that their 
firm would suffer if it were a standalone foreign operation, because then the United States 
effectively would subsidize foreign countries for not reforming their tax systems to profits-only 
taxes.136  The good news is that, at least today, a U.S.-based multinational enterprise could use 
intercompany debt and similar techniques to strip the Freedonian tax base to a Dual BEIT-level 
equivalent. (Stripping further than that would serve no purpose, since the Dual BEIT would 
apply to any Freedonian income unsheltered by Freedonian tax.) 
The international tax regime contemplated above can be implemented unilaterally. It 
creates a neutral profits-only U.S. domestic business tax environment that is available to both 
U.S. and international portfolio investors. It does not incrementally burden foreign normal 
returns of a U.S. multinational group, and thereby again is a neutral investment platform for U.S. 
and foreign portfolio investors (when “neutral” here is understood to mean comparable in result 
to a portfolio investment in a standalone firm domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction in question). 
And it substantially vitiates any opportunities for stateless income tax planning. Provided that the 
U.S. profits-only tax rate is not greatly disproportionate to world norms, investment in U.S. 
business operations and in U.S. multinational business enterprises should face more neutral and 
more attractive tax environments than currently is the case. 
 
                                                 
136 This is a different way of phrasing the conclusion urged by Prof. Warren in the exchange of letters in 2008. It 
remains the case, however, that tax-exempt investors are a red herring here. 
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B. A Novel Alternative: The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax. 
1. In General. Recognizing the scope of the stateless income problem, Alan Auerbach 
and Michael Devereux have proposed in a series of papers a “destination-based cash-flow tax” 
(DBCFT), one of whose chief aims is to deflate the returns to profit shifting.137 The DBCFT idea 
has attracted tremendous attention, and its principles are reflected in the 2016 House Republican 
“Better Way” package of fiscal proposals, usually referred to as the “House Blueprint.”138 For 
that reason, it is useful to consider briefly the DBCFT, and how it might relate to the Dual BEIT. 
The DBCFT would replace the corporate income tax. Thus, while in some respects it can 
be analogized to a value added tax (as discussed below), it is not intended as an additional tax on 
domestic consumption sitting on top of traditional business income taxes.  
As its name implies, the DBCFT is a cash-flow tax, and therefore operates as a firm-level 
profits tax, just as does the Dual BEIT. As such, the wholly-domestic application of the DBCFT 
is unexceptional. Current expenses (including in respect of labor inputs) and capital costs alike 
would be deductible, so that in ex ante terms the tax would fall on profits. Because they both are 
profits taxes, neither structure burdens normal returns earned by a business enterprise. And 
because the cash-flow design of the DBCFT reduces the effective marginal tax rate on 
investment to zero, the DBCFT (like any other well-designed profits tax) disallows any 
deduction for net interest expense (interest expense net of interest income). 
The interesting aspects of the DBCFT relate to its international application. The Dual 
BEIT could adopt the Auerbach-Devereux DBCFT as its bolt-on international tax module, but 
there are good reasons, I believe, not to do so. This Section V.B. explains my reasoning.  
 While both are profits taxes, the DBCFT differs from the Dual BEIT in a number of 
respects, of which three are of paramount importance. First, the DBCFT is silent as to the 
coordination of its proposed business entity tax with investor-level taxation. Capital Taxation in 
an Age of Inequality agues that this coordination exercise is important, difficult and, if handled 
poorly, the source of its own potential efficiency losses. More generally, that paper argues that 
capital income taxation is desirable, once properly situated against the political economy 
background of substantial income and wealth inequality.  
                                                 
137 Alan J. Auerbach, “A Modern Corporate Tax,” The Hamilton Project, (Dec. 2010); Michael Devereux & Rita de 
la Feria, “Designing and Implementing a Destination-Based Corporate Tax,” Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation, working paper 14/07, May, 2014.  
 
138 “A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America – Tax,” Jun. 24, 2016, available at 
http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf. Analyses include Martin Sullivan, “A 
U.S. VAT May Be Closer Than You Think,” 152 Tax Notes 1608 (Sep. 18, 2016); Sullivan, “GOP Plan Not So 
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House GOP’s Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, Explained,” Tax Foundation Blog, Jun. 30, 2016, available at 
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Second, the DBCFT’s international tax rules allocate taxing jurisdiction strictly on the 
basis of the ultimate destination of goods. In this, the DBCFT can be analogized to a value added 
tax with border adjustments (the standard implementation around the world). Third, while the 
DBCFT has no explicit coordination or integration with investor level taxation, it is integrated in 
a way with domestic labor taxation, as explained below, by permitting a deduction for domestic 
(but not foreign) labor inputs. This arguably is its most unusual feature, and one that raises 
significant issues under global trade agreements.  
More specifically, unlike a conventional value added tax, to which the DBCFT has many 
economic similarities, the DBCFT permits firms to deduct the cost of domestic labor inputs. 
(Another way of saying this is that a conventional value added tax burdens labor income at the 
flat VAT rate, collected from the employer; an income tax or the DBCFT burdens labor income 
at progressive tax rates, collected from the employee.) At the same time, the DBCFT follows 
value added tax border adjustment precedent, by disallowing any deduction for the cost of 
imported goods, the value of which of course reflect foreign labor inputs, and by excluding (zero 
rating, if that is a helpful value added tax reference) from income the value of any export.139 The 
result is that a U.S. firm whose production activities are in the United States, but all of whose 
output is exported, would run at a perpetual tax loss, because labor and capital inputs would all 
be deductible, and export sales would be excludable. Making a credible commitment to such a 
firm that it will obtain the use of these losses, while reassuring legislators that this is the intended 
result, and not a tax shelter, remains one of the practical challenges for the managers of the 
House Blueprint. 
By virtue of its destination-based design and the deductibility of wages, the DBCFT’s tax 
base becomes economic rents generated anywhere in the world that are attributable to domestic 
consumption.140 The location of production or asset ownership becomes irrelevant: rents 
generated in the United States but embodied in goods sold for export are not directly taxed by the 
United States, and rents from foreign ownership or production embodied in goods consumed in 
the United States are fully taxable in the United States. 
The DBCFT thus is a novel hybrid. It is not an income tax, and it is not an origin-based 
cash flow like the X Tax. It bears many similarities to a subtraction-method VAT (a form of 
VAT not often seen outside the laboratory), but like the X Tax differs in one fundamental 
respect, which is that in a conventional subtraction-method VAT, labor inputs (domestic or 
foreign) are nondeductible. 
Auerbach and Devereux have designed their DBCFT proposals to vitiate the returns to 
base erosion and profit shifting through its destination-based cross-border design. For simplicity, 
                                                 
139 In the same fashion, royalties paid to a foreign affiliate to use foreign-owned intangibles in the United States 
would be disallowed as imports of services, and royalties received from foreign affiliates for the use of intangibles 
outside the United States would be excluded from the tax base. 
 
140 The treatment of foreign labor inputs is discussed in the next subsection. 
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this design element can be analogized  to how value added taxes are designed: exports are not 
taxed in the country of export, and intermediate goods imported into a country are not deductible 
by the business using them.141 (Alternatively, the non-deductibility of imports under the income 
tax optics of the DBCFT – that is, its subtraction method of calculating its tax base – can be 
rephrased as a tax on imports, as in a credit-invoice value added tax.) 
The theory at work in the DBCFT is that a cash-flow tax creates a zero-rate business tax 
environment for normal returns from domestic operations (i.e., returns on marginal investments), 
and the destination-based extension eliminates any advantage to sourcing the location of 
production or the ownership of high-value intangible assets in low-tax jurisdictions. As 
Auerbach has written: 
One might view this treatment of international transactions as a super territorial system—
one that ignores not only activities that occur abroad, but also those going and coming. 
While a simple territorial system would worsen the transfer-pricing problem because it 
would encourage companies to shift the reported location of activity from the United 
States to low-tax countries, the two stages together would actually alleviate the problem, 
because such shifting would no longer be possible.142 
 
The destination-based cash flow tax can further be understood as a rejection of standard 
instruments designed to isolate the geographic source of income: 
Briefly, though, the determination of worldwide profit occurs in many locations and is 
dependent on many types of activities. For example, many aspects of firm activity 
including headquarters, R&D, production, marketing, and finance could be located in 
different places or more than one place. In addition, consumers and shareholders could be 
located throughout the world. There is simply no answer to the question: in which 
country is profit generated? All of these elements of the company’s activities play a part 
in generating worldwide profit. The combination of them almost certainly plays an 
additional part. The idea on which the international tax system appears to be based — 
that the “source” of profit is where the various “productive” activities take place — is 
actually a historical burden that creates substantial institutional barriers to reform.143 
 
The proposals substitute “destination” for “source” as the basis of allocating the right to 
tax, on the theory that destination jurisdictions have authority to do so, in the institutional sense, 
and that doing so is neutral in respect of the place of production, which has important efficiency 
gains. Alternatively, the destination-based cash flow tax can be seen as a territorial profits tax 
                                                 
141 Auerbach p. 10 (“The destination principle is already familiar in the context of taxation, because it is the 
approach used around the world in the implementation of value-added taxes (VATs).”)  
 
142 Auerbach p. 10. 
 
143 Devereux, Issues in the Design of Taxes on Corporate Profit, 65 Nat’l Tax J. 709, 725 (2012). 
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that relies on an apportionment formula to allocate profits across jurisdictions, which formula 
employs a single factor (place of consumption of a good) that does not create incentives for a 
firm to modify its business operations to reduce its tax liabilities.144 
Because the location of production or the ownership of assets is irrelevant to its 
consumption tax base, the DBCFT generally obviates the relevance of a corporation’s residence. 
While Section V.A. argued that concerns in respect of this issue are overblown, it unquestionably 
is true that eliminating any relevance to this determination would be desirable, if otherwise 
costless. 
The Auerbach and Devereux proposals accomplish their intended objectives of 
neutralizing the production location decision within the four corners of their systems, but the 
DBCFT appears vulnerable to gaming if it is not adopted comprehensively. For example, if the 
United States were to adopt the new regime only for corporations, then unincorporated firms will 
become the importers of choice, because they will remain able to deduct the cost of their imports, 
thereby reducing the U.S. tax burden on U.S. ultimate consumption. The House Blueprint in fact 
extends its DBCFT to unincorporated businesses, including both the disallowance of net interest 
expense and the destination-based design; as of this writing, it is not clear whether the “small 
business” community has fully absorbed this. 
As another example, if the United States alone adopts a destination-based cash flow tax, 
that tax system would apply neutrally to a firm’s location decisions as between the United States 
and a foreign jurisdiction, but the new tax would not seem to address existing law’s incentives to 
generate stateless income, and thereby tax rents, by shifting income from high-tax to low-tax 
foreign jurisdictions that have themselves not migrated to destination-based systems. 
As pointed out in section V.A., a destination-based tax system is not the only stable 
international tax regime that obviates the relevance of stateless income gaming. As suggested in 
The Lessons of Stateless Income, there are in fact two approaches to the design of business taxes 
that are robust to international base erosion and profit shifting. One is a territorial system whose 
source rules or apportionment formula cannot be gamed (comprehensive destination-based 
profits-only taxes being one example, at least from the perspective of the residence country). The 
other stable solution stakes out the opposite corner: a residence-based worldwide 
“superconsolidation” tax system. This is the approach just presented in respect of the Dual BEIT, 
although in fairness to the overall reform program, the Dual BEIT can accommodate either 
solution.  
 
2. Border Adjustments. At least as of the date of this writing, the border adjustment 
feature of the DBCFT has engendered tremendous confusion on the part of proponents and 
opponents alike. Proponents, for example, promise exporters that the DBCFT will subsidize their 
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U.S. production destined for foreign consumption, while simultaneously arguing to importers 
that currency rate adjustments will protect them from any adverse consequences. It is worth 
teasing this issue apart. 
Economists are clear that a border-adjustable VAT does not in fact operate as an export 
subsidy or import penalty. The basic argument is simply that if trade is in equilibrium today, the 
imposition of a uniform tax on all domestic consumption will affect an individual’s budget 
constraint (just as a wage tax would), but not the relative prices of goods. 145 As a result, real 
prices should be unaffected by the introduction of a border-adjusted VAT: goods wherever 
produced will be taxed by the United States when consumed in the United States, and goods 
produced in the United States for export will be taxed only under the consumption tax of the 
country in which the goods are consumed.  
The principal mechanisms by which real prices – the equilibrium in trade – are 
maintained after the introduction of a value added tax are currency exchange rate adjustments. 
Thus, if foreign currency markets are open and liquid, economists would expect to see a prompt 
movement in currency exchange rates that preserves real relative prices of goods. If the United 
States, for example, imposes a 20 percent DBCFT, economists would expect to see the U.S. 
dollar appreciate 25 percent against foreign currencies. 
 In other words, if one were to imagine the first country to introduce a VAT, and 
compared trade between it and other countries before and after the introduction of the VAT, one 
might be surprised to observe that external trade flows were unaffected by the introduction of the 
VAT. Currency exchange rates would adjust, so that, while trade would be unaffected, the 
currency of the first country to introduce the VAT would rise relative to the currencies of its 
trading partners.146 (As an aside, this conundrum should be employed as a litmus test by every 
                                                 
145 David F. Bradford, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: GOING GLOBAL WITH A SIMPLE, PROGRESSIVE TAX, 
American Enterprise Inst. (2004), at 6 – 9; Alan D. Viard, “Border Tax Adjustments Won’t Stimulate Exports,” 122 
Tax Notes 1139 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
  
146 David F. Bradford, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: GOING GLOBAL WITH A SIMPLE, PROGRESSIVE TAX, 
American Enterprise Inst. (2004), at 6 – 9; Alan D. Viard, “Border Tax Adjustments Won’t Stimulate Exports,” 122 
Tax Notes 1139 (Mar. 2, 2009).  
 
Robert Carroll and Alan D.Viard, PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAXATION: THE X TAX REVISITED (2012), ch. 7, 
explains in similar terms the “illusion” of any alleged competitiveness effects from the introduction of a destination 
based tax with border adjustments, and further shows the equivalence of origin and destination based consumption 
taxes in this regard. In the context of a simple one-period model, for example, they conclude that “As measured in 
foreign currency, destination-based taxes raise [nominal] consumer prices, while origin-based taxes lower 
disposable income, but both taxes cause the same reduction in real disposable income.” Id. at 106.  
 
The authors go on, however, to consider a number of cases where the simple exchange rate adjustment story can run 
into difficulty. One is the introduction of different tax rates on different industries. Another, relevant to a VAT but 
not the DBCFT or the Dual BEIT, is the stickiness of wage rates (in nominal terms). The Federal Reserve could be 
compelled on the introduction of a VAT to accept a one-time increase in nominal prices (inflation) as a mechanism 
to reduce wages, to reflect the fact that in a VAT the firm rather than workers is paying the tax on labor inputs. Id. at 
166-70. 
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university career services office. Economists see intuitively why this must be so; tax lawyers 
remembering reading that it is true, but cannot explain why; and policymakers neither remember 
nor believe that it could possibly be true.)  
From this, the argument continues, the concerns expressed above that the DBCFT might 
burden imports and subsidize exports must be mistaken: exchange rate adjustments will restore 
equilibrium.147 If this is true in practice, trade will be unaffected. If it is untrue in practice, then 
exports will be subsidized and imports penalized. Boeing will be advantaged, and Walmart 
disadvantaged. Economists point to Brexit’s effect on sterling, and the presidential election’s 
effect on the Mexican peso, as instances where currency rates did in fact promptly respond to 
events – in both those cases, however, to threats to the prior trade equilibrium. 
What follows from this argument as well is that the reason why foreign firms might rush 
to relocate production to the United States following the adoption of the House Blueprint is not 
that the DBCFT penalizes imports as such, but rather that such a move eliminates foreign income 
tax to which the exporter might otherwise be subject. That is, a Freedonian exporter of widgets to 
the United States for consumption therein generally faces the same U.S. tax regime as does a 
U.S. producer (subject to the observations below about labor tax rates), and in addition 
presumably faces Freedonian corporate income tax on the income generated by its Freedonian 
production. It is the foreign tax that the relocation eliminates, not an incremental U.S. one.  
It also follows from this that the transition to a destination based profits tax, and with it 
the appreciation in the U.S. dollar, will work a one-time very large wealth transfer from U.S. 
investors to foreign investors. Foreign investments held by U.S. investors overnight will be 
worth less in dollar terms, and U.S. investments held by Freedonian investors overnight will be 
worth more in Freedonian pfennig terms.148 Carroll and Viard have estimated that at the end of 
2010  the wealth transfer attributable to the introduction of border adjustments without any 
transition relief would have amounted to a $7.88 trillion loss to American investors and an $8.85 
trillion pickup in wealth for foreign investors.149 As of the time of this writing, I am reasonably 
confident that policymakers have not weighed the implications of this.150 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
147 See in addition to the sources in the preceding footnote, Alan J. Auerbach and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Role of 
Border Adjustments in International Taxation, American Action Forum (Nov. 28, 2016), available at 
https://www.americanactionforum.org/print/?url=https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/14344/. 
148 Robert Carroll and Alan D. Viard, PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAXATION: THE X TAX REVISITED (2012), at 
109-11 (observing that the issue has received “surprisingly little attention”); Alan D. Viard, “Border Tax 
Adjustments Won’t Stimulate Exports,” 122 Tax Notes 1139 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 
149 Robert Carroll and Alan D. Viard, PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAXATION: THE X TAX REVISITED (2012), at 
110-11. 
 
150 As previously noted, Robert Carroll and Alan D. Viard, PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAXATION: THE X TAX 
REVISITED (2012), at 111-14, describes the transfer pricing abuses to which the origin-based X Tax could be subject, 
but concludes that the solutions proposed by Bradford are feasible. Those authors then conclude that an origin-based 
consumption tax system like the X Tax is to be preferred over a border-adjustable destination based system, because 
the former does not introduce the one-time wealth transfer described in the text. 
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3. World Trade Organization Rules. One important objection to the DBCFT is that it 
would operate as an illegal tariff – either an import tax or an export subsidy – under the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).151 Experts in WTO law have 
expressed opinions on this issue, some of which at least raise significant concerns.152 
Counterarguments no doubt can be mustered (some of which are mentioned below). As a 
political economy matter, however, it seems odd to base once in a generation U.S. business tax 
reform on a central pillar whose ultimate survival is not free from doubt. The Domestic 
International Sales Corporation/Foreign Sales Corporation debacle referenced in Part I at least 
had a relatively narrow impact, and thus was salvageable without tearing out the entire business 
tax system lock, stock and barrel. Here, the WTO challenge would be to a much more 
fundamental design element. 
At one level, the issue is simple. WTO rules unquestionably permit border adjustments 
for destination based credit and invoice VATs, and just as clearly prohibit such adjustments for 
business income taxes. Art. III, Par. 2 of GATT, for example, provides a general rule that:  
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or 
other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products.  
And Art. XVI, Par.1 of GATT generally prohibits export subsidies, including subsidies delivered 
through a tax system. GATT does, however, contemplate border adjustments for VATs, if (in the 
case of imports) the VAT applies to domestic production as well as imports.153  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The Dual BEIT’s recommended solution also avoids the one-time wealth transfer, and its worldwide 
superconsolidation regime is simple to implement and plainly robust to transfer pricing gaming. 
 
151 As a result of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the WTO replaced GATT as an international organization, but 
GATT (technically now called GATT (1994)) still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods. World 
Trade Organization, “Understanding The WTO: Basics – The Uruguay Round,” available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm.   
 
152 Recent summaries of the application of the agreements mentioned in the text (as well as the complementary 
agreement for trade in services) include Michael Daly, “Is the WTO a World Tax Organization?: A Primer on WTO 
Rules for Tax Policymakers,” International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department (Mar. 2016); Wolfgang 
Schoen, “Destination-Based Income Taxation and WTO Law: A Note,” Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and 
Public Finance (Jan. 2016). Both express skepticism that the border adjustments contemplated by the DBCFT  
would pass muster under GATT, ASCM and other relevant agreements. See also Wei Cui, “Destination-Based 
Taxation in the House Republican Blueprint,” 152 Tax Notes 1419 (Sep. 5, 2016); David Weisbach, Does the X Tax 
Mark the Spot?, 56 SMU L. Rev. 2001 (2003). These also express doubts as to the DBCFT’s WTO compliance. 
 
 
 
153 Wolfgang Schoen, “Destination-Based Income Taxation and WTO Law: A Note,” Max Planck Institute for Tax 
Law and Public Finance (Jan. 2016), summarizes the rules. 
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The usual shorthand consensus summary of the opaque language of the various WTO 
agreements and official explanatory texts is that the WTO rules, taken as a whole, prohibit 
border adjustments as export subsidies and tariffs, unless those adjustments fall within the 
exception for “indirect” value added taxes. This leads to extensive dialogues concerning the 
essential difference between direct and indirect taxes, which exchanges are no more satisfying 
than those surrounding the use of the same terms (albeit in a different context) in the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Economists in particular find it frustrating that taxes with similar economic effects could 
fall into different legal cubbyholes, but of course that is exactly the world that lawyers inhabit. 
The DBCFT employs a subtraction method (revenues minus costs), and further (and more 
substantively) includes a deduction for labor inputs. As a result, it could be argued to more 
closely resemble an income tax than a value added tax, as the latter term ordinarily is understood, 
which would mean that border adjustments to the DBCFT are not permissible. In the end, experts 
in WTO law (who do not include this author) will have to conclude whether this simplistic legal 
argument will prevail, but the point worth emphasizing here is that this issue is one that should 
be resolved as convincingly as possible before the DBCFT is enacted into law, in the form of the 
House Blueprint, not after the fact. It would be a great pity if a once in a generation business tax 
reform effort later were ruled to be WTO non-compliant, as happened to the U.S. Foreign Sales 
Corporation tax regime some years ago. 
The economists’ case is clear: in economic theory, origin-based and destination-based 
VATs are economic equivalents, as are credit-invoice VATs and subtraction method VATs. The 
only differences relate to questions of administration or accommodation of special circumstances 
(such as different VAT rates or an entity’s taxable status within an economy). Moreover, border 
adjustments should have no effect on trade, once foreign currency (or other nominal price) 
movements are considered. Proponents of the DBCFT in particular argue that the DBCFT can be 
analogized to a combination of two new tax moves: a conventional VAT (albeit implemented as 
a subtraction method rather than a credit-invoice method VAT) and the application of the 
revenues from the VAT to reduce payroll taxes (but presumably not Social Security benefits). 
Each of these moves does not raise any obvious WTO issue, and therefore, it is argued, it cannot 
be the case that doing them together can be problematic either. 
The argument is ingenious, but arguably proves too much. Any tax can be rephrased as a 
combination of other taxes and rebates – indeed, as one of many possible combinations of 
different real or imagined taxes and rebates. It asks too much of any institution, whether the 
WTO or a court, to take what is done and recast it as one of many possible alternative sets of 
policy instruments that were not pursued.154 If, for example, the United States were to introduce 
                                                 
154 Recourse to substance over form or economic substance doctrines would not avail proponents of the DBCFT 
here. Those doctrines take a taxpayer’s formal steps and compress them into a tax-cognizable transaction that 
reflects observable impacts of the taxpayer’s actions on others. Those doctrines cannot be invoked to rearrange what 
actually was done into something else that, in retrospect, might have laid on a more tax-savvy path.  
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an iVAT – the “imported value added tax” – we would agree that this was a tariff by another 
name, not a VAT as that term is ordinarily employed. The iVAT would affect trade, for that 
reason. To turn the proponents’ argument on its head, if we were to couple that troublesome 
iVAT with a separate cash flow tax on domestic production sold for domestic consumption (in 
which labor is deductible), would not the result look much like that reached by the DBCFT? 
Nonetheless, in an effort to hold out an olive branch to the economics profession, I have 
endeavored to think through why the DBCFT strikes legal scholars as troublesome from the 
perspective of the overall objectives of the WTO, beyond the formalistic arguments just 
presented. Given the theoretical equivalences just noted, it is unlikely that there is an answer that 
economists will find very satisfying, but it is nonetheless worth considering some of the pits of 
economic confusion into which lawyers fall. 
One such argument would be that the DBCFT penalizes foreign labor inputs relative to 
domestic labor inputs. This concern is made a bit less fatuous by virtue of the fact that many 
policymakers’ enthusiasm for the DBCFT  is motivated in large part by its apparently 
asymmetrical preference for domestic labor over foreign labor, and by the misperception that the 
DBCFT will be a boon to exports.155  
The best place to start is with a simple value added credit-invoice tax with border 
adjustments, because GATT specifically allows this arrangement, and then to compare that to the 
results obtained under the DBCFT. In a VAT, there is no concept of business profits or losses, 
just consumption. Total VAT collected by Freedonia is based on the value of domestic 
consumption in Freedonia, regardless of the place of production of the goods consumed therein. 
The VAT is not imposed on production or income arising in Freedonia. The place of production 
of a good (that is, where the value is added, as opposed to where it is consumed) is simply 
irrelevant: consumers in Freedonia pay the same VAT in the end regardless of where the 
production takes place. Similarly, consumers in other countries do not bear any Freedonian VAT 
costs in respect of goods produced in Freedonia.  
When Freedonia employs border adjustments (i.e. taxes imports and rebates VAT 
collected along the supply chain on exports), Freedonia is just ensuring that all consumption in 
Freedonia (and only Freedonian consumption) will be subject to Freedonian VAT. The same 
result could be reached through a simple retail sales tax, for example, where sales for export 
were excluded as not constituting taxable retail sales. Mechanically, an exporter of goods 
produced in Freedonia gets a VAT refund on inputs that were subject to VAT when purchased, 
and a Freedonian importer pays VAT on imported goods.   
                                                 
155 David Morgan, Republicans Aim to Coax Trump Toward House Trade Tax Plan, Reuters News, Nov. 30, 2016, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tax-idUSKBN13P2H8. Cf. Kyle Pomerleau and Stephen J. 
Entin, The House GOP’s Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, Explained,” Tax Foundation Blog, Jun. 30, 2016, 
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By paying VAT on import, the Freedonian importer can be viewed as making a down 
payment on the total VAT ultimately due in respect of Freedonian consumption, in an amount 
equal to the value added outside Freedonia. From the other direction, a Freedonian exporter 
obtains a VAT refund, but only of VAT previously collected along the chain of production. The 
result is that exported goods – including goods that incorporate components imported into 
Freedonia – in the end are not subject to Freedonian VAT, because consumption did not take 
place in Freedonia. There is no VAT refund for direct domestic labor costs paid by the 
exporter in respect of exported goods, but neither is there a VAT cost. Alternatively, this can be 
phrased as domestic labor inputs are nondeductible, but income attributable to domestic labor is 
not taxable.   
In short, the border-adjustable features of a conventional credit-invoice VAT assure a 
level playing field in a way that even lawyers can understand, in that Freedonia is not imposing a 
differential tax on domestic consumption derived from foreign production (including labor 
inputs) compared with domestic production. It is possible that intuitions along these lines explain 
the impetus behind the GATT rule permitting  border-adjusted conventional VATs, but not other 
taxes.156 
By contrast, it might be argued, under the DBCFT domestic labor inputs (but not foreign 
labor inputs) are excused from the tax base. As in a VAT, if the United States were to adopt the 
DBCFT, a U.S. importer of goods ultimately sold for domestic consumption effectively would 
pay U.S. VAT on the value of its imported goods, including foreign labor inputs, although the 
mechanism to do so would be the nondeductibility of imported goods. When domestic 
consumption occurs, U.S firm-level tax effectively ends up being collected on the full value 
added, including foreign labor inputs, but excluding the value of any domestic labor inputs, 
because those are deductible. This applies not only to simple imports and resale, but also to 
imports of intermediate goods included in finished goods sold for U.S. consumption.  
From this a lawyer might then argue that there is a differential tax rate imposed on 
domestic consumption derived from domestically produced goods and domestic consumption 
attributable to foreign production. The latter is subject to full VAT, and the former is subject 
only to VAT on a smaller tax base that excludes the value added by domestic labor. On its face, 
this seems to be a thumb on the scale disfavoring imported goods, which if true would be 
problematic.  
The economists’ answer is that the conclusion is simply wrong. The relevant question is 
not which party nominally is the taxpayer, but rather which party bears the economic incidence 
of the tax. Currency or other price movements will ensure that the real balance of trade is 
unaffected by the DBCFT; an array of imports that today all cost $100 and that have differing 
foreign labor inputs will, after the enactment of the DBCFT, continue to cost $100 in real terms – 
                                                 
156 Michael Daly, “Is the WTO a World Tax Organization?: A Primer on WTO Rules for Tax Policymakers,” 
International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department (Mar. 2016). 
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which is to say, the incidence of the tax will not fall on exporters to the United States. As a 
result, neither absolute levels of imports nor relative prices across imports with different labor 
inputs will be affected.   
Nonetheless there is something to be said for the proposition that this result is easier for 
nonspecialists to see in the conventional VAT, where global labor and capital inputs are treated 
identically, based on the location of consumption, when compared to the DBCFT, with its 
apparent two-tier tax on foreign versus domestic labor. Again, focusing on incidence explains 
away the optical illusion, but that does not mean that the argument has no power, just as 
intelligent proponents in policy circles cannot help but argue that the DBCFT will “incentivize” 
exports. More generally, it may be the case that arguments resting on the incidence of a tax are 
simply orthogonal to the tools used by lawyers to distinguish one conceptual cubbyhole from 
another. 
As another possible example of the optical illusions that make it difficult for 
nonspecialists to fit the DBCFT into WTO learning, consider the export case. Continuing with 
the VAT analogy, if the United States were to adopt a DBCFT, the United States would not 
impose VAT on exported goods, just as in the ordinary VAT case, but because the DBCFT also 
permits the deduction for all labor inputs from domestic production, whether aimed at domestic 
or foreign consumption, the DBCFT would lead to exporters operating at a perpetual tax loss, 
which is not a relevant concept within a conventional credit-invoice VAT.157 The DBCFT 
contemplates that exporters will get tax refunds for these structural losses created by the 
definition of the tax base (that is, by deducting wages as an expense, and valuing exports at 
zero).158 So again there is an apparent distortion relative to VATs: in a VAT, the country of 
export does not impose VAT or offer VAT refunds on exported goods, while in the DBCFT, 
exported goods are entitled to government refunds, which is to say, subsidies.  
If labor tax rates under the DBCFT are the same as the business enterprise cash flow tax 
rate, then this apparent subsidy is entirely an optical illusion. The “missing” tax revenues are safe 
and sound, collected from workers in the form of the wage tax to which they are subject under 
the DBCFT, but not a conventional VAT. Interestingly, however, if the weighted average tax rate 
imposed on workers is lower than the DBCFT, then the tax system does seem to have embedded 
in it a structural arbitrage favoring exports: wages would be deducted at the higher firm cash 
flow tax rate, and included in income at the lower aggregate rate imposed on workers. This is not 
problematic in an origin based tax – it is rather simply a matter of domestic tax policy to 
subsidize wages in this manner – but it does seem on its face to have some substantive merit as 
                                                 
157 Again, under a standard VAT with border adjustments, exporters get VAT refunds, but only of VAT paid along 
the chain of production; as a result, an exporter is left with a net VAT liability/asset of zero. 
 
158 The House Blueprint cannot bring itself to offer immediate cash refunds, and therefore increases the value of 
unused net operating loss carryovers by an interest factor. As a practical matter, I would anticipate the adoption of 
the DBCFT to induce exporters to buy importers, so as to use the export-related losses on a current basis. 
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an argument when applied in the border adjustment context, because the net effect does appear to 
give an authentic subsidy to exports. 
 
VI. SPECIAL INDUSTRIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
A. Special Cases. 
An earlier paper on a preliminary iteration of the business enterprise income tax159 
described in detail how the Dual BEIT would apply to financial institutions, investment 
companies, micro businesses, financial derivatives, and other special cases.160 In retrospect, this 
author ruefully acknowledges that overspecifying a proposal leads to reader fatigue or nitpicking, 
rather than admiration and adoption. For these reasons I incorporate here by reference to that 
earlier paper the application of the Dual BEIT to special cases like those listed above. 
Notwithstanding my own good advice to myself, it might be helpful to make a few quick 
observations. As applied to financial institutions, the rough justice of the Dual BEIT’s COCA 
mechanism is too rough indeed. For financial institutions, money is their stock in trade, and for 
all relevant purposes (managerial, regulatory, investor relations) firms operate in an entirely or 
largely mark-to-market environment. 
 The solution is to put all financial services firms (including active securities traders) on a 
mandatory mark-to-market system in respect of both their financial assets and their financial 
liabilities, and to then provide a COCA deduction on the firm’s net tax basis in nonfinancial 
assets, plus the net mark-to-market value of all of its financial assets.161 The idea here is, first, to 
capture all of the financial institution’s income (through comprehensive mark-to-market 
accounting) and then to provide a deduction of an amount that reflects a normal return on the 
institution’s net capital, so as not to overtax financial institutions relative to other businesses. 
(Standard implementations of mark-to-market systems effectively give a deduction for interest 
payments, but not an allowance for equity.)  
                                                 
159 Edward D. Kleinbard, “Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax,” The Hamilton Project at the Brookings 
Institution, (2007), at 36-40. 
 
160 The earlier proposal contained tax rate suggestions, drawn arbitrarily from then-current analogies, but its focus 
was on working through the technical operation and implications of the BEIT mechanism.  
 
The current Dual BEIT proposal differs from that earlier work in many important respects, including by fully 
specifying proposed tax rates (as to which the original proposal was largely indifferent), coming to grips with the 
labor-capital income dilemma, and dropping an earlier surtax on investors’ extraordinary returns. That surtax was 
included originally for tactical political economy reasons, but this author now realizes that he misread the political 
climate in this respect. Nonetheless, the technical solutions proposed therein generally continue to be relevant. 
 
161 As applied to financial services firms, the BEIT thus would function much like an ACE system. Financial 
institutions would obtain deductions in respect of all the actual costs of their liabilities (through the mark-to-market 
system) as well as the more arbitrary COCA deduction in respect of their net assets (that is, their equity).  
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 Financial institutions today have the systems in place to perform this comprehensive 
accounting, and banks and dealers in fact already are required to do so in respect of their “trading 
books” for both tax and financial accounting purposes. The proposal is economically sound; it is 
consistent with the institutions’ own internal risk assessment, compensation, and capital 
allocation practices; and it is technically feasible as applied to this specific group of taxpayers.  
 The BEIT component of the Dual BEIT can be extended to financial derivatives, to 
assure conformity in outcomes between investments in derivatives and investments in 
“physicals” (stocks and bonds).162 Unlike the latter instruments, where one can draw neat 
distinctions between issuers and investors, derivatives are employed by both. Moreover, a 
derivative can change its character from asset to liability and back. At the same time, a derivative 
can move substantial cash from one party to the other. The COCA system therefore can form the 
basis of a consistent approach to the taxation of derivative instruments, including the returns to 
capital embedded in them. The detailed proposal is set out elsewhere, but basically the idea 
would be to continue current tax law’s hedge accounting principles, and mark-to-market for 
professional dealers and traders; other holders of financial derivatives would be taxed under an 
asset/liability model, under which outflows would be treated as investments in the contract 
giving rise to future Includible Amounts, and inflows as recovery of basis, and then a liability.163 
 
The issue of tax-exempt institutions pervades current law, and every reform proposal as 
well. Some, like CBIT, hide the ball for a minute, but no rational person can expect the ultimate 
political outcome to turn on such cosmetic matters. I therefore have always accepted the 
likelihood that the Dual BEIT, when implemented in practice, would exempt tax-exempt 
investors from tax on Includible Amounts, notwithstanding that I would prefer a different 
outcome. 
This subsidy should not influence the actual behavior of firms. The Dual BEIT has no 
incentive for tax-exempts to hold one type of security over another, or to invest in firms with one 
mix of income as opposed to another, because the tax consequences for holders on one hand and 
issuers on the other do not turn on the label of the financial instrument. In turn, the taxation of 
issuers does not depend in any way on the composition of the firm’s investors. The result is that, 
even if the subsidy of tax-exempt institutions is maintained in the Dual BEIT, the subsidy should 
not affect a firm’s financing or investment decisions, whether in respect of the capitalization of 
the firm or in the firm’s decisions as to where to invest. Similarly, the Dual BEIT thus does not 
encourage firms to make foreign direct investments at the expense of U.S. ones to generate tax-
favored income streams for U.S. tax-exempt investors.  
Finally, the overall tax burden on debt provided by tax-exempts to finance equipment 
purchases by business enterprises will rise from the negative effective marginal tax rates enjoyed 
                                                 
162 See Edward Kleinbard, “Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax,” The Hamilton Project at the Brookings 
Institution, pp. 51-53 (2007).  
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by users of that financing today, to zero. And debt financed rent-bearing assets will pay tax at the 
business enterprise rate, rather than zero, as can be true today. 
To the same general effect, this paper does not address how adjustments for inflation 
could be incorporated into the Dual BEIT proposal, although I believe that the Dual BEIT is 
sufficiently flexible in its design to include a solution. In part, this decision reflects the luxury of 
current times, in which inflation is not (and has not been for several years) of any immediate 
concern. And in part it reflects both the length of this paper and the sad lesson learned by the 
author from past iterations of this general theme, which is that overly fulsome explanations of all 
possible issues convince readers that the idea is simply too complex, rather than fill them with 
admiration for the care that the author has expended.  
In practice, most tax systems today are vulnerable to base measurement problems 
attributable to inflation, including the income tax regimes in force in major economies, as well as 
alternative capital income tax proposals. Nor are profits  taxes necessarily exempt: even a simple 
Value Added Tax can expose a firm to tax on phantom inflation income if there is any 
appreciable lag between the time inputs are purchased and outputs are sold. I therefore think it 
appropriate for a prospectus of this sort to defer the topic of inflation adjustments until a point 
further along the implementation path for the Dual BEIT.     
 
B. Non-Business Capital Income. 
The Dual BEIT is a comprehensive income tax on capital invested in the business sector. 
This means that it does not reach two hugely important forms of capital investment: investments 
in government securities (or bank deposits) and investments in owner-occupied housing.  
The proposal is to continue existing law addressing the taxation of bank deposits, U.S. 
government securities and other securities not issued by business enterprises (e.g., foreign 
governments, or state and local governments). Current law does a good job of measuring capital 
income on debt instruments in general, at least where those instruments do not have embedded 
equity features. Current law’s exclusion from income of municipal bond interest is mistargeted, 
but that mistargeting can be addressed separately from the issues considered in this paper. 
My proposal for the taxation of owner-occupied housing is brutally simple, yet a step 
forward in the efficient allocation of capital investment. I propose, as I have developed 
elsewhere, that the personal itemized deductions, including those relating to owner-occupied 
housing, be scaled back, at first to a 15 percent effective tax rate deduction (that is, to a 15 
percent credit), and then over the course of years to zero.164 I further propose retaining current 
law’s inclusion in the tax base of capital gain on the sale of an owner occupied home, subject to 
the $500,000  exclusion provided by current law (purely as a political accommodation, in the 
latter case). 
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The Dual BEIT’s mechanism could be extended to the imputed rental value of owner-
occupied housing – indeed, Norway did just that under its dual income tax for a few years – but 
the political economy hurdles to simply explaining the concept of imputed rental income, much 
less legislating it, are so self-evidentally daunting as to make that enterprise an impediment to 
enacting any change at all.  
The idea then is to move towards a world where imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing are taxed approximately at a zero rate. This sounds defeatist, but in fact would be a 
significant efficiency enhancement over current law, where such investments enjoy a negative 
tax rate. 
 
 
VII. IMPLEMENTING AND EVALUATING THE DUAL BEIT 
 
A. Implementation: Tax Rate and Transition. 
1.  Tax Rates. In practical political economy terms, the designer of a capital income tax 
does not have a free hand at choosing capital income rates, for the simple reason that corporate 
income tax rates are subject to worldwide competition across jurisdictions. The trend has been to 
lower corporate rates, so that in most major OECD economies other than the United States the 
headline rate is now below 30 percent. The corporate income tax in turn is probably the largest 
single capital income tax; it thus probably serves to anchor capital income tax rates.  
For simplicity, the proposal developed in this paper has adopted a flat corporate 
(technically, business enterprise) profits-only tax rate of 25 percent. (I ignore here any micro-
business lower rates.) Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality discussed some of the tradeoffs 
underlying this thinking, but basically the worldwide tax consolidation that I recommend 
counsels strongly in favor of a moderate headline rate.165 I recognize the case for taxing rents at 
higher rates than this, but I also recognize the political economy resonance of not burdening 
entrepreneurship, the political economy demands of worldwide competition in headline business 
tax rates, the inability actually to identify rents in practice, and the importance in tax design of 
symmetry in the treatment of gains and losses across the blurred lines of returns to risk, returns to 
uncertainty and rents.  
The taxation of normal returns is a similarly fraught exercise in balancing competing 
objectives. Because the Dual BEIT uses the same mechanism to separate out normal returns from 
the business enterprise tax base and to include in income normal returns to investors, the tax rate 
on normal returns as a practical matter should follow from the business enterprise tax rate – that 
is, by way of example, a flat rate of 25 percent. This is a substantial reduction in the capital 
                                                 
165 Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality, Section I.E. 
 
 
 
84 
income tax rate on individuals who earn interest income outside tax-deferred accounts, but on the 
other hand the tax will be measured and collected annually, which raises the rate relative to the 
long-term deferral (and even exemption on death) available today.   
If the COCA formula (for example, 1-Year Treasuries plus 300bp) overstates normal 
returns at the firm level (where they are excluded from income), the same mechanism will 
include a comparable amount at the investor level. Some harm is done, but that harm is 
minimized when the rates are identical.  
 
2.  Transition Issues. Transition issues are extremely important in any fundamental tax 
reform proposal. A new tax system will not only create future winners and losers but will also 
affect current stores of wealth. Nonetheless, a transition from a badly-implemented capital 
income tax system to a better one should minimize those issues. The relative prices of some real 
and financial capital assets may change, as effective tax rates are made more neutral, but this is 
no different than a change in cost recovery methods, or any of the other tweaks to the income tax 
that markets have absorbed. And whatever the magnitude of those changes, they will be less than 
would be true in a switch to a consumption tax. In particular, existing basis in real and financial 
assets will remain relevant under the BEIT, which is not the case in consumption tax proposals. 
Income tax reform obviously poses fewer transition issues than a switch to a consumption 
tax, but that does not mean the issues are trivial. An overnight switch to COCA, for example, 
could literally bankrupt highly leveraged companies. The Dual BEIT proposal therefore 
contemplates different transition rules for its non-COCA components (uniform entity-level 
profits tax, true consolidation principles, and a revised business asset and acquisition regime), on 
the one hand, and COCA, on the other.  
The Dual BEIT'S non-COCA rules just do not seem to work under a phase-in model and 
therefore must apply in toto as of a specified date. Since, in many respects, the rules are 
simplifications of current law, applying them immediately to operations should not cause 
irreparable harm to taxpayers. At the firm level, the COCA concept, in contrast, can be phased in 
by specifying a multiyear period over which the interest expense deduction scales down and the 
COCA deduction ramps up. The investor side is more debatable, but probably should simply be 
adopted in toto as of a specified date near the end of the business enterprise phase-in period.  
Admittedly, these suggestions would require more work, but the key thought is that, 
because the Dual BEIT remains an income tax, its transition issues should be more tractable than 
those implicit in a move to a consumption tax as the principal instrument in U.S. tax policy. 
 
B. Evaluating the Dual BEIT. 
1. In General. Parents make bad evaluators of their offspring, but I nonetheless submit 
that the Dual BEIT, as just summarized, would be a very substantial improvement over current 
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law capital income taxation, and is superior to other capital income tax proposals once those are 
sufficiently fleshed out to make a fair comparison possible. Of course, one must first accept the 
desirability of an annually-measured and collected flat tax on capital income, but that is the job 
of the companion article to this one.  
First, the Dual BEIT is comprehensive, in that it reaches all forms of business 
organizations and all forms of investments therein.  
Second, it yields consistent measures of normal returns. Unlike other comprehensive 
capital income tax proposals, the BEIT mechanism splits the taxation of returns to capital by 
taxing time value of money (normal) returns only at the investor level, while taxing profits (in 
the broadest sense – that is, including returns to risk, returns to uncertainty and rents) at the 
business enterprise level. By doing so, the BEIT mechanism sidesteps the problems that plague 
CBIT and similar comprehensive entity-only income tax proposals, all of which accurately tax 
normal returns only if they get capitalization and depreciation precisely right.  
To emphasize, the depreciation allowance in respect of real assets is fundamental to the 
measurement of net income, and getting that allowance right is not simply a question of 
determining the economic life of various real assets. More fundamentally, any income tax that 
measures net income at the enterprise level must also solve the riddle of distinguishing current 
expenses from capitalizable ones – for example, in respect of advertising expenses. An 
enterprise-level net income tax (other than an unrealistic deus ex machina solution like the 
universal mark to market of all real assets) will always be error-prone in this regard. 
Second, the BEIT mechanism seeks to reduce the realization principle to its smallest 
possible component. By taxing normal returns to investors rather than business enterprises, and 
by imputing those returns, the BEIT takes advantage of the intuition that investment assets turn 
over more rapidly than do noninventory real assets, so that the base for determining normal 
returns is closer to the economic ideal. For the same reasons, the BEIT repeals numerous 
exceptions to the recognition of income. The result is a system where reported taxable income 
tracks economic income more closely than under current law. 
Specifically, the Dual BEIT makes every gratuitous transfer, business merger or the like 
an occasion to revalue investors’ basis in the financial assets they hold, and measures Includible 
Amounts under quasi-original issue discount principles. Borrowing against appreciated securities 
also would be treated as a revaluation opportunity. As a result, the Scylla and Charybdis of 
capital income taxation (the debt-equity distinction and our fulsome reliance on the realization 
doctrine) are largely disarmed.  
Third, the Dual BEIT achieves investor-firm integration, without any of the baggage 
associated with imputation credit schemes or the like.166 The COCA mechanism accomplishes 
this without requiring that investor income turn on any aspect of firm-level tax liability. To the 
extent that investor Includible Amounts exceed firms’ aggregate COCA deductions, that is a 
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feature, not a bug: it would reflect the greater velocity of investors’ trading in securities than 
firms’ trading in their income-producing real assets (to that extent mitigating the relevance of the 
realization doctrine in the measurement of normal returns), and the fact that firms will have 
traded off COCA deductions for immediate expensing of self-developed intangibles. 
Fourth, the Dual BEIT offers a surprisingly featureless a tax topography, which 
minimizes both tax gaming and occasions of comparative unfairness. Importantly, it does not 
rely on different tax regimes for private and public firms, or for debt and equity.  
Fifth, the Dual BEIT is very parsimonious in the information it requires of investors in 
particular, and imposes no investor – firm coordination requirements at all.  
Sixth, by moving the taxation of normal returns to the investor level, the Dual BEIT fixes 
that burden on the least capital mobile taxpayers – individual investors rather than multinational 
firms. At the same time, the individual investor level is a cleaner canvas on which to calculate 
taxable normal returns, because neither depreciation nor other business tax incentives are 
relevant. 
Finally, the Dual BEIT embodies several very attractive political economy 
characteristics. Most important in this regard, the Dual BEIT will be compelling to firm 
managers: firms (and thus the managers of firms) will face a comprehensive profits tax system, 
in which normal returns to capital are exempt from tax. As a result, firms’ capital structures will 
no longer be distorted by tax considerations, mergers and acquisitions – including all-cash deals 
– will be tax-free in present value terms at the firm level, and marginal investments will bear 
zero firm-level tax. Managers thus will enter a tax land of milk and honey, in which their 
perennial pleas for a more “competitive” business tax system will have been answered. And 
while it is true that investors will in some cases face a tax liability without the receipt of cash, 
most firms can be expected to adjust their cash payout policies to address this; in return, 
investors will face capital gains tax rates of zero. 
 
2. Efficiency Considerations. Like any profits-only tax, the firm-level component of the 
Dual BEIT affords business enterprises a neutral environment along the margins of how tax 
might affect the scale of investment (its effective marginal tax rate is zero), and the capital 
structure of the firm.167 In the latter respect, the Dual BEIT, like an actual cash flow tax or other 
capital account allowance mechanisms, is superior to an ACE, because it is not at risk of 
financial legerdemain employing equity-flavored debt instruments or the like to enhance the total 
deductions available in respect of a firm’s capital. The firm-level component of the Dual BEIT 
also is efficient along the margin of the choice of form of business organization, because all 
firms are subject to the same regime.  
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When applied to multinational activities, tax systems generally face a Hobson’s choice 
between the unattainable (accurate geographic sourcing of income) and the arbitrary (for 
example, worldwide tax consolidation).168 Worldwide tax consolidation, as envisioned for the 
Dual BEIT, shares with destination based cash flow taxes the great merit of being relatively 
robust to “stateless income” planning by multinational firms.169 In both cases, the idea is that 
there are no payoffs to doing so, in the former case because the income is taxed in the residence 
country regardless, and in the latter case because only the destinations of sales drive  the 
allocation of taxing responsibilities.  
Worldwide tax consolidation, where the tax rate itself is quite moderate by world norms, 
operates more as a “territorial” tax system with a very robust floor on stateless income gaming 
than it does the assertion of taxing jurisdiction over profits arising in important market 
economies with markedly lower tax rates. Admittedly there are some exceptions to this 
observation. In particular, in the case of worldwide tax consolidation employing country-by-
country foreign tax credits, a U.S. multinational doing business in a country (Freedonia) with 
systematically higher tax rates than the U.S. rate would face incentives to use stateless income 
planning to bring its foreign tax rate in Freedonia down to the U.S. effective rate. If such 
strategies retain vitality, the worldwide system puts a hard floor on their use, because there is no 
utility in driving rates below the U.S. rate. 
Viewed from a worldwide efficiency perspective, and ruling stateless income out of the 
picture, there might appear to be a distortion along the margins of real investment (U.S. firms 
would locate investment in the lower-taxed United States rather than Freedonia).    In many cases 
this fact pattern will boil down to the case that Freedonian normal returns will be taxed by 
Freedonia, whereas the ideal in the Dual BEIT is that normal returns are not burdened at the firm 
level. The short answers are, first, that no unilateral tax system can achieve worldwide harmony, 
and, second, because Freedonian normal returns tax will be paid by all firms conducting business 
in Freedonia, that the rate logically should be reflected in (higher) Freedonian pretax returns. If 
that in fact is the case, then a U.S. firm is fully compensated by the market for the Freedonian 
tax.170 
Conversely, if Freedonia enjoys systematically lower effective tax rates on firm income 
than does the United States, then a worldwide tax consolidation system would seem to distort 
investment decisions by imposing a higher global tax rate on that income than that enjoyed by 
Freedonian competitors. This concern is misplaced, however, where, as here, the Dual BEIT is a 
profits-only tax. If there are rents to be captured in Freedonia, they will remain attractive even 
after a U.S. profits-only tax. 
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Worldwide tax consolidation admittedly places great stress on the fiction of corporate 
residence. I discuss this issue at length elsewhere in this paper and elsewhere.171 Very briefly, 
however, at least as applied to the United States today, corporate residence is rarely difficult to 
discern. The case of corporate inversions does not disprove this assertion, but rather reminds us 
of the many failings of the U.S. tax legislative process. A more appropriate definition of 
corporate residence is straightforward as a drafting matter.172 Moreover, it remains the case that 
U.S.-domiciled firms ultimately are overwhelmingly owned by U.S. persons.173 This means that 
a profits-only worldwide tax will fall predominantly on profits accruing to U.S. persons. And 
unlike a destination based cash flow tax a worldwide consolidated profits-only tax can obtain 
reasonable allocations of tax revenue collection without imagining any form of international 
cooperation. 
At the investor level, the Dual BEIT contemplates that U.S. resident investors will bear 
the full burden of the capital income tax on the normal returns to all their portfolio investments, 
wherever located. As a result, there will be no significant incremental distortion along the 
margins of their portfolio investment decisions.  Since the capital of multinational firms is 
generally held to be much more mobile than the residence of individual citizens of the United 
States, the result will be a more attractive environment for investment in the United States, and a 
reduction in the impetus to move capital out of the United States.174 
Moreover, because foreign portfolio investors in U.S. corporations will face a domestic 
profits-only tax, and no U.S. investor-level tax, those investors will enjoy the benefits of 
investing in U.S. domestic operations without facing any direct or indirect burden on normal 
returns. Other capital income tax solutions, like CBIT, that attempt to measure and impose tax on 
normal returns at the firm level, burden foreign portfolio investors.  
 
3. Incidence. There is a rich literature on the incidence of the corporate income tax.175 
This literature generally agrees that there are three possible groups of individuals on whom the 
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burden of a corporate income tax conceivably could come to rest: capital owners generally, 
labor, and consumers. Most of the literature concludes that the corporate income tax is not 
shifted to consumers, because of competition from noncorporate and foreign providers. Further, 
the literature generally agrees that, in the case of a small open economy, the burden of a 
corporate income tax imposed on a marginal investment yielding normal returns is shifted 
entirely to labor, because the effect of the tax is simply to reduce the available pool of investment 
capital until pretax yields rise sufficiently high to offer investors the required after tax rate of 
return on capital. Beyond that, consensus is more difficult to find. 
A good deal of the literature assumes away the issue when it models the corporate 
income tax as a tax on normal returns; as applied to U.S. multinational enterprises, it might be 
more accurate to think of the corporate income tax today as closer to a tax on rents (including 
“tax rents” of the sort I describe elsewhere176). In turn, there is no reason to think that a tax on 
rents is shifted to labor, because the mechanism described above, of money finding its own 
global level in after-tax normal returns through changes in country-level investment pools across 
fungible marginal business investments, by definition does not apply to profits, which are not 
fungible. Profits, and the incidence of taxes imposed on profits, are properties of capital owners. 
If in fact the incidence of the firm-level component of the Dual BEIT fell on labor, then 
the whole thrust of the project would be misplaced, because it would simply do indirectly what 
could be accomplished directly through fine-tuning a labor income tax. But because the firm-
level Dual BEIT is a tax on profits, not normal returns, its incidence should fall on the owners of 
capital, and in particular on the historic owners of the firms generating such rents.177 Moreover, 
as applied to the United States, there are persuasive arguments that the U.S. economy does not 
behave like a small open economy. Economists generally agree that in a simple model of a small 
open economy, looking at a firm earning marginal returns, the incidence of a corporate income 
tax would fall on labor rather than capital, but empirical evidence, particularly relating to the 
operation of the U.S. economy within the larger global economy, point to the conclusion that 
capital owners in fact bear the great preponderance of the burden of the U.S. corporate income 
tax. This conclusion is made more forceful in the case of any profits tax, including the Dual 
BEIT, because by definition rents are a property of capital ownership that capital owners do not 
share with labor.178  
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As a result, the incidence of the Dual BEIT should fall predominantly on owners of 
domestic capital (the investors in financial claims against firms), because firms themselves face a 
zero effective marginal tax rate on new investments yielding normal returns. In turn, the 
investor-level tax on Includible Amounts is in economic substance close to (but a constitutional 
whisker away from) a periodic tax on domestic owners of capital, and as such the incidence 
should fall on those domestic capital owners (the investors in financial claims against firms). 
Like any tax on savings, the Dual BEIT conceivably may affect the quantum total savings by 
domestic owners of capital, depending on competing income and substitution effects, but an 
individual level tax of this sort does not necessarily create a capital vacuum for investments in 
attractive U.S. business opportunities, because foreign investors (to whom the income inclusion 
rules would not apply) will make up any shortfall in domestic savings.179  
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